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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Energy Systems at the International 
Hellenic University. It summarizes the energy policy of the European Union and the renewable 
energy penetration progress. 
The introduction helps us understand the importance of the policies and how challenging is 
the task to swift from a fossil fuel-based energy mix to renewable energy-based one. The 
second chapter summarizes the most important implemented energy policies classified into 
eight broad categories. It gives an overall picture of the EU’s energy policy and the framework 
of the Renewable Energy penetration development. In the third chapter the progress of 
renewable energy penetration in the EU is presented through statistics and graphs, showing 
the effects of implemented policies. Finally, in the fourth chapter, an elementary approach of 
the future penetration of renewable energy in the final energy mix is presented. After the 
implementation and comparison of five regression specifications, the one selected was used 
for long-run forecast up to 2020. 
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1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The EU and the world are at a cross-road concerning the future of energy. Climate change, 
increasing dependence on oil and other fossil fuel, growing imports, and rising energy costs 
are making our societies and economies vulnerable. These challenges call for a 
comprehensive and ambitious response. 
In the complex picture of energy policy, the renewable energy sector is the one energy sector 
which stands out in terms of ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and pollution, exploit 
local and decentralized energy sources, and stimulate world-class high-tech industries. The 
EU has compelling reasons for setting up an enabling framework to promote renewables. 
They are largely indigenous, they do not rely on uncertain projections on the future availability 
of fuels, and their predominantly decentralized nature makes our societies less vulnerable. It 
is thus undisputed that renewable energies constitute a key element of a sustainable future. 
Significant developments have taken place in European energy policy since 2000, driven by 
increasing concern about global warming, and the effect of rapidly increasing energy prices on 
competitiveness and security of supply in EU. The European Commission has risen to the 
challenges, proposing a range of policies to address them. While there have been concerns, 
for example by some member states regarding some of the policies, overall the proposals by 
the European Commission are sound. They correctly reflect the energy challenges faced by 
the world today, and their implementation will bring global benefits. 
In particular, the Commission’s goals in the field of energy and environment are highly 
ambitious, but pursuing them will be necessary not only to ensure the EU contribution to the 
mitigation of climate change, but also to send a global signal that meaningful action can and 
ought to be taken now. To ensure that the very ambitious targets are being achieved in a 
balanced manner, it will be necessary to ensure regular reviews and constant tracking of the 
implementation of the whole policy package. 
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1.1. A World Energy Review 
 
As is evident from the Figure 1.1 the total energy consumption increases at a rate of 2,28% 
annually over the last 25 years. Pace has accelerated after 2002 mainly due to the high 
growth rate of the Chinese economy. 2009 was the only year in recent history that negative 
growth was observed but in 2010 rebounded strongly with an increase of 5,6%, the largest 
increase in percentage since 1973. Chinese energy consumption grew by 11,2%, and China 
surpassed the US as the world’s largest energy consumer with a global energy share of 
20,3%. Energy consumption grew by 6,7% in Japan, 4% in Europe and 3,7% in the United 
States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. World primary energy consumption by fuel (Mtoe) [6]. 
All forms of energy grew strongly, with growth in fossil fuels suggesting that global CO2 
emissions (Figure 1.2) from energy use grew at the fastest rate since 1969 and we can 
estimate that fossil fuels still account about 80% of the global fuel mix. 
Oil remains the world’s leading fuel, at 33,6% of global energy consumption, but it continued 
to lose market share for the 11th consecutive year. After falling for two consecutive years, 
global oil consumption grew by 2,7 million barrels per day (b/d), or 3,1%, to reach a record 
level of 87,4 million b/d. This was the largest percentage increase since 2004 but still the 
weakest global growth rate among fossil fuels. 
World natural gas consumption grew by 7,4%, the most rapid increase since 1984. 
Consumption growth was above average in all regions except the Middle East. The US had 
the world’s largest increase in consumption (in volumetric terms), rising by 5,6% and to a new 
record high. Russia and China also registered large increases – the largest volumetric 
increases in the country’s history in each case. Consumption in other Asian countries also 
grew rapidly (+10,7%), led by a 21,5% increase in India. 
Coal consumption grew by 7,6% in 2010, the fastest global growth since 2003. Coal now 
accounts for 29,6% of global energy consumption, up from 25,6% 10 years ago. Chinese 
consumption grew by 10,1%; China last year consumed 48,2% of the world’s coal and 
accounted for nearly two-thirds of global consumption growth. But consumption growth was 
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robust elsewhere as well: OECD consumption grew by 5,2%, the strongest growth since 1979, 
with strong growth in all regions. 
Global hydroelectric and nuclear output each saw the strongest increases since 2004. 
Hydroelectric output grew by 5,3%, with China accounting for more than 60% of global growth 
due to a combination of new capacity and wet weather. Worldwide nuclear output grew by 2%, 
with three-quarters of the increase coming from OECD countries. French nuclear output rose 
by 4,4%, accounting for the largest volumetric increase in the world. 
Other renewable energy sources continued to grow rapidly. Global biofuels production in 2010 
grew by 13,8% constituting one of the largest sources of liquids production growth in the 
world. RE used in power generation grew by 15,5%, driven by continued robust growth in wind 
energy (+22,7%). The increase in wind energy in turn was driven by China and the US, which 
together accounted for nearly 70% of global growth. These forms of RE accounted for 1,8% of 
global energy consumption, up from 0,6% in 2000 [6]. 
Consistent with the surge in energy consumption, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 
boomed by 6% in 2010 and exceeded their 2009 levels by 30%. 
Emissions from OECD countries represented 41% of the world emissions, but increased at a 
slower pace than the world average (3,8%). In the United States, emissions rose faster than in 
Europe (4% vs. around 3% on average in Europe), while Japan experienced a surge in its 
emissions (+7,6%) after a severe drop in 2009. In 2010, US emissions are 12% above their 
1990 levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (reference approach). 
Data Source: [7] 
In Asia, CO2 emissions grew dramatically due to economic growth and the fossil-based energy 
mix. China, the world’s largest emitter (35% more than the US), posted a 6,7% increase in its 
emissions and has a growing share of world emissions (25% in 2010). CO2 emissions also 
increased sharply in other large emitters among emerging countries, such as India (+5%) and 
Russia (+11%). 
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Energy consumption mix is different around the world (Figure 1.3). It varies greatly depending 
on the primary energy reserves available in each region as well as political decisions on the 
use of nuclear energy. China’s growth is fuelled by coal in the extraordinary percentage of 
about 70% while Middle East uses its own oil and natural gas. By far the best diversified fuel 
mix is that of the EU and all its energy policies aim at much greater improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Primary energy consumption mix for 2010. 
Data Source: [6] 
Economic recovery has led to an increase in total energy consumption per unit of GDP 
(energy intensity), for the first time in more than 20 years (+ 0,5%), thanks to more developed 
countries (Figure 1.4). The highest increase in energy intensity was in the European Union 
(+2,5% compared to -1,7% on average before the crisis). This poor performance was mainly 
due to the industrial sector, where energy consumption did not decrease at the same pace as 
the value added. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Energy intensity of GDP at purchasing power parities. 
Data Source: [7] 
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Energy intensity differs depending on world regions. It is three times higher in CIS than in 
European countries. India is on a par with world average, with energy intensity levels 60% 
higher than in Europe. High energy intensity in the CIS, Middle East, China and other Asian 
developing countries is mainly explained by the predominance of energy-intensive industries 
and low energy prices. 
However what we have mentioned up to now are mere numbers and technical terminology 
that shows only one dimension of energy. Energy is not just fuels, power plants and the end-
use technologies. Energy has socio-economic dimensions and also fits into a broader social 
context. It is important to recognize the major economic and social trends occurring worldwide 
such as increasing globalization, urbanization, population growth, energy sector privatization 
and rapid technological innovation [1]. All of these trends influence energy strategies and 
policies and should be taken into account by policymakers. 
Increasing Globalization. Although globalization is not benefiting all nations and regions, it is 
a fact that trade barriers are falling and world trade is growing. The global economy is 
becoming more integrated trough mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, the 
telecommunication revolutions and the expansion of multinational companies. Multinational 
companies are playing an increasing role in fossil fuel production and distribution, ownership 
of gas and electric utilities and manufacturing RE technologies. As companies and markets 
become increasingly international so too policy interventions through coordinated action and 
policy harmonization. 
Restructuring & Privatization. Many nations are privatizing formerly government-owned 
utilities, petroleum and natural gas companies and other institutions. This is being done 
ostensibly to reduce inefficiency and attract private capital to the energy sector. At the same 
time efforts are being made to increase the transparency of policymaking, reduce government 
subsidies and liberalization of energy markets. Successful policies must engage the private 
sector and catalyze private investment in the desired technologies on a large scale. However 
restructuring and privatization do not guarantee that investments in new energy supplies will 
occur, that efficiency and energy services will be improved or that costs will be reduced. 
Power shortages and cost increases, for example, have occurred in developing countries such 
as Brazil and India following electric sector restructuring and privatization. 
Rapid Technological Innovation. Technological innovation is accelerating and affecting 
every sector of our daily life. Penetration of these end-use technologies affects energy use 
both directly, through improved appliance and process controls and the use of electricity by 
electronic devices, and indirectly trough structural changes that save energy. Rapid 
technological evolution is also occurring in energy sector (production, conversion and end-
use). However the scope of these innovations is not equally shared with a growing technology 
gap between rich and poor nations, as well as between richer and poorer segments of some 
nations. 
Urbanization. The rapid urbanization of the world’s population over the twentieth century is 
described in the 2005 Revision of the UN World Urbanization Prospects report. The global 
proportion of urban population rose dramatically from 13% (220 million) in 1900, to 29% (732 
million) in 1950, to 49% (3,2 billion) in 2005. The same report projected that the figure is likely 
to rise to 60% (4,9 billion) by 2030. 
The proliferation of giant cities like Tokyo, Seoul, Mexico City, New York, Mumbai etc. 
presents special challenges related to transport, air quality, provision of basic services and 
employment. As urbanization accelerates, energy use in urban areas increases rapidly. On 
the other hand urbanization can facilitate the dissemination of new energy technologies and 
presents the opportunity to design more efficient and sustainable habitats and transport 
systems as cities expand. 
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Population Growth & Standards of Living. For several years population has been 
increasing faster than many vital non renewable and renewable resources. This means that 
the amount of these resources per person is declining in spite of the contribution of modern 
technology. World population at the start of 2010 was over 6,8 billion people. It has doubled in 
the past 45 years and it is increasing by over 140 people every minute [8]. While populations 
of some industrialized countries have stabilized, over 3 billion people live or struggle to exist in 
countries where population is still growing rapidly with doubling times of less than thirty years. 
Another issue that comes up with this growth is the quality of life which is high in the 
developed countries and low in developing ones. Since the developing countries like India and 
China wants to reach the standards of living of the developed world this means that energy 
policies must be sophisticated enough to provide practical solutions for a sustainable future. 
 
 
1.2. Sustainability 
 
Sustainable energy development should provide adequate energy services for satisfying basic 
human needs, improving social welfare and achieving economic development throughout the 
world while it does not endanger the quality of life of both current and future generations and 
does not threaten critical ecosystems (definition according to H. Rogner and A. Popescu). 
So, as discussed in previous paragraphs, current energy sources and patterns of energy use 
are unsustainable. Continuing to consume even greater amounts of fossil fuels will cause too 
much damage to the environment, risk unprecedented climate change and rapidly deplete 
petroleum resources. Current trends in energy supply and demand will also exacerbate 
inequity and tensions among nations, tensions that fuel regional conflict and outbursts. A high 
growth, fossil fuel-intensive energy future presents a variety of problems and challenges for 
humanity. These problems and challenges are the answer to the question why we need 
Renewable Energy Sources (RES) [4]: 
• Climate Change 
In the debate over climate change and its origin three facts seem incontrovertible: 
i) the earth’s climate is changing and generally warming 
ii) the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen steadily since the Industrial 
Revolution when fossil fuels started to be burned in large quantities and 
iii) CO2 is a greenhouse gas that absorbs infrared radiation reflected from the ground 
and prevents it escape into space. Most authorities link these three facts and 
conclude that CO2 derived from fossil fuels is largely responsible for the observed 
global warming. 
The factors that control climate are very complex and only partly understood. CO2 is released 
in vast quantities from natural processes and balanced by a similar quantity taken up by 
photosynthesis and re-absorption in the oceans. By comparison anthropogenic releases of 
CO2 from combustion processes are small. With extensive deforestation taking place, 
however, one of the principal sinks for CO2 is being removed and this is compounding the 
effect of burning fossil fuels. Independent analyses have shown a net increase in atmospheric 
carbon. Carbon dioxide (GWP=1) is not the only greenhouse gas. There are others like 
Nitrous oxide with GWP of 310, Methane with GWP of 21, HFCs with GWP of 100-3.000, 
PFCs with GWP of 5.000-10.000 and Sulfur hexafluoride with GWP of 23.000. 
Despite the complications arising from natural phenomena, the evidence that greenhouse 
gases are largely responsible for climate change is growing even stronger. The global 
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temperature is increasing while data that demonstrate the concentration of CO2 in air has 
increased from ~270ppm before the Industrial Revolution to 393ppm today (June 2011) [3]. A 
recent conference of climate scientists concluded that the world should be aiming to keep the 
concentration of CO2 below 400ppm to avoid serious climatic consequences and potential 
long term problems that would lead to catastrophic positive feedbacks. Its concentration is 
predicted to rise to 700ppm or even higher by the end of this century with clearly catastrophic 
consequences. 
The first tentative steps to combat global warming were taken at the UNFCCC that was held in 
Kyoto in December 1997. The resulting Kyoto Protocol called for the industrialized nations to 
reduce their emissions by at least 5% below baseline 1990 levels by 2008-12 and got into 
force in February 2005. Obviously is too early to gauge the extent to which the Kyoto Protocol 
may be proved to be successful but it should be acknowledged that the initiative is only a first 
small step towards carbon free energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Kyoto Protocol participation map 2010 (Green-countries that have ratified the treaty; Dark green-Annex 
I and II countries that have ratified; Grey-not yet decided; Brown-no intention of ratifying) [18]. 
• Atmospheric Pollution 
Since the 1960s there has been a marked increase in road traffic worldwide. At first this gave 
rise to serious air pollution called photochemical smog, especially in sunny climates where 
photochemical reactions among the automotive exhaust gases led to the formation of this kind 
of smog. Cities like Los Angeles, Athens and Tokyo experienced this severe pollution. This 
problem was partially solved with catalytic converters and over the years legislation on the 
transport sector has almost solved it. 
Except road vehicles, ships and trains are subject to less legislation and frequently emit visible 
plumes of particulate pollution along with gases. Industries that are heavy users of energy and 
therefore potential polluters are iron and steel, cement manufacture, paper and board and 
especially power station. Coal burning power stations emit sulfur dioxide, which arises from 
the sulfur contained in the coal, and also nitrogen oxides produced during combustion. It is 
these gases that give rise to acid rain which is detrimental to the natural habitat. Technologies 
exist for the suppression of these acid gases but are not yet universally employed. In some 
countries power stations are licensed as to the quantity of the sulfur dioxide that they may 
discharge which encourages them to burn low sulfur coal. 
The march of technology has made major inroads into solving the problems of air pollution in 
the more advanced countries while the legislation is often less strict and power station 
technology less sophisticated in developing nations. Nevertheless modern technology will be 
employed as these countries’ economies become more affluent. Although air pollution is not 
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nearly as severe a problem as it once was, a transition to RE use would improve matters 
further [4]. 
• Inequity 
Energy consumption, like income, is distributed very inequitably around the world. Per capita 
energy consumption of commercial fuels and electricity is growing more rapidly in developing 
countries but the OECD nations still consume many times more commercial energy per capita 
than developing nations. There are also substantial disparities in energy use within countries, 
both in industrialized and developing, with wealthier households to consume much more 
energy than poorer households. 
In 2009 more than 1,4 billion people globally lacked access to electricity, 85% of them in rural 
areas, and the number of people relying on traditional biomass for cooking was estimated to 
be around 2,7 billion. Given this inequitable distribution of commercial energy consumption, it 
is not surprising that greenhouse gas emissions and contribution to global warming are highly 
skewed as well [9]. 
• Source Depletion & Security of Supply 
The total primary energy consumption throughout the world has increased from about 6.000 
Mtoe in 1973 to more than 12.000 Mtoe in 2011, a 100% rise in 37 years and is projected by 
the IEA to reach 16.500 Mtoe by 2030. This increase is a result of growth in world population 
and a general rise in prosperity. There is a well established link between the GDP of a nation 
and its energy consumption, although nations are now trying hard to break this link. 
In looking ahead to 2030, it is predicted that the percentage of the world energy market 
supplied by fossil fuels will not change greatly compared with today’s supply. So, gas will rise, 
coal and oil will decline slightly and nuclear will fall as old nuclear stations are retired and not 
replaced. 
Many geologists and petroleum engineers are of the opinion that the earth’s ultimate reserves 
of petroleum are around 2*1012 barrels, of which over 40% has been used already. The 
concept of reserves is open to debate and some authorities opt for 3*1012 barrels. 
Nevertheless, it is claimed that over 90% of the available oil has been discovered and 
mapped. Some important oil producing regions (e.g. USA, North Sea) have passed their peak 
production rates and are in decline while others are expected to peak within 10 years. 
Moreover the rate at which oil is being pumped greatly exceeds the rate at which new 
reserves are found. Even when new oilfields have been identified, substantial investment of 
time and money is required, particularly off shore in deep water with high risk for accidents 
and oil spills [4]. 
It is important to distinguish between reserves in place and excess production capacity 
available at short notice. Among the major producing countries, only Saudi Arabia has excess 
capacity that could be brought into use quickly. Elsewhere the exploitation of fresh reserves 
will require substantial investment and concerns has been expressed that the necessary 
capital may not be available. If these developments are not serious enough an even more 
alarming fact is that over 60% of conventional oil is concentrated in just five Middle Eastern 
countries: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. New oil fields will no 
doubt be discovered but are unlikely to compare in size with those of Middle East and will not 
change significantly the overall picture. 
The requirement for petroleum will doubtless intensify as developing countries aspire to 
Western style mobility. Present indications suggest that there will be growing competition for 
oil-not in the distant future but within the next two decades when world production peaks and 
starts to decline. This has been dubbed “The Big Rollover”. From that point on there will be oil 
shortages and a new political dynamic in which countries compete for limited supplies. Unless 
there is a widespread acceptance of this disturbing prospect and an urgent response, just five 
Arab countries with probably Canada and Venezuela will effectively control the supply of 
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petroleum. Among oil-importing nations, notably USA, Japan and EU, there is a real cause for 
concern over adequate supplies will be available. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Energy imports as the share of total primary energy consumption (%) for coal (hard coal & lignite), 
crude oil and natural gas in 2008. Negative values denote net exporters of energy carriers [2]. 
It is difficult to guess what the response will be from the oil-rich countries to this developing 
situation. They may decide to restrict production for political reasons, to extend the life of their 
reserves or to force up the price of oil products. Rather than falling back to lower levels it is 
widely forecast that, in the medium term, oil prices will continue to spiral upwards. So, for all 
these reasons countries strive to be self sufficient in energy and tend to favor the use of any 
indigenous resources that they may have. 
A sustainable energy future is possible through much greater energy efficiency and much 
greater reliance on RES compared to current energy patterns and trends. Greater energy 
efficiency would reduce growth in energy consumption, decrease investment requirements 
and improve energy services in poorer households and nations. Shifting from fossil fuels to 
RES in the coming decades would address all the problems associated with a business as 
usual energy future. 
 
 
1.3. Barriers to RE Use 
 
According to many studies RES could provide all of the energy consumed in the world. The 
theoretical potential of RE is much greater than all of the energy that is used by all the 
economies on Earth. The challenge is to capture it and utilize it to provide desired energy 
services in a cost-effective manner. Compared, for example, with the worldwide primary 
energy supply of 2008 (492 Ej, IEA 2010), bioenergy could provide 3,1 times more, 
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hydropower 0,3, ocean energy 15, wind energy 12, solar energy 7.900 and geothermal energy 
2,8 times more [2]. 
The question that comes up is that, since RES can be the sustainable solution of the world’s 
energy problem why their penetration is at such a low level. 
A wide range of barriers limit the introduction and deployment of RE technologies throughout 
the world. The significance of the different barriers varies among sectors, institutions and 
regions. Some of the barriers will shrink as energy efficiency and RE technologies (see 
Appendix A1) advance and gain market share, but others are likely to persist unless directly 
confronted through policy interventions. 
Some are technical in nature, some related to human behavior, others are due to flaws in the 
ways markets operate and others related to public policies and institutions. Taken as a whole 
these barriers are inhibiting the transition to a more sustainable energy future. It is important 
to understand the nature and scope of these barriers before considering the policies and 
programs for removing or overcoming them. 
Limited Supply Infrastructure 
The physical system for transporting energy from where it is produced to where it used is often 
unable to integrate sources of renewable energy for which it was not originally designed. 
Much of the world's electricity systems were not designed around harvesting renewable 
energy resources such as solar or wind, and often significant investments in modernization 
and expansion of the available infrastructure are necessary to connect these new resources. 
For example, for low penetration levels (up to 20%) of wind power in a system, system 
operation will hardly be affected. The established control methods and system reserves 
available for dealing with variable demand and supply are more than adequate for dealing with 
the additional variability at wind energy penetration, depending on the nature of a specific 
system. For higher penetration levels, some changes to systems and their method of 
operation may be required to accommodate the further integration of wind energy, but as 
mentioned before this means capital intensive investments. 
Although production of RE technologies is increasing rapidly, it is still not large enough to 
achieve significant economies of scale and drive down production costs. With limited 
production and sales, marketing and transaction costs can be high and as long as prices are 
high, demand will remain limited. Also RE technologies can be costly in countries where they 
are not yet manufactured relative to locally produced energy sources. 
Small scale RE technologies such as solar heating and electricity systems or larger scale wind 
and biomass conversion technologies may not be available in some countries. The demand 
for RE technologies may be too low or too diffuse to justify local production, import or 
marketing. This creates a vicious cycle –private firms are reluctant to enter the RE business in 
new regions where the technology is not yet established and the market never gets 
established without the presence of equipment suppliers. 
Quality Problems 
It is important to select systems of adequate quality and systems that are following a defined 
standard. They must be long lasting, user friendly and repairable by local technicians. Also the 
warranty of components and overall system must be considered. Standards don’t always exist 
for system components something that has led to significant variation in quality between 
apparently similar devices with a major impact on the energy output. 
Energy quality issues also come from the nature of the RES. The output of a PV system for 
example depends on the solar intensity and cloud cover which means that it depends on 
weather conditions, time of the day and day of the year. In the same way the inconstant wind 
speed and direction affects the output of a wind turbine. 
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The impacts of the above mentioned quality problems can be voltage dips and swells, short or 
long interruptions, harmonics, surges and transients, flicker, unbalance and EMC problems. 
So we end up having important wastage costs due to poor power quality. 
Insufficient Information & Training 
Smooth market function requires low-cost access to good information and the requisite skills 
for all concerned. However, in specific markets, skilled personnel who can install, operate and 
maintain RE technologies may not exist in large numbers. Project developers may lack 
sufficient technical, financial and business development skills. Consumers, managers, 
engineers, architects, lenders or planners may lack information about RE technology 
characteristics, economic and financial costs and benefits, geographical resources, operating 
experience, maintenance requirements, sources of finance and installation services. The lack 
of skills and information may increase perceived uncertainties and interfere with decision 
making. 
Lack of Money or Financing 
Renewables developers and customers may have difficulty obtaining financing at rates as low 
as may be available for conventional energy facilities. In addition to having higher transaction 
costs, financial institutions are generally unfamiliar with the new technologies and likely to 
perceive them as risky, so that they may lend money at higher rates. High financing costs are 
especially significant to the competitive position of renewables, since renewables generally 
require higher initial investments than fossil fuel plants, even though they have lower 
operating costs. A study by the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory found that financing costs can 
greatly affect the price and competitiveness of wind energy, since most of the cost is in capital 
and little is in operation. The access to credit is especially problematic in rural areas of 
developing countries where poorer households lack acceptable collateral. 
Pricing & Tax Barriers 
RE measures can be disadvantaged if the price for conventional energy sources is subsidized 
or structured so that it is not based on actual costs. Energy prices rarely reflect the full costs to 
society associated with conventional energy production and use, including social and 
environmental costs. Likewise buyback rates offered by utilities may not reflect all the benefits 
of renewables-for example the value of supply diversification, increased system reliability, 
peak demand reduction etc. These pricing distortions make it difficult for RES to compete with 
conventional energy sources. 
Tax policies can discourage the adoption of capital intensive renewable technologies. This is 
the case when businesses are allowed to deduct fuel purchases from revenues when 
calculating income taxes but must depreciate RE devices over many years. Some countries 
subject imported RE technologies or components such as PV cells and wind turbines to high 
import duties, thereby driving up their cost. Also renewables can be discouraged by the tax 
breaks such as “depletion allowances” provided to conventional fossil energy resources. 
Legal & Regulatory Barriers 
In many countries, power utilities still control a monopoly on electricity production and 
distribution. In the absence of a legal framework, independent power producers may not be 
able to invest in RE facilities and sell power to the utility or to third parties under so called 
‘power purchase agreements’. Utilities may negotiate power purchase agreements on an 
individual ad hoc basis, making it difficult for project developers to plan and finance projects 
on the basis of known and consistent rules. Also utilities may not allow favorable transmission 
access to RE producers, or may charge high prices for transmission access. Transmission 
access is necessary because some RE resources, like windy sites and biomass fuels, may be 
located far from population centers. Transmission or distribution access is also necessary for 
direct third-party sales between the RE producer and a final consumer. New transmission 
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access to remote RE sites may be blocked by transmission access rulings or right of way 
disputes. 
Restrictions on siting and construction are also common. Wind turbines, rooftop solar hot 
water heaters, PV installations and biomass combustion facilities may all encounter building 
restrictions based upon height, aesthetics, noise or safety, particularly in urban areas. Wind 
turbines have faced specific environmental concerns related to siting along migratory bird 
paths and coastal areas. Urban planning departments or building inspectors may be unfamiliar 
with RE technologies and may not have established procedures for dealing with siting and 
permitting. Competition for land use with agricultural, recreational, scenic or development 
interests can also occur. 
Political Obstacles 
Many governments favor conventional fossil fuel sources and electric generation technologies 
over RE technologies due to tradition, familiarity, the size, economic strength and political 
clout of the conventional energy industries. In the case of developing countries other key 
institutions such as multilateral development banks have resisted lending for RE projects due 
to their small size, complexity, high perceived risk, and other factors. 
Vested interests can exert pressure in the political arena to block the adoption of policies 
favorable to RES. Electric utilities, fossil fuel producers and vendors of conventional energy 
technologies often oppose financial incentives or market reserves for renewables. 
In the US for example, most electric utilities oppose market reserves for renewable electricity 
and are preventing the adoption of such reserves in many states. Also oil companies oppose 
and are preventing the adoption of market reserves for renewable based fuels. RE industries 
are relatively immature and much less influential in the political arena than conventional 
energy suppliers. 
Public Reception 
Despite the fact that the great majority of people support the RE technologies, many of them 
are opposed to their installation when it comes for their region, making the RE project 
developers face the so called Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) problem. The most common fears 
that the locals provide are the visual impact, noise nuisance and interference in 
electromagnetic waves. They believe that these impacts will drive down their property values 
and will have a negative effect on tourism. However surveys show that these fears get 
eliminated as the years passing by and everyone gets more and more familiar with the RE 
technologies. 
Some of the barriers listed above inhibit off-grid applications while others apply more to grid 
connected. Also we all understand that for some countries they might seem minor problems 
that can be faced while in poor and developing ones might take years to be overcome. 
However without targeted policy initiatives to overcome these barriers, RES in all likelihood 
will remain niche technologies that contribute relatively little to worldwide energy supply in the 
next few decades. 
 
 
1.4. Policy Options 
 
In order to overcome the previously mentioned barriers we need to implement different types 
of policies by also having in mind the economic and social context of energy. The policy 
initiatives are needed to increase the availability and deployment of renewable energy use 
and can be grouped into the following 13 categories: 
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Research Development & Demonstration. Government or private funded RD&D can be 
an important policy for advancing energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. 
RD&D tends to be more effective when it involves collaboration between research institutes 
and the private sector, when it is coordinated with other policies such as financial incentives, 
market reserves or regulations and when it focuses on a broad range of designs. RD&D on 
clean energy technologies merits expansion. In addition, greater international collaboration in 
RD&D on clean energy technologies, including collaboration between industrialized and 
developing nations, could provide a number of benefits including cost and risk sharing, more 
rapid learning and faster deployment of clean energy technologies worldwide. 
Financing. Financing can help increase the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable 
energy technologies, especially in developing countries. Financing schemes should be 
designed to support energy efficiency and renewable energy businesses, minimize transaction 
cost, support high quality products and work through established financing channels such as 
commercial banks. Financing without subsidies can be a viable long-term policy, but lower 
income groups in all likelihood will need subsidies to afford clean energy technology. 
Financing is most effective in combination with other policies such as financial incentives and 
the creation of marketing, delivery and service infrastructure. 
Financial Incentives. Financial incentives provided by governments or utilities can be an 
effective tool for stimulating the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
technologies. Incentives should reward energy savings or renewable energy output rather 
than reward investment, be sustained over many years in order to build up markets and drive 
down costs and phase out gradually as costs drop and other barriers are removed. Financial 
incentives can also be used to stimulate commercialization and initial markets for innovative 
technologies. In designing incentive programs for developing countries, it is important to 
support rather than hinder local manufacturing and marketing of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy measures. 
Pricing. Taxing fossil fuels based on their social and environmental costs can increase 
energy efficiency, reduce energy consumption and encourage introduction of renewable 
energy sources. Taxing the carbon content of fossil fuels can be an effective policy if the tax is 
large enough and a portion of the revenues is used for incentives for energy efficiency and 
renewable technologies. It is also important to reduce or eliminate subsidies on conventional 
energy sources in ways that don’t harm low income consumers. Paying avoided costs or retail 
prices for renewable energy or cogenerate power supply to the electric grid can support the 
adoption of these technologies. Finally, differential taxes based on the relative energy 
efficiency of different products or activities is a promising but underutilized energy policy. 
Voluntary Agreements. Voluntary agreements between government and the private sector 
can be an effective policy in RES deployment and increasing energy efficiency. Voluntary 
agreements tent to work best when industries fear they will face taxes or regulations if 
meaningful energy efficiency and use targets are not established and met, when thorough 
monitoring and evaluation take place and when companies that achieve significant results are 
recognized. 
Regulations. Regulations can have the form of laws or codes & standards set in order to 
provide a framework which will help towards a target. This target can be RE use, energy 
efficiency measures, mitigation of environmental impacts of energy use etc. Regulatory 
oversight on the energy sector not only shows the way but also protects and manages the 
interests of all stakeholders with an aim to safe and sustainable growth of the sector. Also 
regulations are adapted and get improved all the time in order to fulfill their target more 
accurately and quickly. 
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Information Dissemination & Training. Information and training can help address some 
of the barriers limiting the adoption of RES. Training can be valuable for ensuring that RE 
technologies are installed and used properly. Information dissemination and promotion can 
increase the awareness and adoption of RE measures. They tend to be more effective when 
they are targeted to decision makers at time that technologies enter the market and when 
combined with other policies such as financing incentives and regulations. 
Procurement. Government led procurement can help to commercialize and build markets 
for innovative energy efficiency and RE technologies. It has been used mainly for energy 
efficiency measures so far but gradually governments purchase significant amounts of RE 
technologies and green power. Government procurement should be carried out in ways that 
support the development of viable markets for these technologies over the long run. 
Market Reforms. Utility sector privatization and increased competition can lead to efficiency 
improvements and emissions reduction in the supply of electricity. Utility sector restructuring 
can advance end-use energy efficiency, RE development and increased access to electricity 
supply with specific policies adopted to address these needs. Such policies include RE 
obligations, encouraging marketing of green power, rate discounts for low income households 
and small surcharges on retail electricity service to fund clean energy activities. In addition 
interconnection and cooperation among energy markets of different countries are two 
promising strategies to provide better services and improve the security of supply. 
Market Obligations. Market obligations can result in substantial acquisition of RES or 
energy efficiency measures. In particular renewable portfolio standards are expanding 
renewable energy implementation in the electricity sector in countries around the world. RE 
acquisition is done on a competitive basis, thereby driving down the cost of renewable 
electricity sources. Market obligations can also be used to stimulate the development and 
commercialization of innovative vehicle technologies or renewable fuels. Likewise emissions 
cap and trading schemes can help to stimulate energy efficiency improvements and RE 
development if these policies are carefully designed. 
Capacity Building. Capacity building is critical for implementing clean energy technologies 
on a large scale. All countries need energy efficiency and RE centers and programs at 
national and local levels. Capacity building is also needed to staff and train private companies 
that manufacture, market and trade these technologies. Capacity building should be given 
greater priority in energy assistance projects for developing and transition countries. 
Planning Techniques. Careful energy and transportation planning can help nations, 
regions and cities move towards a more sustainable future. Integrated resource planning 
helps to define the optimal set of demand side and supply side investments for meeting future 
energy service needs. It can include environmental considerations and it usually leads to 
increased energy efficiency and RE use measures. Integrated land use and transport planning 
helps to expand public transportation systems, locate new housing and commercial 
development near public transport facilities and reduce urban sprawl. Doing so can cut fuel 
use and provide other benefits. 
Supporting Tools. Supporting tools are not exactly policy options but they play a major role 
in the policy implementation. Supporting tools can be programs or entities established in order 
to supervise the progress of implemented policies and help all the stakeholders involved in the 
energy market. This can be done through coordination of efforts or/and financial support 
provided with an aim to assure a sustainable sector growth and a smooth transition towards 
new circumstances. 
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In recent years an increasing number and variety of RE policies have driven substantial 
growth in RE technologies something that has led to significant rise in the level of investment 
since 2004/5. 
Until the early 1990s, few countries had enacted policies to promote RE. Since then, and 
particularly since the early-to mid-2000s, policies have begun to emerge in a growing number 
of countries at the municipal, state/provincial and national levels, as well as internationally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7. Countries with at least one RE target and/or at least one RE-specific policy. This figure includes only 
national-level targets and policies (not municipal or state/provincial) and is not necessarily all-inclusive [2]. 
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Initially, most policies adopted were in developed countries, but an increasing number of 
developing countries have enacted policy frameworks at various levels of government to 
promote RE since the late 1990s and early 2000s. Of those countries with RE electricity 
policies by early 2010, approximately half were developing countries from every region of the 
world. 
Most countries with RE policies have more than one type of mechanism in place, and many 
existing policies and targets have been strengthened over time. Beyond national policies, the 
number of international policies and partnerships is increasing. Several hundred city and local 
governments around the world have also established goals or enacted renewable promotion 
policies and other mechanisms to spur local RE deployment. 
The focus of RE policies is shifting from a concentration almost entirely on electricity to include 
the heating/cooling and transportation sectors. These trends are matched by increasing 
success in the development of a range of RE technologies and their manufacture and 
implementation as well as by a rapid increase in annual investment in RE and a diversification 
of financing institutions, particularly since 2004/5. 
According to The Global Trends in RE Investment 2011 report which was prepared for the UN 
by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, global investment in renewable energy sources grew by 
32% during 2010 to reach a record level of US$211bn (see Appendix A2). The main growth 
drivers were backing for wind farms in China and rooftop solar panels in Europe. Also 
developing nations invested more in green power than rich nations for the first time last year. 
 
 
1.5. The Role of Policies 
 
The success of policy instruments is determined by how well they are able to achieve various 
objectives or criteria. The main criteria are [2]: 
Effectiveness: the extent to which intended objectives are met, for instance the actual 
increase in the amount of RE electricity generated or share of RE in total energy supply within 
a specified time period. 
Beyond quantitative targets, factors may include achieved degrees of technological diversity 
(promotion of different RE technologies), which is considered a crucial factor for dynamic 
effectiveness (long-term sustained growth that enables innovation and the development of a 
manufacturing base), or of spatial diversity (geographical distribution of RE supplies). 
Efficiency: the ratio of outcomes to inputs, or RE targets realized on economic resources 
spent, mostly measured at one point in time (static efficiency); also called cost effectiveness. 
Dynamic efficiency adds a future time dimension by including how much technology 
development and innovation is triggered by the policy instrument. Reducing the risks to 
investors is crucial for minimizing costs of financing, which in turn reduces project costs. 
Equity: the incidence and distributional consequences of a policy, including dimensions such 
as fairness, justice and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples. Equity can be assessed, 
in part, by looking at the distribution of costs and benefits of a policy and/or by evaluating the 
extent to which it allows the participation of a wide range of different stakeholders (e.g., equal 
rights to independent power producers and to incumbent utilities). 
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Institutional feasibility: the extent to which a policy instrument is likely to be viewed as 
legitimate, gain acceptance, and be adopted and implemented. Institutional feasibility is high 
when policies are well adapted to existing institutional constraints. 
Economists traditionally evaluate instruments for environmental policy under ideal theoretical 
conditions; however, those conditions are rarely met in practice, and instrument design and 
implementation must take political realities into account. 
In reality, policy choices must be both acceptable to a wide range of stakeholders and 
supported by institutions. In market economies, instruments need to be compatible with 
markets. An important dimension of institutional feasibility addresses the ability to implement 
policies once they have been designed and adopted. 
Other criteria are also examined in the literature, including subcategories of the four set out 
above. But most literature focuses on effectiveness and efficiency of policies, which are 
therefore the main criteria that serve as the basis of evaluation, however, criteria for judging 
how well policies work will depend on the policy goals of the jurisdiction that enacts and 
implements those policies. 
The role of different policies combined with their success is important for a particular 
technology to make its way through the market [1]. Certain policies such as research and 
development, financial incentives and procurement initiatives are most appropriate for 
stimulating commercialization and initial markets for new technologies. Other policies such as 
financing, voluntary agreements and information dissemination are used to accelerate 
adoption once a technology is established in the marketplace. Policies such as regulations 
and market obligations are often used to maximize market share or complete the market 
transformation process. However these are general rules and thus there are exceptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Role of policies in new technology’s market share through time [1]. 
An integrated approach to market transformation often consist of a combination of “technology 
push” through RD&D, “demand pull” through financial incentives, education and training, 
procurement or market obligations and “market conversion” through codes and standards. In 
addition some actions such as energy pricing reforms, capacity building and planning 
techniques can facilitate the effective implementation of other more focused policies. An 
integrated approach can also account for and address the multiple barriers that are likely to 
exist in any country or locale. 
 18 
The appropriate mix of policies in any particular situation depends on technological attributes, 
the barriers that exist and market conditions. This conceptual framework is sometimes 
referred to as the “innovation system”. The innovation system consists of a wide range of 
factors including the knowledge base, the prices and relative performance of competing 
technologies, the behavior of different actors in the marketplace, the networks among these 
actors, institutions that can foster or impede innovation and the cultural context. In some 
cases it is possible to advance RE technologies trough existing innovation systems while in 
other cases the barriers are too great and it is necessary to create new ones [1]. 
If decision makers intend to increase the share of RE and, at the same time, to meet 
ambitious climate mitigation targets, then long-standing commitments and flexibility to learn 
from experience will be critical. Some analyses conclude that large, low-carbon facilities such 
as nuclear power, or large coal (and natural gas) plants with CCS can be scaled up rapidly 
enough to meet CO2 reduction goals if they are available. Alternatively, the expansion of 
natural gas fired turbines during the past few decades in North America and Europe, and the 
rapid growth in wind and solar technologies for electric power generation demonstrate that 
modularity and more widely distributed smaller-scale units can also scale rapidly to meet 
large-scale energy demands. The technological and economic potential for each of these 
approaches and their costs have important implications for the scale and role of RE in 
addressing climate change. To achieve GHG concentration stabilization levels that 
incorporate high shares of RE, a structural shift in today’s energy systems will be required 
over the next few decades. Such a transition to low-carbon energy differs from previous ones 
(e.g., from wood to coal, or coal to oil) because the available time span is restricted to a few 
decades, and because RE must develop and integrate into a system constructed in the 
context of an existing energy structure that is very different from what might be required under 
higher penetration RE futures [5]. 
A structural shift towards a world energy system that is mainly based on renewable energy 
might begin with a prominent role for energy efficiency in combination with RE; policies that 
extend beyond R&D to support technology deployment; the creation of an enabling 
environment that includes education and awareness raising; and the systematic development 
of integrative policies with broader sectors, including agriculture, transportation, water 
management and urban planning. The appropriate and reliable mix of instruments is even 
more important where energy infrastructure is not yet developed and energy demand is 
expected to increase significantly in the future. 
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EU Energy Policy 
 
 
Energy policy came to the fore in Europe with the oil crisis of the 1970s. Before this time most 
Western Europe Governments were engaged in nuclear power development. In some 
countries Governments also involved themselves in the supply of oil, coal and/or natural gas. 
Renewable energy sources, with the exception of hydropower in countries having significant 
hydropower potential, attracted very little interest. Starting in the ’70s, this has changed. 
Nowadays, there are considerable concerns in Europe over security of energy supply, 
environmental issues, competitiveness of the European economies, and regional 
development. 
In December 1995, the European Commission issued the white paper, "An Energy Policy for 
the European Union". In issuing the paper, the Commission established an official basis on 
which to build a common, community-wide energy policy. In the Commission’s view, a 
common energy policy will further economic integration within the EU and contribute to the 
realisation of a single European market. According to the white paper, energy policy must 
form part of the general aims of the EU’s economic policy, which focuses on market 
integration and deregulation, aiming to minimise its policy interventions. An EU energy policy 
would aim to enhance European economic competitiveness and supply security, and 
contribute to the achievement of the EU’s broader policy goals relating to job creation and 
environmental protection. 
EU’s energy policy aims at addressing growing environmental concerns associated with the 
energy sector, such as global climate change, and to transform this growing concern for 
sustainability into opportunities for global economic and technological leadership. This 
overarching goal is supported by activities in three main energy policy areas market 
liberalisation, energy security, and protection of the environment and climate. 
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Market Liberalisation: One of the most important energy and economic policy goals of the 
European Commission is the creation of a single, integrated European energy market. 
Currently, each of the EU’s 27 Member States is at a different point on the path to the 
liberalisation of its energy industries, and each state has a unique set of energy institutions 
and regulatory structures. The Commission aims to further each of its three main energy 
policy concerns, competitiveness, supply security and environmental protection, through the 
creation of trans-European energy networks. A key action facilitating the development of these 
networks will be the Community-wide reduction of existing regulatory barriers and the 
introduction of competition in the energy industries, especially gas and electricity. 
Security of energy supply: Ensuring energy supply security is a second key objective of EU 
energy policy. The EU is currently approaching 55% (2008) import dependence, and this trend 
appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The EU is also seeking to enhance its 
energy security through a variety of policy actions aimed at diversifying both Europe’s internal 
fuel mix and its external sources of energy supply. The Commission considers all major fuel 
types (fossil, nuclear, renewable) and energy efficiency important elements of long-term 
energy security and is encouraging Member States to maintain a broad portfolio of energy 
supply options and to ensure that there is a broad internal energy resource base. 
Protection of the environment & climate: The third major objective of EU energy policy is 
environmental protection. The Commission believes that the goals of greater economic 
competitiveness and environmental protection are not necessarily in conflict, and that policies 
that move the industry to invest in new, cleaner, and less energy-intensive technologies 
(principally in the energy efficiency and renewable areas) will prove an advantage rather than 
a penalty to European firms in the long term [5]. 
 
 
2.1. Institutions 
 
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic community with supranational and 
intergovernmental features. It is more than just a federation of countries, but not a federal 
state. It is a new type of structure that does not fall into any traditional legal category. Its 
political system is historically unique and has been constantly evolving over more than 50 
years. It is now composed of twenty-seven member states, with about 500 million inhabitants, 
and a GDP of € 12,28 trillion in 2010 according to Eurostat. 
The origin of the European Union (as it is known today) was the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), founded in 1951 by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and 
the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), which expired in 2002. 
These six countries formed the European Economic Community (EEC) through the Treaty of 
Rome, which was signed in 1957 and took effect on 1 January 1958. They also formed the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which continues to exist alongside the EU. 
The name of the EEC was changed to the European Community (EC) under the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, which also included the Treaty on the European Union (EC Treaty).  
There have been seven waves of enlargement since the original six created the EEC: In 1973, 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; in 1981, Greece; in 1986, Portugal and Spain; in 
1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden; in 2004, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia; and in 2007, Bulgaria and 
Romania. All member states of the European Union are democratically governed, with a wide 
variety of structures, ranging from highly federalised states to constitutional monarchies.  
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The key to decision-making in the EU is to find sufficient consensus among the European 
Commission, the Council (in which all member states are represented), the European 
Parliament (EP), and local authorities and social partners, which are represented at EU level 
through the European Committee of the Regions (COR), and the European Economic and 
Social Committee (ESC). For this process the roles of the various institutions are all clearly 
defined in the European Treaties and in European case law [5]. 
Most decisions in energy policy are therefore taken in a co-decision process (Figure 2.1) 
(Article 251 of the EC Treaty) by the Council (ministers from the 27 member states) and the 
EP. The final legislation is a text agreed in this way, which might be quite different from the 
original Commission proposal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Structure of the Co-Decision process [5]. 
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In the Common Foreign and Security Policy, decisions are taken by the European Council and 
the Council of Ministers. The EP is kept informed and is consulted on the broad orientations 
and choices. The Commission may make proposals, but does not have exclusive 
competence. Increasingly, and in line with changes in the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Council (heads of state and government of member states and the Commission president) is 
involved in the wider energy policy development. At successive summits, notably in March 
2006, March 2007 and March 2008, the European Council has been moving towards 
increasingly detailed indications of what Europe’s energy policy should be, based largely on 
proposals from the European Commission. This confirms the growing relevance of energy 
policy to wider strategic considerations. 
The European Commission is the executive body responsible for the policy development 
and administration of the European Union. It is the third part of the institutional triangle that 
manages and runs the EU, together with the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament. As the EU’s executive arm, the Commission implements the decisions taken 
jointly by the European Council and Parliament, and it has wide powers to manage EU 
common policies, such as research and technology, overseas aid, regional development. It 
also manages the budget for these policies. Its members are appointed for a five-year term by 
agreement between the member states, each of which has the right to propose one 
Commissioner. Their appointment is subject to approval by the European Parliament. The 
Commission is also answerable to the Parliament for its actions. As “Guardian of the Treaties”, 
it has to ensure that the regulations and directives adopted by the Council and Parliament are 
being implemented in all the member states. If they are not, the Commission takes the 
offending party to the European Court of Justice to oblige it to comply with EU law. An 
important principle is that the Commission is independent of member state, industrial or 
financial interests. 
In all areas of EU competence, the Commission has exclusive power to propose legislative 
measures – an important right of initiative. However, it usually only makes proposals following 
widespread consultations with interested parties, such as social or economic stakeholders, 
citizens, or pressure groups. Accordingly, the Commission also has a role in assembling and 
analysing information on market developments, public opinion and strategic considerations 
with a view to better defining new policy proposals. It also has the task of ensuring that 
member states apply EU legislation. This helps ensure that all member states implement 
policies in a timely fashion and in a climate of openness and solidarity. Therefore, compliance 
monitoring, review and follow-up of member states are key activities of the Commission. 
The European Commission is organised in Directorates-General. The most important of these 
in the area of energy policy are: 
• DG Energy (ENER) which is the lead DG responsible for energy policy making. 
• DG Mobility & Transport (MOVE) responsible for transport policy. 
• DG Competition (COMP), the Union’s competition watchdog. 
• DG Environment (ENV) which is responsible for environmental legislation such as 
pollution control and emissions trading. 
• DG Enterprise & Industry (ENTR) which is responsible, among others, for the 
Sustainable Industrial Policy, the Lisbon Strategy on growth and jobs, and the analysis 
of the effects of energy and environmental policy on industry. 
• DG External Relations (RELEX) which is now merged into the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) and is responsible for the relations with countries outside the EU. 
• DG Research & Innovation (RTD) which is responsible for energy research, jointly with 
DG-ENER & DG-MOVE. 
• DG Trade (TRADE) which is responsible for the EU’s trade policy. 
• The Joint Research Centre (JRC). 
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Eurostat is the statistical service responsible for producing energy statistics and outlooks. It is 
part of the European Commission. 
The Euratom Treaty creates a specific framework and decision-making process for nuclear 
energy, defining specific tasks and powers of the Euratom Community. Although the 
European Parliament does not have the same formal powers as under the EC Treaty, the 
Commission consults the European Parliament on legislative proposals within the scope of the 
Euratom Treaty. This difference could be reduced within the projected Lisbon Reform Treaty 
(12th Protocol modifying the Euratom Treaty). The Euratom Supply Agency is responsible for 
monitoring the uranium supply situation in the EU. It is independent and only administratively 
overseen by DG-EN. 
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is working for the EU in data collection and 
distribution in the area of environmental protection. It is responsible for preparing reports to 
the UNFCCC, and assists the Commission with information in the preparation of 
environmental and energy regulation. The Commission is a member of the EEA executive 
board [5]. 
 
 
2.2. Energy Policy Development 
 
EU policy development follows important political principles expounded in the Treaties and 
political statements, notably: 
• Subsidiarity: in the EU context, this means taking EU action where it adds value, and 
leaving alone matters best done at national level. 
• Proportionality: not going beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives. 
• Better regulation: avoiding burdensome legislation, consulting widely on all proposals, 
and assessing the full impact of proposals before they are made, is a principle which has 
a prominent place in the Lisbon Reform Agenda for Growth and Jobs and is also an 
important guide. 
The aim is to ensure that policies are developed in the most democratic, representative, 
transparent and consensual way possible with clear justifications and balanced assessment of 
options. All legislative proposals are accompanied by “impact assessments” which outline the 
advantages/benefits and drawbacks/costs of different policy actions, and justify the course 
taken in the proposed policy. 
Reflecting these requirements, new energy policy proposals are prepared on the basis of wide 
stakeholder consultations, including national authorities, regional bodies, industrial 
associations, individual companies, consumers and their associations and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). A number of consultation groups also exist, including the Madrid and 
Florence Forums (for gas and electricity markets, respectively), the Gas Coordination Group, 
the Oil Supply Group, the Amsterdam (Sustainable Energy) Forum, the Berlin (Fossil Fuels) 
Forum and the Prague/Bratislava (Nuclear) Forum. Internet consultations may also take place, 
while Eurobarometers and other surveys are also used. This means that proposals made by 
the European Commission have already been largely tested for their relevance, 
appropriateness and timeliness. Significant consultations undertaken by the Commission 
however also take place when required or on an informal level. Independent studies may also 
be commissioned into specific issues in order to help develop and implement policy initiatives. 
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Consultations also take place within and between the different EU institutions. Within the 
European Commission, Inter-Service Groups and formalised Inter-Service Consultations 
(involving representatives of all interested Directorates-General) smooth the preparation of 
new initiatives. There is also close contact between the European Commission and the 
European Parliament committees, specifically for energy with the ITRE and Environment 
(ENVI) Committees as well as the temporary Climate Change (CLIM) Committee. Together 
with member states, the Council’s Energy Working Group provides the framework for 
examining the Commission's proposals. Informal co-ordination is carried out by the regular 
meetings of the Energy Directors-General group of the Commission, although this is not an 
institutional body. 
The Commission’s role as watchdog is important to ensure the implementation of policy 
across the EU. At the same time, national regulatory authorities (set up under relevant 
directives) also have a role in ensuring that national legislation applying EU rules is properly 
implemented in the member states. 
The Council of Ministers, comprising members of national governments, together with the 
European Parliament, whose members are directly elected by EU citizens, are, broadly 
speaking, the bodies which jointly take legally binding decisions in the EU (though the 
Commission has sometimes delegated powers to act autonomously). The European 
Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the Committee of the Regions (COR) are also 
consulted, and give their opinions on policy statements/proposals. Under the Lisbon Treaty, 
national parliaments will have a stronger role. This ensures full democratic oversight. 
 
Acknowledging the sensitivities regarding some aspects of energy policy in member states, 
EU energy policy actions have respected, and will continue to respect, two principles: 
• Member States are ultimately responsible for their national energy mix.  
• Indigenous energy resources are a national, not European, resource. 
Notwithstanding this, member states have in the past accepted legally binding, although non-
enforceable EU targets for specific energy sources, such as renewables, and are negotiating 
legally binding, enforceable, national targets within the framework of the draft Renewables 
Directive. Importantly, the EU has for more than a decade agreed legal provisions for the 
opening-up of energy networks within the internal energy market and encouraging cross-
border collaboration, interconnection and energy flows. 
 
The EU has also developed an external energy policy, acting in areas of its own competence, 
such as economic, technical and financial co-operation, with agreements covering trade, 
investment, infrastructure development and us (e.g. Energy Community Treaty, Energy 
Charter Treaty), etc. Energy issues also come up in the framework of political co-operation 
under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title V, Treaty on European Union). 
While the CFSP is somewhat involved, most of the Commission’s external competence 
derives from the EC Treaty. 
Energy policy developments at EU level have gained momentum in 2005 when a new political 
will emerged among member states to work together more closely in energy matters and to 
strengthen the common policy in certain fields. This was first expressed at the G8 Summit at 
Gleneagles in July 2005 in an action plan covering climate change, clean energy and 
sustainable development, and this theme was taken up during the UK presidency of the EU in 
the second half of 2005. The next major step was taken at the Hampton Court informal 
summit of EU leaders in October 2005, when heads of EU states and governments called on 
the Commission to urgently set out how the EU could work together in energy matters. 
Climate change, international geopolitics and the establishment of the internal energy market 
were important drivers of these political changes [5]. 
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2.3. Legal Basis & Legislative Framework 
 
All EU energy legislation is based on the EU Treaties (including Euratom), since the creation 
of the Union. A European coal policy existed under the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) from 1952 until 2002, when the ECSC expired. In nuclear policy, the EU has a clear 
remit only through the Euratom Treaty of 1957.  
Because there is currently no specific article on energy in the currently ratified EU Treaties, 
energy-related legislation has so far been introduced under the following legal basis: 
• Environment (Art 175); 
• Approximation of laws (Art 81-97); 
• Trans-European networks (Art 154); 
• Difficulties in the supply of products (Art 100); 
• Research (Art 166); and 
• External relations (various articles in the treaties). 
European legislation can be divided into three forms: 
Directives are directly binding on Member States, but often flexible to take into account 
different national and administrative traditions. This implies States have discretion to decide 
how they align legal and administrative systems. Directives can contain requirements that take 
into account the specific conditions of a Member State. Provisions requiring Member States to 
gather information and report do not have to be transposed into binding national legislation. 
The term framework directives are used for directives setting out general principles, 
procedures and requirements for legislation in different sectors. 
Regulations are directly binding on Member States and superior to any conflicting national 
law. They are not transposed into national law since they are to be applied directly by national 
courts and national administrative body. This form is usually used when a unified system is 
needed; the purpose is precise, as are the requirements to the Member States. 
Decisions are individual legislative acts directly binding for the parties to whom they are 
addressed. They are usually very specific in their scope and can be used for specifying 
detailed administrative requirements or update technical aspects of regulations or directives. 
Important role on policy making and law development play the green and white papers issued 
as official documents by the Commission: 
A green paper is a discussion document intended to stimulate debate and launch a process 
of consultation, at European level, on a particular topic. A green paper usually presents a 
range of ideas and is meant to invite interested individuals or organizations to contribute views 
and information. It may be followed by a white paper, an official set of proposals that is used 
as a vehicle for their development into law [18]. 
The white paper is an authoritative report or guide that helps solve a problem. White papers 
are used to educate readers and help people make decisions and are often requested and 
used in politics, policy, business, and technical fields. Policy makers frequently request white 
papers from universities or academic personnel to assist policy developers with expert 
opinions or relevant research [18]. 
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2.4. Renewable Energy 
 
Back in 1986 a Council resolution highlighted the promotion of renewable energy as one of 
the Community's energy objectives. Efforts concentrated on R&D programmes and the 
European Parliament continuously argued for an action plan to promote renewable energy. In 
the Commission White Paper from 1995 "An Energy Policy for the European Union" the three 
main objectives for the Community energy policy were identified: improved competitiveness, 
security of supply and protection of the environment. Renewable energy was recognised as a 
factor to help achieve these objectives and a strategy for renewable energy was proposed and 
cited in the indicative work programme attached to the White Paper (European Commission, 
1997:6). Finally, in 1997 the White Paper "Energy for the Future - Renewable Energy Sources 
of Energy - White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan" came. This Community 
strategy confirms an indicative target of a 12% share of renewable energy sources in total 
final energy consumption by 2010. 
Besides the RE White Paper, main drivers behind Community initiatives on renewable energy 
are the energy strategy set in the "Green Paper Towards a European Strategy for the security 
of energy supply" (2000) and the climate change strategy set in the "European Climate 
Change Programme" (2000). 
At the end of 2001 the Directive on the Promotion of the Electricity Produced from Renewable 
Energy was adopted. In accordance with the White Paper, the overall indicative target of this 
directive was to increase, by 2010, the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption 
to 12%. An indicative target was set for the electricity to 22,1% of total EU-15 gross 
consumption from renewable energy sources in 2010 (2001/77/EC: art. 3.4). In the Accession 
Treaty, published April 2003, national targets were adopted for the new Member States. The 
total renewable electricity target for EU-25 was 21% of overall electricity consumption by 
2010. To reach this goal the directive set indicative targets for the share of renewable 
electricity production per EU Member State. 
Not before 2003 was the Directive "on the promotion of biofuels or other renewable fuels for 
transport" (2003/30/EC) adopted. The Directive stipulated that Member States should set 
national indicative targets to raise the share of biofuels in their transport fuel market. These 
should be based on the reference values of an increase to 2% by 2005 and 5,75% by 2010 of 
the share of biofuels in diesel and petrol for transport purposes calculated on the basis of 
energy content. 
In March 2007, the heads of states and governments of the 27 EU member states adopted a 
binding target of 20% renewable energy from final energy consumption by 2020. Combined 
with the commitment to increase energy efficiency by 20% until 2020 and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% within the same period (or respectively 30% in 
case of a new international agreement), Europe’s political leaders paved the way for a more 
sustainable energy future for the European Union and for future generations. In January 2008, 
the European Commission presented a draft directive on the promotion of the use of energy 
from Renewable Energy Sources (RES) which contains a series of elements to create the 
necessary legislative framework for making 20% renewable energy become a reality. The 
Directive sets the legislative framework that should ensure the increase of the 8,5% 
renewable energy share of final energy consumption in 2005 to 20% in 2020 and, if properly 
transposed into national law, will become the most ambitious piece of legislation on renewable 
energy in the world. The RES Directive (DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC) (EC, 2009) was approved 
by the European Parliament in December 2008, by the Council at the end of March 2009, 
published in the Official Journal in June 2009 and will then need to be transposed in national 
law [5]. 
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The implemented policies on renewable energy use are: 
1. National Targets 
Up to Directive 2009/28 the targets set were indicative. For each member state there were 
indicative targets for RES-E share (Directive 2001/77/EC) and a 5,75% share of biofuels and 
other renewable fuels in transport for all member states (Directive 2003/30/EC) for 2010. 
Today there are binding national targets for renewable energy shares of final energy 
consumption in 2020, (including a 10% renewables in transport target for all member states): 
these are calculated on the basis of the 2005 share of each country plus both a flat rate 
increase of 5,5% per member state as well as a GDP-weighted additional increase to come up 
with the numbers as outlined in the table in the Directive 2009/28/EC. Furthermore, the new 
directive closed the legislative gap for the heating and cooling sector which is expected to 
grow rapidly in the next decade. 
Also interim targets per country are set for 2011/12, 2013/14, 2015/16 and 2017/18 as a 
percentage share of their 2020 target. These interim targets are crucial for monitoring the 
progress of renewable energy development in a member state, although they are, 
unfortunately, only of indicative nature. 
2. National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) 
NREAPs (introduced with the Directive 2009/28/EC) are considered crucial towards the 2020 
mandatory targets and they must be adopted by all Member States. They set out their targets 
for the shares of energy from renewable sources in transport, electricity, and heating and 
cooling in 2020 and adequate measures to achieve these targets. Member states should 
notify their national action plans to the Commission for examination by June 2010 at the latest. 
These plans should provide for two things: to give member states the flexibility to decide for 
themselves how they want to meet their national targets, but at the same time to create 
investor security and help to mobilize private capital by setting clear goals and mechanisms 
on the national level. National action plans should include detailed mandatory outlines and 
targets for the different renewable energy sectors (heating/cooling, electricity and transport 
fuels), which show the way ahead on the national level. In addition, support measures to meet 
the national targets must be outlined. 
3. Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin (RE-GO) 
RE-GO were introduced in the EU with the first renewables directive (2001/77/EC). Under the 
directive, member states had to establish a system under which RE-GOs were to be issued to 
all producers of renewable electricity, where is required to prove the share or quantity of 
energy from renewable sources in their energy mix, on request by a central body, from 23 
October 2003. They are accompanied by a unique identification number. Some of the 
information specified in a RE-GO are the energy source from which the energy was produced, 
the start and end dates of production, whether it relates to: electricity or heating or cooling, the 
date and country of issue etc. 
The expectation at the time of the introduction was that the establishment of the RE-GO 
system would eventually enable trade between member states and it was seen as necessary 
to facilitate trade and increase transparency for consumers. The directive did not require 
member states to accept RE-GOs purchased in another member state as counting towards 
the national indicative target, but it left open the possibility for any member state to allow this. 
The option of trade of Guarantees of Origin between member states issues concerns about 
the risk of trade being detrimental to the development of renewables. The reasons for allowing 
restrictions in tradability of Guarantees of Origin are that: 
• The development of higher-cost renewables would be stifled 
• Trading RE-GOs and existing support systems in most member states may be 
incompatible 
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• Windfall profits may accrue to existing producers of (low-cost) RE because of the 
existence of considerable non-economic barriers, and governments may have less 
incentive to eliminate non-economic barriers to the large-scale diffusion of renewables. 
The impact assessment estimates the costs of not allowing trading at up to € 8 billion per year 
by 2020 [5]. As a consequence of this cost assessment, the proposal includes the provision for 
trading Guarantees of Origin despite the risks outlined above, but in some instances restricts it 
to cases where the member states have achieved their interim targets and entered into a 
bilateral agreement enabling this trade, or allows member states to restrict it in order to give 
themselves control over the use of the renewables potential within their borders, to avoid the 
risks outlined above. 
4. Grid Priority Access & Operation 
Member States must take the appropriate steps to develop transmission and distribution grid 
infrastructure, intelligent networks, storage facilities and the electricity system, in order to allow 
the secure operation of the electricity system as it accommodates the further development of 
electricity production from RES. 
Also it must be ensured that TSOs and DSOs guarantee the transmission and distribution of 
electricity produced from RES. Priority and guaranteed access to the grid must be provided by 
the TSOs; when dispatching electricity generating installations, they are to give priority to 
generating installations using RES in so far as the secure operation of the national electricity 
system permits, based on transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. 
5. Cooperation Mechanisms 
Cooperation mechanisms can be used by Member States in order to reach their targets. 
Member States are allowed to make arrangements for the statistical transfer of a specified 
amount of energy from renewable sources from one Member State to another. 
Two or more Member States are allowed to cooperate on all types of joint projects relating to 
the production of electricity, heating or cooling from renewable energy sources. That 
cooperation may involve private operators. 
One or more Member States are allowed to cooperate with one or more third countries on all 
types of joint projects regarding the production of electricity from renewable energy sources. 
Such cooperation may involve private operators. 
Two or more Member States are allowed to decide, on a voluntary basis, to join or partly 
coordinate their national support schemes. In such cases, a certain amount of energy from 
renewable sources produced in the territory of one participating Member State, may count 
towards the national overall target of another participating Member State, if the Member 
States make a statistical transfer of specified amounts of energy from RES from one to 
another or set up a distribution rule agreed by participating Member States that allocates 
amounts of energy from RES between them. 
The basic idea of all the above mentioned mechanisms is to fulfil part of a Member State’s 
RES target in another country by providing financial support, with the potential advantage of 
accessing cheaper RES-E and RES-H in other countries. 
6. Restrictions on Biofuels & Bioliquids 
The binding nature of the 10% target has triggered the very important debate on sustainability 
criteria and a certification scheme. This scheme will serve as an example for biofuels 
production standards globally. The industry is committed to strict but practical sustainability 
standards that apply for domestic production as well as imports that will eventually be applied 
to all energy sources be it biomass, food or fossil fuels. 
Also GHG emissions from the use of biofuels and bioliquids must be calculated and expected 
to be lower than or equal to the emissions reported under the heading ‘cultivation’ in part D of 
Annex V of the Directive 2009/28/EC. 
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7. Support Schemes 
The six main categories of support instruments are: feed-in tariff (FIT), feed-in premium (FIP), 
quota obligation (QO), investment grants (IG), tax exemptions (TE) & fiscal incentives (FI) [12]. 
 
EU-27 
RES-E RES-H RES-T 
FIT FIP QO IG TE FI IG TE FI QO TE 
AT X      X X  X X 
BE X  X X X  X X   X 
BG X     X X  X X  
CY X   X   X   X X 
CZ X X  X   X   X X 
DE X     X X  X X X 
DK  X      X  X X 
EE X X    X X  X  X 
ES X X   X     X X 
FI    X X  X   X  
FR X      X X X X X 
GR X   X X  X X   X 
HU X   X   X    X 
IE X      X   X X 
IT X  X     X   X 
LT X   X   X X  X X 
LU X   X   X   X X 
LV X   X X  X   X X 
MT X   X  X X    X 
NL  X   X X X X  X  
PL   X  X X X   X X 
PT X      X  X X X 
RO   X       X X 
SE   X  X  X X   X 
SI X X    X X   X X 
SK X    X  X   X X 
UK X  X  X  X X  X X 
Table 2.1. Main RES support schemes in EU-27 per sector [12]. 
Feed-in tariff is a fixed and guaranteed price paid to the eligible producers of electricity from 
renewable sources, for the power they feed into the grid. Feed-in tariff systems have been 
historically and currently still are the main instruments of support in the EU. They are used in 
the following Member States: France, Germany, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Hungary, Portugal, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia. Most countries 
use a differentiation according to technology, which facilitates the development of a range of 
technologies due to the different level of tariffs they receive. However, a few countries, 
including Cyprus and Estonia do not differentiate according to technologies and apply a 
common feed-in tariff for all technologies. 
The advantage of tariffs, compared to feed-in premiums and quota obligations, lies in the long-
term certainty of receiving a fixed level support, which lowers investment risks considerably. 
The costs of capital for RES investments observed in countries with established tariff systems 
have proven to be significantly lower than in countries with other instruments that involve 
higher risks of future returns on investments. Also, the weighted average costs of capital are 
notably higher in countries with quota obligations, compared to tariff-based systems. By 
guaranteeing the price and providing a secure demand, feed-in tariffs reduce both the price 
and market risks, and create certainty for the investor regarding the rate of return of a project. 
The lower cost for the investor result lower average support cost for society. 
The cost-efficiency of tariffs for society decreases when policy makers overestimate the cost 
of producing renewable electricity. This is because the level of tariffs is based on future 
expectations of the generation cost of renewable electricity. When these turn out lower than 
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expected, producers receive a windfall profit. It is therefore important that tariffs are reviewed 
regularly in order to adjust the system to the latest available generation cost projections and to 
stimulate technology learning. Furthermore, payments should be guaranteed for a limited time 
period (approx. 15-20 years) that allows recovery of the investment, but avoids windfall profits 
over the lifetime of the plant. 
In tariff systems, RES generators do not sell the produced electricity on the power market, but 
a single buyer, e.g. the TSO, fulfils this role. Therefore the producers are generally not 
stimulated to adjust their production according to the price signals on the market (i.e. 
electricity demand), unless this is provided by other means (e.g. peak/off-peak tariffs). This 
may be a disadvantage in terms of market compatibility. 
In a feed-in premium system, a guaranteed premium is paid in addition to the income 
producers receive for the electricity from renewable sources that is being sold on the electricity 
market. Feed-in premium systems have gained ground over the last years and are used as 
main support instruments in Denmark and the Netherlands. In Spain, Czech Republic, Estonia 
and Slovenia premiums exist in parallel to the tariff system. These Member States have 
introduced the possibility to choose between feed-in tariffs and premiums for a selection of 
technologies. The flexibility and coverage of the systems differs from country to country. 
Premium systems provide a secure additional return for producers, while exposing them to the 
electricity price risk. Compared to feed-in tariffs, premiums provide less certainty for investors 
and hence, imply higher risk premiums and total costs of capital. There are different design 
options for premium systems. Premiums that are linked to electricity price developments, e.g. 
limited by cap and floor prices, provide higher certainty and less risk of over-compensation 
than fixed premiums. 
The level of premiums is based on future expectations regarding the generation costs of 
renewable electricity and the average electricity market revenues. Therefore premium systems 
also embody the risk of inducing additional costs for society and windfall profits for producers 
when production costs are over-estimated, or electricity prices and learning rates are 
underestimated by policy makers. Time limits and a regular review of cost projections and 
adjustment of premiums based on these projections is therefore also important in feed-in 
premium systems. Both Denmark and the Netherlands have applied such practices. Denmark 
has put a cap on the overall return for producers, thereby limiting societal costs. In the 
Netherlands the level of the premium is determined annually and an overall cap is set on the 
total cost of the support. 
In premium systems, the renewable electricity producer participates in the wholesale electricity 
market. The advantage of premiums is therefore that producers of renewables are stimulated 
to adjust their production according to the price signals on the market (i.e. electricity demand), 
at least if they have fuel costs. This can be beneficial for power system operation. 
Quota obligations have been introduced in Belgium, Italy, Sweden, UK, Poland and 
Romania. In countries with quota obligations, governments impose minimum shares of 
renewable electricity on suppliers (or consumers and producers) that increase over time. If 
obligations are not met, financial penalties are to be paid. Penalties are recycled back to 
suppliers in proportion to how much renewable electricity they have supplied. Obligations are 
combined with renewable obligation certificates (ROCs) that can be traded. Hence, ROCs 
provide support in addition to the electricity price and used as proof of compliance. A ROC 
represents the value of renewable electricity and facilitates trade in the green property of 
electricity. Quota obligations with certificates expose producers to market signals, which can 
be beneficial from a power system operation perspective. 
Another related advantage of quota obligations compared to feed-in tariff and premium 
systems, is the fact that support is automatically phased out once the technology manages to 
compete. Tradable certificates represent the value of the renewable electricity at a certain 
time. When the costs of renewable technologies come down through learning, this is 
represented by the adjustment of the price of certificates. On the other hand, this might be a 
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challenge for plants already in operation that did not profit from this technological learning. 
Furthermore, certificate prices are volatile to other market influences (e.g. exercise of market 
power). 
Uncertainty about the current and future price of certificates increases financial risks faced by 
developers. This uncertainty can have a negative impact on the willingness to invest. Because 
producers do not only sell their electricity on the market, but also their certificates, the risk on 
the certificate market is added to the risk on the electricity market. This uncertainty increases 
the level of risk premiums and cost of capital. As these costs are usually transferred to 
consumers, the societal costs of renewable electricity support are usually higher than under 
feed-in tariff and premium systems. 
Depending on the design, quota obligations tend to stimulate the development and 
deployment of lower-cost technologies and generally discard innovations in more costly 
options. This is particularly the case for quota obligation systems that are technology-neutral 
and do not make a distinction between renewable energy options. For more mature 
technologies such biomass combustion and possibly onshore wind, such a system may be 
appropriate, but can lead to windfall profit if the marginal price is set by more expensive 
technologies. Depending on the specific market and resource conditions, less mature 
technologies would best be supported under a quota obligation system with technology or 
band specifications. 
Also, to stimulate less-mature options under a quota obligation system, these technologies are 
sometimes combined with more targeted support (tariffs or premiums) for more expensive 
RES-E options. Such a combination of instruments has been introduced in the UK for solar PV 
and has been introduced in Italy for a range of smaller projects and options. 
Hence, technology banding or a combination of support instruments could address specific 
learning rates for less mature technologies, while at the same time providing adequate 
support from more mature technologies. 
On a national level, investments grants for RES-E are available in several Member States 
and are often devised to stimulate the take-up of less mature technologies. In Finland, 
investment grants and subsidies are the only support available on a national level. 
Tax incentives or exemptions are often complementary to other types of renewable energy 
incentive programmes. They are powerful and highly flexible policy tools that can be targeted 
to encourage specific renewable energy technologies and to impact selected renewable 
energy market participants, especially when used in combination with other policy 
instruments. A wide range of tax incentives are present in the EU. Some countries, including 
Spain, the Netherlands, Finland and Greece provide tax incentives related to investments 
(including income tax deductions or credits for some fraction of the capital investment made in 
renewable energy projects, or accelerated depreciation). Other Member States, including 
Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK, have devised production tax incentives that 
provide income tax deduction or credits at a set rate per unit of produced renewable 
electricity, thereby reducing operational costs. Investment and production tax exemptions are 
most prominently present in the EU10. 
A fifth and related category are fiscal incentives, including soft or low-interest loans that are 
loans with a rate below the market rate of interest. Soft loans may also provide other 
concessions to borrowers, including longer repayment periods or interest holidays. On a 
national level, soft-loans are available in Germany, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Estonia, Malta and 
Poland. 
Tenders are used for larger-scale projects and most commonly for offshore wind. Tendering 
schemes for offshore wind are employed in the Netherlands, UK, Denmark and Spain. Its 
advantages include the amount of attention it draws towards renewable energy investment 
opportunities and the competitive element incorporated in its design. Its handicap is that the 
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overall number of projects actually implemented so far has proven to be very low (For further 
information on support schemes per RES technology see Appendix A3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Main support schemes for RES-E and policy changes 1997-2010 [11]. 
8. RES Technologies in Buildings 
The new RES directive (2009/28) introduced the integration of RE technologies in buildings. 
Member States must submit, in their building regulations and codes, appropriate measures in 
order to increase the share of all kinds of energy from renewable sources in the building 
sector. Trough these measures, by 31 December 2014, Member States must require the use 
of minimum levels of energy from renewable sources in new buildings and in existing buildings 
that are subject to major renovation (especially RE technologies that achieve a significant 
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reduction of energy consumption like heating and cooling systems). RE technologies’ 
integration in buildings is one of the major pillars towards the nearly zero-energy buildings 
concept which will be implemented from 2018 and on (see next paragraph). 
9. Information & Training 
Member States must ensure that information on support measures is made available to all 
relevant actors, such as consumers, builders, installers, architects, and suppliers of heating, 
cooling and electricity equipment/systems and of vehicles compatible with the use of energy 
from renewable sources. 
They also must ensure that information on the net benefits, cost and energy efficiency of 
equipment and systems for the use of heating, cooling and electricity from renewable energy 
sources is made available either by the supplier of the equipment/system or by the national 
competent authorities. In cooperation with local and regional authorities, they must develop 
suitable information, awareness-raising, guidance or training programmes in order to inform 
citizens of the benefits and practicalities of developing and using energy from RES. 
10. Reporting & Monitoring 
On the one hand each Member State must submit a report to the Commission on progress in 
the promotion and use of energy from renewable sources by 31 December 2011, and every 
two years thereafter. The sixth report, to be submitted by 31 December 2021, will be the last 
report required. The reports will provide detailed information on the whole progress of the 
renewable penetration and the framework for their promotion. 
On the other hand, on the basis of the reports submitted by Member States, the Commission 
will report every two years to the European Parliament and the Council. The first report must 
be submitted in 2012 and it will be a valuation and a criticism on the progress of the Member 
States’ renewable policy implementation. 
11. Supporting Tools 
One of the most important supporting tools on the RE sector is the RE-Shaping project. The 
core objective of the RE-Shaping project is to assist Member State governments in preparing 
for the implementation of the RES Directive and to shape a European policy for RES in the 
medium to long term. The past and present success of RE policies will be evaluated and 
recommendations derived on how to improve future RES support schemes.  The main target 
groups of the RE-Shaping project are European, national and regional policy makers in the 
field of RE, regulators, DSOs / TSOs as well as national industry associations [19]. 
 
 
2.5. Energy Efficiency & Savings 
 
Energy efficiency has been identified as a cornerstone in the Commission’s energy policy and 
one of the pillars of the Commission’s 20 20 by 2020 policy targets. The Commission is aiming 
for an improvement of at least 20% of the EU’s energy consumption compared to business-
as-usual projections for 2020. This objective corresponds to achieving approximately 1,5% of 
real energy savings per year up to 2020. If successful, this would mean that by 2020 the EU 
would use approximately 13% less energy than today, saving € 100 billion and around 780 
millions tonnes of CO2 each year, around 20% of the current emissions [5]. 
Energy efficiency policies are recognised to be important because they can assist with 
achieving other EU targets. For example, enhanced energy efficiency will lower total energy 
use and therefore make the renewable energy target easier to attain. The Commission 
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therefore has a range of policies and measures in place or under development that affect 
energy efficiency across many sectors. These cover research funding, finance for energy 
efficiency, fiscal policies and education. EU has a significant array of directives aimed at 
promoting energy efficiency. Some of the most important implemented policies on the effort 
for energy savings and efficiency increase are: 
1. National Targets 
Each Member State must take cost effective, practical and reasonable measures designed to 
contribute towards achieving an overall national indicative energy savings target of 9% of the 
ninth year of application of the Directive 2006/32/EC (ESD). This target must be set and 
calculated in accordance with the provisions and methodology of Annex I of the ESD. The 
national energy savings in relation to the national indicative energy savings target must be 
measured as from 1 January 2008. 
For the purpose of the first NEEAP, each Member State must establish an intermediate 
national indicative energy savings target for the third year of application of this directive, and 
provide an overview of its strategy for the achievement of the intermediate and overall targets. 
The intermediate target has to be realistic and consistent with the overall national indicative 
energy savings target. 
2. National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) 
Member States must submit to the Commission the following NEEAPs: 
• a first NEEAP not later than 30 June 2007; 
• a second NEEAP not later than 30 June 2011; 
• a third NEEAP not later than 30 June 2014. 
All NEEAPs must describe the energy efficiency improvement measures planned to reach the 
targets and, as well as to comply with the provisions on the exemplary role of the public sector 
and provision of information and advice to final customers. The second and third NEEAPs 
must also include a thorough analysis and evaluation of the preceding NEEAP. 
3. Cogeneration 
Cogeneration not only can increase energy efficiency, but also improves security of supply. In 
order to promote and develop high efficiency cogeneration the next measures have been 
taken: 
• Guarantees of origin. The origin of electricity produced from high-efficiency cogeneration 
can be guaranteed according to objective, transparent and non discriminatory criteria 
laid down by each Member State. They must also ensure that this guarantee of origin of 
the electricity enable producers to demonstrate that the electricity they sell is produced 
from high efficiency cogeneration and is issued to this effect in response to a request 
from the producer. 
• Support schemes and 
• Grid priority access like the RE systems. 
4. Public Procurement 
In the Annex VI of the ESD there is a list of eligible energy efficient public procurement 
measures. Member States must ensure that the public sector applies at least two 
requirements from this list. 
Recognising that the procurement of energy-efficient equipment and appliances by public 
institutions is one way to stimulate a market for energy-efficient products, on 10 July 2007 the 
European Council adopted a new regulation for implementing the EU-US Energy Star 
programme in the EU. It requires EU institutions and the relevant member state government 
authorities to use energy efficiency criteria no less demanding than those defined in the 
Energy Star programme when purchasing office equipment. This is the first time that the 
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Council and the European Parliament have set mandatory energy efficiency criteria for public 
procurement. The Commission has also developed a handbook for guiding energy-efficient 
public procurement [5]. 
5. Improvement of Building’s Energy Performance  
Energy consumption for buildings-related services accounts for approximately one third of 
total EU energy consumption. The Commission considers that, with initiatives in this area, 
significant energy savings can be achieved, thus helping to attain objectives on climate 
change and security of supply. Towards the promotion of the improvement of the energy 
performance of buildings the next measures have been taken: 
• Energy performance calculation & requirements. Each Member State has adopted a 
methodology for calculating the energy performance of buildings and setting the 
minimum energy performance requirements (when setting requirements, Member States 
may differentiate between new and existing buildings and between different categories 
of buildings) according to the general framework set out in the Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive (EPBD). 
• Energy performance certificate. When buildings are constructed, sold or rented out, an 
energy performance certificate is made available to the owner or by the owner to the 
prospective buyer or tenant, as the case might be. The energy performance certificate 
includes the energy performance of a building and reference values such as minimum 
energy performance requirements in order to make it possible for owners or tenants of 
the building or building unit to compare and assess its energy performance. The validity 
of the certificate shall not exceed 10 years. 
• Display of certificates. For a building with a total useful floor area of over 500m2, for 
which an energy performance certificate has been issued and is occupied by public 
authorities and frequently visited by the public, the energy performance certificate must 
be displayed in a prominent place clearly visible to the public.  On 9 July 2015, this 
threshold of 500m2 will be lowered to 250m2. 
• Heating & cooling systems. Regular inspection and reporting on inspection of heating 
and air-conditioning systems of the buildings. 
• Nearly zero-energy buildings. In order to increase the number of nearly zero-energy 
buildings, Member States must draw up national plans which include targets 
differentiated according to the category of building. After 31/12/2018 all new buildings 
occupied and owned by public authorities are to be nearly zero-energy buildings and by 
31/12/2020 all new buildings are to be nearly zero-energy buildings. Towards this target 
the potential integration of CHP and RE systems will contribute. 
• Financial incentives & market barriers. For the transition towards nearly zero-energy 
buildings and the improvement of building’s energy performance, Member States must 
take appropriate steps to provide financing and other instruments. By 30 June 2011, 
Member States should draw up a list of existing and, if appropriate, proposed measures 
and instruments including those of a financial nature. This list must be updated every 
three years and communicated to the Commission through the NEEAPs. 
6. Metering Energy Consumption 
As far as it is technically possible, financially reasonable and proportionate in relation to the 
potential energy savings, final customers for electricity, natural gas, district heating and/or 
cooling and domestic hot water must be provided with competitively priced individual meters. 
These meters reflect accurately the final customer's actual energy consumption and provide 
information on actual time of use. 
When an existing meter is replaced, such competitively priced individual meters should always 
be provided, unless this is technically impossible or not cost-effective in relation to the 
estimated potential savings in the long term. Also, when a new connection is made in a new 
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building or a building undergoes major renovations, as set out in the EPBD, such meters 
should always be provided. 
7. Improvement of Energy Related Products 
In order to maximize the environmental benefits from improved design of the energy related 
products and improve their energy efficiency, two Directives have been established towards 
this direction. 
The Directive 2009/125/EC (which repealed Directive 2005/32/EC) establishes a framework 
for the integration of environmental aspects in the design and development of energy-using 
products (eco-design requirements) to ensure the free movement of these products within the 
internal market. It defines the principles, conditions and criteria for setting environmental 
requirements for the products and it will apply to all energy-using products which are placed 
on the market. It will also cover parts which are intended to be incorporated into products 
which are placed on the market as individual parts for end-users, the environmental 
performance of which can be assessed independently. 
The Directive 2010/30/EU (which repealed the Directive 92/75/EEC) establishes a framework 
for the harmonisation of national measures on end-user information, particularly by means of 
labelling and standard product information, on the consumption of energy, thereby allowing 
end-users to choose more efficient products. This directive shall apply to energy-related 
products which have a significant direct or indirect impact on the consumption of energy and, 
where relevant, on other essential resources during use. The introduction of the system of 
labels and fiches concerning energy consumption or conservation is accompanied by 
educational and promotional information campaigns aimed at promoting energy efficiency and 
more responsible use of energy by end-users. 
8. Taxation 
Taxation is seen as a powerful tool for providing incentives for energy efficiency, and the 
Commission is planning a range of energy efficiency tax related work. Taxation of energy 
products is to a certain extent harmonized at EU level. The Energy Taxation Directive 
2003/96/EC already now sets forth minimum rates for the taxation of energy products used as 
motor fuels and heating fuels as well as electricity. However, the Directive has become 
outdated and inconsistent. Taxation based on volumes of energy products consumed cannot 
address EU's energy and climate change targets. It also fails to set economic incentives to 
foster growth and stimulate job creation. Taxation of energy products must better take account 
their energy content and their impact on the environment. 
The EC has already presented its proposal to overhaul the outdated rules on the taxation of 
energy products in the European Union. The new rules aim to restructure the way energy 
products are taxed to remove current imbalances and take into account both their CO2 
emissions and energy content. Existing energy taxes would be split into two components that, 
taken together, would determine the overall rate at which a product is taxed. The Commission 
wants to promote energy efficiency and consumption of more environmentally friendly 
products and to avoid distortions of competition in the Single Market. The proposal will help 
Member States to redesign their overall tax structures in a way that contributes to growth and 
employment by shifting taxation from labor to consumption. The revised Directive would enter 
into force as of 2013. Long transitional periods for the full alignment of taxation of the energy 
content, until 2023, will leave time for industry to adapt to the new taxation structure. 
In addition, there were discussion about the value-added tax (VAT), and how it influences 
energy efficiency. Current EU rules on VAT, elaborated in the 2006 VAT Directive 
(2006/112/EC), specify that Member States must subject supplies of goods and services to a 
rate of at least 15%, with the exception of a broad range of areas deemed essential, including 
energy, where countries are free to apply reduced rates of no less than 5%.  Discussions led 
to recent amending directives and regulations for greater flexibility on VAT rates to encourage 
energy efficiency [5]. 
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9. Fiscal incentives 
Direct fiscal incentives for these purposes are, or have been, used in a number of EU Member 
States. In most cases they take the form of a subsidy or rebate provided after the purchase 
(The Netherlands) or paid directly at the check-out (Spain, Hungary, Denmark), in some cases 
delivered only in case of replacement of the old appliance (Spain, Hungary). In Italy the 
consumers receive a tax credit for the purchases of energy-efficient (A+ and A++) refrigerators 
and freezers (delivered only in case of the replacement of the old appliance). The purchases 
of condensing boilers are promoted in France through a tax credit and Austria through region-
specific subsidy schemes. There are also a wide range of programmes, including various 
subsidy schemes, promoting the purchases of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLi) in EU 
countries. 
Direct fiscal incentives address the same policy objective as reduced VAT rates thus 
represent in this sense an alternative instrument. They have a number of advantages 
compared to reduced VAT rates [16]: 
First, subsidy schemes can be better targeted to specific consumer groups, e.g. low income 
households. This helps to address distributional concerns of energy taxation. Targeting may 
also alleviate the free-rider problem, namely the fact that the benefit of a reduced VAT rate 
also goes to the consumers, who would purchase an energy-efficient appliance in any case. 
Hence the same target can be achieved more cost-effectively. In addition, direct fiscal 
incentives are likely to be more visible to consumers and thus may have a stronger signalling 
effect than reduced VAT rates. Second, contrary to direct tax incentives VAT reduced rates 
are not effective in the case of taxable economic agents which can deduct VAT paid on inputs. 
Third, direct fiscal incentives would not probably create the risk of distorting cross-border trade 
in the same way as reduced VAT rates, if they are targeted only to the residents of a country. 
Fourth, subsidies delivered at the check-out or as income tax credits to consumers are more 
certain to reach the consumer than reduced VAT, which may not be entirely passed through to 
retail prices. The same does not apply, however, to corporate tax credits given to the 
manufacturers. Fifth, direct subsidies can be more calibrated to the product characteristics: 
(a) Some products need higher subsidies than others to motivate consumers. Reduced VAT 
may not sufficiently bridge the upfront price gap (which is the most relevant market failure for 
VAT to tackle) in case of large price difference between energy efficient and less efficient 
products and of (downward) price effects on the old stocks of less efficient products. 
(b) Some products to be promoted also often have other better standards (of luxury) than the 
ones the specific policy wants to promote. 
(c) The VAT instrument lacks flexibility in terms of tackling a possible rebound effect (e.g. it 
cannot be required that a purchase subject to a reduced rate concerns a replacement of an 
old appliance). 
On the other hand, compared to reduced VAT rates, the creation of a subsidy scheme can be 
administratively more complex than the differentiation of rates in an existing tax regime (VAT) 
and thus may entail higher administrative costs. Finally, it must be taken into consideration 
that direct fiscal incentives, unlike reduced VAT rates, belong to the sole competence of the 
EU Member States and that therefore their use remains inevitably dispersed if the Member 
States do not coordinate their action in this regard. 
10. Education & Awareness 
Consumers’ purchasing decisions influence the success of the energy efficiency policies. The 
Commission therefore plans a number of educational measures to raise public awareness of 
the importance of energy efficiency, including education and training programmes on energy 
and climate change issues. It also organises competitions to reward the most energy-efficient 
school in the EU. In addition, it considers that public authorities should set an example. The 
Commission itself plans to obtain EMAS certification for all the buildings it owns, and then to 
extend the initiative to all EU institutions. Furthermore, the Commission plans to adopt 
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guidelines on tenders and to set up networks for cities to exchange good practices concerning 
energy efficiency in urban areas [5]. 
11. Monitoring & Evaluation 
Impact assessment, monitoring and evaluation are to be an integral part of the Commission’s 
energy efficiency policy process. Any new policy, revisions or recasts to existing policies must 
be accompanied by an impact assessment report. These reports are themselves reviewed by 
the Impact Assessment Board within the European Commission. 
There is no general requirement to undertake an ex post evaluation of directives or 
Commission policies. However, monitoring requirements are usually written into the relevant 
directives. For example, articles 14 and 15 in the ESD (Directive 2006/32/EC) outline in detail 
how the national energy efficiency action plans will be evaluated and the process for reviewing 
the overall energy services framework [5]. 
12. Supporting Tools 
One of the most important policy supporting tools on energy efficiency is the European 
Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ECEEE), a non-profit, independent organisation. 
ECEEE offers governments, industry, research institutes and citizen organisations a unique 
resource of evidence-based knowledge and reliable information, promotes the understanding 
and application of energy efficiency in society and assists its target groups – from policy 
makers to programme designers to practitioners – with making energy efficiency happen. 
ECEEE participates actively in the European policy making process. The organisation 
participates in a number of EU policy making and advisory fora, and frequently comments on 
European energy policy through position papers and responses to public consultations. It has 
also held expert workshops and briefings for policy makers. It has co-operated with the EC, 
the Parliament and the EU presidency, to hold expert seminars. These institutions appreciate 
the competence and integrity offered by ECEEE's network of members [20]. 
 
 
2.6. Internal Energy Markets 
 
EU efforts to reform electricity and gas industries started in the middle of the 1990s, and the 
aim to build a fully competitive internal market for gas and electricity is a principle embedded 
in the creation of the European Union. Making the energy sector in Europe competitive and 
more efficient is seen as part of the response to growing concerns on the competitiveness of 
European industries in globalising markets. 
Negotiations between the EU authorities, the member states and the market stakeholders 
during the 1990s culminated in an Electricity Directive in 1996, (Directive 96/92/EC) and, in 
1998, in a Gas Directive (Directive 98/30/EC), that introduced a first set of common rules for 
the EU energy market. With only relatively few and brief experiences with market liberalisation 
in Europe and in the rest of the world, and with relatively strong opposition from some EU 
member states, the first market directive only included soft reform provisions. For example, 
the EC encouraged but did not mandate the establishment of an independent regulatory 
authority within each country to supervise the market. 
With regard to electricity, the directive gave the largest customers the possibility to choose 
their supplier. It also included provisions to grant open access to the grids, but without a 
regulated access framework, and also included requirements to unbundle transmission 
system operator functions through accounting procedures from vertically integrated 
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companies. It also introduced the concept of a single buyer, acting in the internal energy 
market but appointed to be the sole supplier in a specific domain. 
For natural gas, the directive aimed at opening the gas networks to third parties (third-party 
access – TPA), and allowing free choice of suppliers for the largest customers. This was to be 
achieved through accounting unbundling of the vertically integrated gas operators, thus 
allowing competition for supplies and customers through the natural monopoly network. The 
reform was intended to create a more appropriate competitive framework, spurring gas-to-gas 
competition, thus increasing economic efficiency and lowering costs for the final consumers in 
markets frequently dominated by monopolies. At the time, wide divergences in prices paid by 
large industrial consumers, despite similar wholesale prices, highlighted the lack of 
competitiveness in EU gas markets in an era of low oil prices. 
Even before the implementation of the first directives was completed, there was a push to 
accelerate gas and electricity market liberalisation. The reason for this was that the first 
directives did not provide much of the legislative framework necessary for comprehensive and 
targeted liberalisation, and had therefore led to uneven results. When the inadequacies in the 
light-handed approach towards regulation and unbundling in the first market directives 
became clear, a new process was launched leading towards a second liberalisation package. 
In March 2002, the European Council decided on market opening for all business energy 
users in 2004 and full market opening in 2005. In 2003, the second market directives were 
adopted (gas: 2003/55/EC; electricity: 2003/54/EC), together with Regulation (EC 1228/2003) 
on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and full 
market opening for all customers was agreed for 1 July 2007. The directives were to be 
implemented by member states by transposing them into their relevant national legislation by 
1 July 2004, whereas the regulation was immediately applied. The main parts of the directive 
and the regulation were: 
Directive 
• A stepwise opening of retail markets towards full market opening for all customers by 1 
July 2007. 
• Stricter provisions for the unbundling of transmission networks, leaving only the options 
of legal separation (establishing a separate company) or full ownership unbundling. 
Provisions for local low-voltage networks are less strict. 
• Provisions for the mandatory establishment of independent regulators. 
Regulation 
• New detailed provisions on cross-border electricity trade. 
In 2001 the European Council requested the Commission to provide detailed assessments of 
the implementation of the market directives on an annual basis, and these were required by 
the second market directive to be finalised by 2005. The series of annual benchmarking 
reports culminated in a comprehensive report in 2005. In general, the benchmarking reports 
are very critical about the lack of implementation of directives and regulations in a large 
number of Member States, they point out that in many of them the provisions that are being 
implemented focus on the letter of the legislation and not on the spirit of creating a true 
internal market. 
The sector inquiry, as well as the Green Paper and the March Council conclusions, led the 
Commission to propose a third liberalisation package in 2007. This agreement materialised in 
proposals for a third market directive and for a new regulation on cross-border electricity trade. 
The proposals were mainly aimed at strengthening the requirements and provisions in the 
second market directive, and maintain the vision for a truly competitive internal market. 
Despite the fact that a group of eight member states rejected the proposal for full ownership 
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unbundling negotiations led to the adoption of Directive 2009/72/EC for electricity, Directive 
2009/72/EC for gas, Regulation 713/2009 for establishing an Agency for the cooperation of 
Energy Regulators, Regulation 714/2009 for cross-border exchanges in electricity and 
Regulation 715/2009 for natural gas transmission networks [5]. 
The most important implemented policies on market reforming are: 
1. Designation of Independent Regulatory Authority 
All Member States must designate a single national regulatory authority at national level. The 
regulatory authority must be independent and exercise its powers impartially and 
transparently. In order to achieve this, Member States must ensure that the regulatory 
authority is legally distinct and functionally independent from any other public or private entity. 
Its staff and persons responsible for its management act independently from any market 
interest and do not seek or take direct instructions from any government or other public or 
private entity when carrying out the regulatory tasks. 
The duties of the regulatory authority is to oversee and monitor the whole electricity and gas 
market in order to facilitate their regular function and the rights and obligations of each one of 
the legal entities and undertakings involved in the markets. 
2. Regional Cooperation 
Member States’ and regulatory authorities’ cooperation for the purpose of integrating their 
national markets at one and more regional levels can be the first step towards the creation of 
a fully liberalised internal market. 
Regulatory authorities and Member States must promote and facilitate the cooperation of 
transmission system operators at a regional level, including on cross-border issues, with the 
aim of creating a competitive internal market in electricity and gas, foster the consistency of 
their legal, regulatory and technical framework and facilitate integration of the isolated 
systems forming electricity islands that persist in the Community. The geographical areas 
covered by such regional cooperation shall include cooperation in geographical areas defined 
in Regulation 714 and 715/2009 [40] [41]. 
3. Unbundling of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) 
The Directive 2009/72/EC determines three models for the unbundling of the TSOs: The 
Ownership Unbundled TSO (OU), the Independent System Operator (ISO) and the 
Independent Transmission Operator (ITO). 
In the OU model the same person or persons are entitled directly or indirectly to exercise 
control over an undertaking performing any of the functions of generation or supply, does/do 
not have the right to exercise control directly or indirectly or exercise any right over a TSO or 
over a transmission system and vice versa. The same person or persons are not entitled to 
appoint members or be a member of the supervisory board, the administrative board or bodies 
legally representing the undertaking, of a TSO and directly or indirectly to exercise control or 
exercise any right over an undertaking performing any of the functions of generation or supply. 
The OU model is accompanied by a strong functional unbundling. 
The ISO model is an alternative to the OU model. The setting up of a system operator or a 
transmission operator that is independent from supply and generation interests should enable 
a VIU to maintain its ownership of network assets whilst ensuring effective separation of 
interests, provided that such independent system operator or transmission operator performs 
all the functions of a system operator. So, the ISO model maintains the assets to the VIU and 
requests a strong regulatory environment to function. It is the alternative solution for the 
Member States where on 3 September 2009 an undertaking owing a transmission system was 
a part of a VIU. 
The ITO is the second main model set out by the electricity directive. The main difference 
between the ISO and the ITO is the lack of the non-control obligation, which is a prerequisite 
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in both the OU TSO and the ISO. The main rule for the function of the ITO is that it must be 
equipped with all human, technical, physical and financial resources necessary for fulfilling 
their obligations under this directive, as well as carry out the activity of electricity transmission. 
4. Unbundling of Distribution System Operators (DSOs) 
When a DSO is a part of a VIU, legal and functional unbundling measures must be applied. In 
particular, the DSO must be independent at least in terms of its legal form (legal unbundling), 
organization and decision making from other activities not relating to distribution (functional 
unbundling). Those rules shall not create the obligation to separate the ownership of assets of 
the DSO from the VIU. In addition to these requirements, where a DSO is a part of a VIU, it 
must be independent in terms of its organization and decision-making from the other activities 
not related to distribution. 
Member States may decide not to apply the unbundling measures to integrated electricity 
undertakings serving less than 100.000 connected customers or serving small isolated 
systems. 
5. Unbundling & Transparency of Accounts 
Member States or any competent authority they designate, including the regulatory authorities 
and the dispute settlement authorities, have right of access to the accounts of natural gas and 
electricity undertakings if it is necessary to carry out their functions. 
Electricity and natural gas undertakings, whatever their system of ownership or legal form, 
shall draw up, submit to audit and publish their annual accounts in accordance with the rules 
of national law concerning the annual accounts of limited liability companies. Undertakings 
which are not legally obliged to publish their annual accounts shall keep a copy thereof at the 
disposal of the public at their head office. 
Electricity and natural gas undertakings must, in their internal accounting, keep separate 
accounts for each of their transmission and distribution activities as they would be required to 
do if the activities in question were carried out by separate undertakings, with a view to 
avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition. They must also keep 
accounts, which may be consolidated, for other electricity and gas activities not relating to 
transmission or distribution. Revenue from ownership of the transmission or distribution 
system must be specified in the accounts and where appropriate, they must keep 
consolidated accounts for other, non-electricity/gas activities. The internal accounts must 
include a balance sheet and a profit and loss account for each activity [40] [41]. 
6. Third Party Access (TPA) 
Member States must ensure the implementation of a system of TPA to the transmission and 
distribution systems based on published tariffs, applicable to all eligible customers and applied 
objectively and without discrimination between system users. Those tariffs, or the 
methodologies underlying their calculation, are to be approved and published prior to their 
entry into force. 
The TSO or DSO can refuse access where it lacks the necessary capacity or where the 
access to the system would prevent them from carrying out the PSOs. Clearly specified 
reasons must be given for such refusal based on objective and technically and economically 
justified criteria which must be consistently applied. The system user who has been refused 
access can make use of a dispute settlement procedure. The TSO or DSO must provide 
relevant information on measures that would be necessary to reinforce the network. The party 
requesting such information may be charged a reasonable fee reflecting the cost of providing 
such information. 
7. Dispatching & Balancing Rules 
National regulatory authorities must determine the criteria on which the dispatching of 
generating installations and the use of interconnectors will be based. These criteria must be 
published and applied in a non-discriminatory manner, ensuring the proper functioning of the 
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internal market in electricity. The criteria must also take into account the economic 
precedence of electricity from available generating installations or interconnector transfers and 
the technical constraints on the system. 
Dispatching priority must be given to generating installations using renewable energy sources 
and CHP. For reasons of security of supply, priority can be given to the dispatch of generating 
installations using indigenous primary energy fuel sources, to an extent not exceeding, in any 
calendar year, 15% of the overall primary energy necessary to produce the electricity 
consumed in the Member State. 
TSOs must comply with minimum standards for the maintenance and development of the 
transmission system, including interconnection capacity. They must adopt rules for balancing 
the electricity system and charging system users of their networks for energy imbalance. 
8. Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 
One of the main rules for the organization of the electricity and gas sectors is the possibility of 
the Member States to impose on undertakings PSOs. PSOs belong to the universal services, 
which came as a consequence of the liberalization of the energy market, and are considered 
as the right of all households to be supplied at a reasonable, easily and clearly comparable 
and transparent price. The main elements of the universal services are the obligation to 
connect, the quality and regularity of supply and prices. In the above ambit, the establishment 
of last resort, the protection of remote customers and the universal services to small 
enterprises are included. Ensuring universal services may be one of the reasons for imposing 
a PSO, especially in less developed markets. 
The PSOs may be related to security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price 
of supply, environmental protection, including energy efficiency, energy from RES and climate 
protection. In the area of final customer protection, the protection of vulnerable customer is 
included. Supplying vulnerable customers is recognized as an important task. 
9. Subsidies 
Under current EU legislation, it is possible to provide for subsidies in energy markets. 
Traditionally, the most important subsidies have been to support coal production, or its 
gradual phase-out. With the emerging policy objective of decarbonising energy supply, 
subsidies have become available to renewable energy as well. For energy security and 
diversification of supply, Member States are also allowed to set public service obligations 
(PSOs), supporting the use of a particular fuel financially. 
The design of subsidies varies by Member State. It is possible for subsidies to be paid largely 
in a manner that is compatible with an open energy market, or that the subsidy is paid in a 
way that precludes the active participation of the subsidised energy producer in the market. 
State subsidies which provide an economic advantage to certain undertakings and have the 
potential of distorting competition and which affect trade between Member States have to be 
approved by the Commission. However, according to case law, measures (involving for 
example renewable electricity feed-in tariffs) which are designed according to the relevant 
legislation fall outside of the Commission’s state aid control remit. 
The Commission aims to persuade Member States to grant less state aid in general and to 
redirect spending to horizontal purposes of common interest, such as environmental 
protection and allow them, within certain limits, to continue to encourage state aid for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
The European Council meeting of spring 2006 asked for further work on appropriate 
incentives and disincentives, and called for the reform of subsidies that have considerable 
negative effects on the environment and are incompatible with sustainable development, with 
a view to gradually eliminating them. The Commission stressed in Green Paper on market-
based instruments for environment and related policy issues [COM(2007)140] that it will work 
with Member States towards this objective [5]. 
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10. Review & Reporting 
The Commission must monitor and review the application of the electricity and gas market 
directives and should submit an overall progress report to the EP and the Council for the first 
time by 4 August 2004, and thereafter on an annual basis. Every two years, the progress 
report must also include an analysis of the different measures taken in the Member States to 
meet PSOs, together with an examination of the effectiveness of those measures and, in 
particular, their effects on competition in the energy market. Where appropriate, the report 
may include recommendations as to the measures to be taken at national level to achieve 
high public service standards, or measures intended to prevent market foreclosure. 
By 3 March 2013, the EC must submit, as part of the general review, to the EP and the 
Council, a detailed specific report outlining the extent to which the unbundling requirements 
have been successful in ensuring full and effective independence of TSOs, using effective and 
efficient unbundling as a benchmark. 
11. Supporting Tools 
Towards the difficult task of energy market liberalization, policy supporting tools seem to play 
crucial role. Some of the most important will be presented here. 
With the regulation 713/2009, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is 
established. The purpose of the ACER is to assist the regulatory authorities in exercising at 
Community level, the regulatory tasks performed in the Member States and, where necessary, 
to coordinate their action. The types of the ACER’s acts are to issue opinions and 
recommendations addressed to TSOs, regulatory authorities, the EP and the Council or the 
Commission, to take individual decisions in the specific cases and submit to the Commission 
non-binding framework guidelines on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 
exchanges in electricity and the natural gas transmission networks. 
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) is the voice of Europe's national 
regulators of electricity and gas at EU and international level. Through CEER, a non-for-profit 
association, the national regulators cooperate and exchange best practice.  A key objective of 
the CEER is to facilitate the creation of a single, competitive, efficient and sustainable EU 
internal energy market that works in the public interest. [63] 
The establishment of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO) for 
electricity and gas, aims at cooperation of the TSOs at Community level through the ENTSO 
in order to promote the completion and functioning of the internal market in electricity/gas and 
cross-border trade and to ensure the optimal management, coordinated operation and sound 
technical evolution of the European electricity/gas transmission network. The ACER will 
monitor the execution of ENTSO’s tasks and report to the Commission. 
 
 
2.7. Security of Energy Supply 
 
The European Union is dependent to varying degrees on energy imports of oil, gas, coal and 
electricity. Some individual member states may be self sufficient in one of these energy 
sources, or overall net exporters. Since 2005, some major events made energy security of 
supply a major issue in European energy policy. These events include the rapid rise of fossil 
fuel prices since 2004; the interruption of gas supplies from Russia in January 2006, with 
resulting gas shortages in a number of EU Member States, and the continuing threat that 
disputes between neighbouring suppliers and transit countries will affect supplies of gas and 
oil to the EU; a major electricity blackout in November 2006, affecting large parts of north-
western Europe, and caused by a transmission system management failure in northern 
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Germany; the development of the internal energy market; and the political commitment of the 
EU to a transition to high-efficiency, low-carbon energy system [5]. 
As a consequence of these events and developments, energy security policy has been 
recognised as a major challenge for the EU-27, with action at European level being required. 
All the policies mentioned in the previous chapters up to now aim at security of energy supply 
as one of their major targets. The fuel and suppliers diversification through RE penetration 
and external energy relations is one pillar. Another is the aim for a single, integrated European 
energy market through the internal market reform so as to help the so important internal trade. 
However there are a few more specific policies in security of supply that must be mentioned: 
1. Measures on Security of Gas Supply 
The Regulation 994/2010 (which repealed the Directive 2004/67/EC) establishes provisions 
aimed at safeguarding the security of gas supply by ensuring the proper and continuous 
functioning of the internal market in natural gas. Towards this direction a list of market and 
non-market based security measures is provided and Member States must establish 
preventive action plans and emergency plans. A Gas Coordination Group is established to 
facilitate the coordination of measures concerning security of gas supply. 
2. Measures on Security of Electricity Supply 
The Directive 2005/89/EC establishes measures aiming at safeguarding security of electricity 
supply so as to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market for electricity and to 
ensure: 
• an adequate level of generation capacity; 
• an adequate balance between supply and demand and 
• an appropriate level of interconnection between Member States for the development of 
the internal market. 
It also establishes a framework within which Member States are to define transparent, stable 
and non-discriminatory policies on security of electricity supply compatible with the 
requirements of a competitive internal market for electricity. 
3. Increasing Interconnections & Enforcing Infrastructure 
The Trans-European Networks – Energy program aims at increasing the interconnections in 
both electricity and gas sector and enforce their infrastructure. 
In the electricity sector, the primary aim of the TEN-E programme is to establish additional 
internal interconnections to support trade of electricity within the EU, equivalent to cross-
border transmission capacity corresponding to at least 10% of installed generating capacity, 
following a EC decision in spring 2002. This commitment recognises the importance of cross 
border transmission capacity in realising the vision of an internal electricity market. TEN-E 
identifies major transmission axes, major bottlenecks in these corridors and additional priority 
projects of regional importance; 196 priority electricity transmission projects were decided in 
2003, 32 of them categorised as being of European interest and 164 of common interest.  
In the gas sector, the main aim of the TEN-E programme is to provide additional routes and 
access to more sources of gas, to increase diversification. Projects can either be pipelines, or 
LNG import terminals, or storage [5]. 
4. Emergency Oil Stocks 
EU member states are obliged to hold emergency oil stocks under Directive 2006/67/EC, 
which is the codification of older legislation dating back to 1968. Stocks have to cover 90 days 
of consumption in most Member States (except eight states with a transition arrangement) 
and 67,5 days for net exporters or countries in an almost balanced position regarding imports. 
They should be held in the form of petroleum products, fuel oil, diesel, or gasoline. Member 
States have to report on their stockholding on a monthly basis, but are free to choose the 
arrangements they deem appropriate for the stockholding. At the end of September 2007, only 
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two member states were not complying with the stockholding arrangement. Non-compliance 
can lead to an infringement procedure by the Commission. In case of a supply disruption, the 
EU Oil Supply Group will consult on releasing the stocks. 
Following a decision by the European Council in 2007, the Commission started work on 
amending the framework of oil stockholding in the EU with the aim to make it more compatible 
with the tested IEA emergency stockholding system. This led to the Directive 2009/119/EC 
which will be into force from 31 December of 2012. 
5. National Emergency Plans 
Member States are to have procedures in place and contingency plans to be implemented in 
the event of a major supply disruption. These procedures will enable competent authorities to 
release quickly, effectively and transparently some or all of their emergency and specific 
stocks, and will impose general or specific restrictions on consumption in line with the 
estimated shortages, by allocating petroleum products to certain groups of users on a priority 
basis. Also, in order to meet local crisis, a Member State may release emergency stock in 
amounts lower than the compulsory minimum level set by the Directive 2006/67/EC. 
 
 
2.8. Environmental Protection 
 
Commission policies to reduce emissions of CO2 date back to 1991, and the first 
comprehensive policy was launched by the Commission in the form of the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP) in 2000, which is currently in its second phase. The goal of the 
ECCP is to identify and develop all the necessary elements of an EU strategy to implement 
the Kyoto Protocol, and it has led to the adoption of a wide range of new policies and 
measures. 
The Kyoto Protocol was ratified in 2002. It was committed to an 8% reduction of GHG 
emissions during the commitment period 2008-2012, compared to base-year emissions, which 
vary between Member States. This target was distributed among the then EU-15 through a 
burden-sharing agreement in 2002. The latest EU-12 are not subject to the burden-sharing 
agreement but instead have to fulfil their targets as signatories of the Protocol. The burden-
sharing agreement stipulated that not more than 50% of emissions reductions in any Member 
State could come from the use of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms (clean development 
mechanism and joint implementation), but otherwise left the development of national policies 
to reduce GHG emissions up to Member State governments. For the post-Kyoto regime, the 
EU will again aim to have a single target assigned to it, and redistribute it internally. 
Until 2005, the Commission pursued climate change policy solely as a co-operative exercise 
within the Kyoto framework. With the date of expiry of this framework by 2013 coming closer, 
and a perceived lack of urgency on the part of international partners, a policy change took 
place. As a consequence, in 2007 the EU agreed to pursue unilateral GHG emissions 
reductions of 20% by 2020, while offering to step these up to 30% in the case of a new global 
agreement being found. 
Air pollution was one of the early areas of the Commission’s energy and environment policy, 
and pollution control legislation is now affecting transport and power generation in particular. 
Most affected are coal-fired power stations, in particular because of the legislation restricting 
SO2 emissions. In the area of transport, NOX and particles are being controlled, with 
implications for diesel vehicles. 
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The most important policy instruments affecting the energy sector are the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control Directive (IPPCD, Directive 96/61/EC, as amended), regulating a 
broad range of industrial and agricultural activities as well as the Large Combustion Plant 
Directive (LCPD, Directive 2001/80/EC, which has replaced the old LCP Directive 88/609/ 
EEC from 1988), setting out minimum requirements for emissions to air from these plants. 
Industrial installations covered under the IPPC Directive are responsible for 83% of the EU’s 
SO2 emissions, 34% of NOX emissions, 43% of particles and 55% of volatile organic 
compound (VOC) emissions, according to the Commission. 
Renewable energy penetration and energy efficiency policies aim at mitigating the climate 
change and environmental protection. Some more specific policies though are: 
1. EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
The EU ETS is the first and biggest international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas 
emission allowances, the EU ETS covers some 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in 
30 countries. Launched in 2005, the EU ETS works on the "cap and trade" principle. This 
means there is a "cap", or limit, on the total amount of certain greenhouse gases that can be 
emitted by the factories, power plants and other installations in the system. Within this cap, 
companies receive emission allowances which they can sell to or buy from one another as 
needed. The limit on the total number of allowances available ensures that they have a value. 
At the end of each year each company must surrender enough allowances to cover all its 
emissions, otherwise heavy fines are imposed. If a company reduces its emissions, it can 
keep the spare allowances to cover its future needs or else sell them to another company that 
is short of allowances. The flexibility that trading brings ensures that emissions are cut where 
it costs least to do so. 
The number of allowances is reduced over time so that total emissions fall. In 2020 emissions 
allowances will be 21% lower than in 2005. 
The ETS now operates in 30 countries (the 27 EU Member States plus Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway). It covers CO2 emissions from installations such as power stations, combustion 
plants, oil refineries and iron and steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, 
bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. Nitrous oxide emissions from certain processes are 
also covered. Between them, the installations currently in the scheme account for almost half 
of the EU's CO2 emissions and 40% of its total greenhouse gas emissions. 
Airlines will join the scheme in 2012. The EU ETS will be further expanded to the 
petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium industries and to additional gases in 2013, when the 
third trading period will start. At the same time a series of important changes to the way the 
EU ETS works will take effect in order to strengthen the system. 
The success of the EU ETS has inspired other countries and regions to launch cap and trade 
schemes of their own. The EU hopes to link up the ETS with compatible systems around the 
world to form the backbone of a global carbon market [51]. 
2. National Allocation Plans (NAPs) 
National allocation plans (NAPs) are plans that set out each Member State’s allocation of CO2 
emission allowances under the EU ETS. NAPs fix both the total of emission allocations 
available in each Member State and the allocation made to each installation covered by the 
scheme. By placing a cap on the total number of emission allowances, NAPs create the 
scarcity needed for a functioning market in allowances to develop. This in turn enables 
companies to limit or reduce their emissions at least cost. 
Member States are required to draw up their NAP well in advance of each ETS trading period 
and to have it approved by the European Commission. NAPs for the second ETS trading 
period, running from 2008 to 2012, should be submitted to the Commission by 30 June 2006. 
This deadline needs to be respected so that the Commission can take decisions on all 25 
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NAPs and member states could take their final allocation decisions by the end of 2006, well 
before the second trading period starts. 
The second trading period under the ETS coincides with the five-year period – known as the 
‘first commitment period’ - in which the EU and member states must meet their targets for 
limiting or reducing emissions of greenhouse gases under the Kyoto Protocol on climate 
change. For many Member States the NAPs for 2008-2012 are likely to play an important part 
in ensuring their targets are achieved.  
3. Emission Limit Values for LCP 
The Directive 2001/80/EC sets specific emission limit values for Large Combustion Plants 
(LCP) of thermal input equal or over 50kW. 
4. Vehicle labelling 
For motor-vehicle it isn't electrical efficiency that is indicated through labeling but information 
on fuel consumption and/or CO2 emissions. The EU Directive (1999/94/EC) obliges car 
manufacturers and distributors to display information on fuel consumption and CO2 emissions 
of new passenger cars in showrooms and within any marketing activity (CO2 label). The labels 
include mandatory data on CO2 emissions (g/km) and fuel consumption (l/100km and/or km/l). 
The EU directive allows the member states plenty of room for national implementation; as a 
result, the labelling systems differ within Europe. 
CO2 labeling is a practical method to inform consumers about the fuel economy and 
environmental standards of the new cars. But as the buying decisions are strongly influenced 
by costs, size, power, manufacturer and safety of the car, the impact on the consumer 
decision is quite low. For this reason, relative comparison methods on the labels are 
preferable. CO2 labeling may lead to a growing awareness about environmental impacts of car 
use and in combination with tax incentives (e.g. the "Green motor tax" in Denmark or Vehicle 
Registration Tax in Ireland), it may already help shifting consumer decisions to more 
environmental friendly cars. 
5. Vehicle Emission Standards 
European emission standards define the acceptable limits for exhaust emissions of new 
vehicles sold in EU member states. The emission standards are defined in a series of 
European Union directives staging the progressive introduction of increasingly stringent 
standards. 
Currently, emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), total hydrocarbon (THC), non-methane 
hydrocarbons (NMHC), carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate matter (PM) are regulated for 
most vehicle types, including cars, lorries, trains, tractors and similar machinery, barges, but 
excluding seagoing ships and aeroplanes. For each vehicle type, different standards apply. 
Compliance is determined by running the engine at a standardised test cycle. Non-compliant 
vehicles cannot be sold in the EU, but new standards do not apply to vehicles already on the 
roads. No use of specific technologies is mandated to meet the standards, though available 
technology is considered when setting the standards. New models introduced must meet 
current or planned standards, but minor lifecycle model revisions may continue to be offered 
with pre-compliant engines. 
Voluntary agreement between the European Commission and European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (ACEA) to limit the amount of CO2 emitted by passenger cars sold 
in Europe is known as ACEA agreement. Signed in 1998, the agreement sought to achieve an 
average of 140 g/km of CO2 by 2008 for new passenger vehicles sold by the association's 
cars in Europe. This target represents a 25% reduction from the 1995 level of 186 g/km and is 
equivalent to a fuel economy of 5,8 l/100 km or 5,25 l/100 km for petrol and diesel engines 
respectively. However, the average for the whole car market for 2008 was 153,7 g/km, so the 
target has not been achieved. The ultimate EU target, to which these agreements are to 
contribute, is to reach an average CO2 emission (as measured according to Commission 
Directive 93/116/EC) of 130 g/km for all new passenger cars by 2015. 
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6. Fuel Quality 
The Directive 2009/30/EC, which amended the Directive 98/70/EC and 99/32/EC, set 
technical specifications on health and environmental grounds for fuels and a target for the 
reduction of life cycle GHG emissions. 
Fuel suppliers are responsible for monitoring and reporting life cycle greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of energy from fuel. From 1 January 2011 and every year on they must 
report to the authority designated by the Member State on the greenhouse gas intensity of fuel 
and energy supplied within each Member State, by providing the total volume of each type of 
fuel or energy supplied, indicating where purchased and its origin and life cycle greenhouse 
gas emissions per unit of energy. 
The directive also provides environmental specifications for market fuels to be used for 
vehicles equipped with positive and compression ignition engines as well as rules for 
calculating the GHG emissions from biofuels. 
7. Provisions for Industrial Activities 
For industrial activities set in detail in Annex 1 of the Directive 2010/75/EU, Member States 
must take the necessary measures to provide that installations are operated in accordance 
with the principles set in article 11 of the directive. Besides these general principles governing 
the basic obligations of the operator, there are special provisions for: 
• Combustion plants 
• Waste incineration and co-incineration plants 
• Installations and activities using organic solvents 
• Installations producing titanium dioxide 
8. Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) 
The Directive 2009/31/EC establishes a legal framework for the environmentally safe 
geological storage of carbon dioxide to contribute to the fight against climate change. The 
purpose of environmentally safe geological storage of CO2 is the permanent containment of 
CO2 in such a way as to eliminate or prevent, as far as possible, negative effects and any risk 
to the environment and human health. Also criteria for the selection of storage sites and 
storage permits are provided. 
 
 
2.9. Nuclear Energy 
 
Nuclear energy is currently the largest single source of low-carbon electricity in the EU, 
equivalent to 260 Mtoe, or 14% of the EU total energy supply. There are 144 nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) operating in 14 Member States and in 2009 these provided 27% of the total 
electricity generated in the Union. European NPPs are among the most efficiently operated 
reactors in the world. Those operating today, and the 68 NPPs that operated previously and 
were retired from service, have delivered significant amounts of baseload electricity. 
Nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Member States employ leading-edge technologies and have 
sufficient capacity to supply EU requirements. Technologies available include reprocessing, 
which makes more efficient use of the energy available in uranium through recycling and 
reduces the volume of spent fuel waste. Some Member States also have the most advanced 
programs in the world to safely dispose of spent nuclear fuel in deep geological repositories. 
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Nuclear power remains a controversial issue and the EU nuclear reactor fleet is ageing. Power 
uprates and lifetime extensions, in some cases to 60 years, of several EU reactors have 
improved performance and output. Despite this, EU nuclear generating capacity will decline 
from now on, unless significant investment is forthcoming in the near future for plant lifetime 
extensions and the replacement of facilities reaching the end of their operating lives. Without 
this investment, this low-carbon source of baseload electricity generation could be reduced 
from 31% to 21% of the total electricity generated in the EU in 2020. Reduced electricity 
generation in NPPs will make the ambitious EU goal of a 20 to 30% reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions by 2020 even more challenging. 
Electricity generation in NPPs enhances EU efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
clean air initiatives as it is a low-emission technology with no direct emissions of CO2, NOx, 
SOx, ozone and particulate matter. Nuclear power also enhances EU security of energy 
supply, since uranium is widely distributed and about 50% of global mine production comes 
from reliable, politically stable trading partners. In 2006, Canada, Australia and the United 
States supplied about 40% of the natural uranium to EU utilities. 
Within the EU there are widely differing attitudes to the acceptability of nuclear power and it is 
up to each member country to choose to include it as part of its energy mix. Similarly, nuclear 
regulation is a national responsibility. Regulatory approval processes for NPPs are typically 
long and add to investor uncertainty, and they differ from country to country. While regulation 
will remain a national responsibility, there are moves for greater co-operation internationally, 
for example the Multi-National Design Evaluation Process and the activities of the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association [5]. 
However after the accident in Fukushima on 3 March 2011 EU released a statement calling 
for the following priorities: 
• Review the safety of all EU nuclear power plants through stress tests. The assessments 
will be conducted by independent national authorities. The EC will assess initial findings 
by the end of 2011. 
• Request that similar “stress tests” be carried out in neighboring countries and worldwide. 
• The highest standards for nuclear safety should be implemented and continuously 
improved in the EU and promoted internationally. 
• The EC will review the existing legal and regulatory framework for the safety of nuclear 
installations and will propose by the end of 2011 any necessary improvements. 
 
 
2.10. Research & Development 
 
R&D is considered as a top priority policy sector in EU, with significant contribution towards 
the energy efficiency and RES targets and penetration. Collaborative R&D, including energy 
R&D, has a long history in the EU. The Commission has traditionally been in charge of 
preparing and developing programs with a dual focus on achieving R&D results and on 
creating an integrated European research landscape. 
European energy R&D funding is today primarily aiming to integrate R&D efforts across 
borders, by building long-term partnerships and increasing effective exchange of R&D results 
at European level. The EU support programs therefore run in parallel with national support 
programs, but have now become an important source of funding for R&D institutions in the 
EU. With the recent strong focus on creating a competitive low-carbon economy in Europe, 
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energy R&D has also become a key element in the Commission’s low-carbon strategy. This is 
backed by other European institutions, most importantly the European Council, that on 14 
March 2008 emphasized the need for sustained investment in R&D and an active take-up of 
new technologies in energy. The main R&D programs in the EU are: 
1. The Framework Program (FP) 
The multi-annual Framework Program for Research and Technology Development (FP) is the 
main instrument for the implementation of European energy research policy, and for the 
provision of funding by the EU to R&D activities since 1984. It covers almost all aspects of European 
research. The FP is the EU’s main financial and legal instrument to implement the European Research 
Area. The current Seventh Framework Program (FP7) is running from 2007 to 2013. It comprises four 
specific sub-programs: Cooperation (including energy), Ideas, People, and Capacities, and is part of the 
Lisbon Agenda of the EU. 
The Commission, Parliament and the Council together decide on the FP, as set out in the European 
Treaties. The Commission plays a key role in the development of the FP, and attempts to use it to 
support overall policy goals.  
Under the structure of FP7, energy research is split into nuclear R&D, managed by the Euratom 
Directorate of DG ENER, with the program running from 2007 to 2011, and non-nuclear energy 
research, from 2007 to 2013. Under the energy theme of the FP7 Co-operation Program, nine subject 
areas for non-nuclear energy research have been identified, as set out below. These continue 
to be strongly focused on energy supply technologies: 
• Hydrogen and fuel cells 
• Renewable electricity generation 
• Renewable fuel production 
• Renewables for heating and cooling 
• CCS technologies 
• Clean coal technologies 
• Smart energy networks 
• Energy efficiency and savings 
• Knowledge for energy policy making 
The bulk of nuclear spending in FP7 is allocated to the ITER fusion reactor project at 
Cadarache in France. For fusion energy, the priorities are the realization of the ITER project, 
including an accompanying program for the exploitation of the ITER device and the 
preparations for the development of demonstration reactors. In the nuclear fission R&D area, 
FP7 priority activities include the following three areas: 
• Waste management, including geological disposal. 
• Reactor systems, including nuclear installation safety and development of advanced 
reactor concepts. 
• Radiation protection. 
2. Strategic Energy Technology Plan (SET-Plan) 
The European Council agreed on an “Energy Policy for Europe” in March 2007, backing the 
Commission’s proposals on energy and climate change, and underlining the need to 
strengthen energy research, in particular to accelerate the competitiveness of sustainable 
energies, notably RE and low-carbon technologies and the further development of energy 
efficient technologies. The Council decision acknowledged that low-carbon technologies will 
play a vital role in reaching the EU’s energy and climate change targets. 
Because of the timing of the start of FP7, it had not been possible to reflect this in the design 
of the FPAs, and energy technology innovation therefore had a relatively low priority in the 
funding allocation of FP7. To rectify this to some extent, the Commission adopted the SET 
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Plan on 22 November 2007. Its main goal is to accelerate the development and 
implementation of low-carbon technologies, and to help overcome the issue of funds already 
allocated for the period 2007 to 2013 under FP7. 
The time horizon of the SET Plan includes both a 2020 perspective and a long-term vision to 
2050. It also sets out the key EU technology challenges for the next ten years to meet the 
2020 targets and also the technology challenges that will have to be addressed to put the EU 
on course to achieve the 2050 vision. The plan aims to provide a twin-track approach, of 
reinforcing research to lower costs and improve performance; and of continuing proactive 
support measures to create business opportunities, stimulate market development and 
address the non-technological barriers that discourage innovation and the market deployment 
of efficient and low carbon technologies. The SET-Plan includes: 
• The European Industrial Bioenergy Initiative 
• The European CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage Initiative 
• The European Electricity Grid Initiative 
• The Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Technology Initiative 
• The Sustainable Nuclear Initiative 
• Energy Efficiency – The Smart Cities Initiative 
• The Solar Europe Initiative 
• The European Wind Initiative 
The SET-Plan also includes the next supporting tools: 
The SET-Plan Steering Group (SET-Group) which coordinates the implementation of the SET-
Plan by providing a high-level discussion platform and a flexible framework for strategic 
planning and implementation. It works to maximize the cost-effective contribution that 
technology can make to achieving Europe’s energy goals. 
The European Energy Research Alliance (EERA) which aims to accelerate the development of 
new energy technologies with the help of Joint Research Programs supporting the SET-Plan 
by concentrating activities and resources, combining national and EU sources of funding and 
maximizing complementarities and synergies. 
The SET-Plan Information System (SETIS). It supports the strategic planning and 
implementation of the SET-Plan. It makes the case for technology options and priorities, 
monitors and reviews progress regarding implementation, assesses the impact on policy, and 
identifies corrective measures if needed. SETIS works in close collaboration with European 
stakeholders such as the ETPs, industrial stakeholders, trade associations, international 
organizations and the finance community [59]. 
3. Research Fund for Coal and Steel 
The industry-focused research program of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel (RFCS) is 
complementary to and managed outside FP7. It was created when the ECSC Treaty expired 
in July 2002. With a yearly budget of around € 60 million, financed by the interests accrued 
each year by the assets of the ECSC (€ 1.600 millions) at the time of the Treaty’s expiry, the 
fund supports research projects in the areas of coal and steel [5]. 
4. Supporting Tools 
Some of the most important R&D program’s supporting tools are presented below: 
The Energy Technology Platforms (ETPs) bring together R&D stakeholders, led by industry, to 
define medium- to long-term research and technological development objectives. There are 
seven ETPs: Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (established in 2003), Solar Photovoltaics (2005), Zero-
Emission Fossil Fuels (2005), Smart Grids (2006), Biofuels (2006), Solar Thermal (2006) and 
Wind (2006). ETPs help the stakeholders establish long-term Strategic Research Agendas 
(SRAs), and contribute directly to the FP7 work plans, ensuring that EU-funded R&D is 
relevant for users. In order to secure implementation of their SRA, a primary objective of the 
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ETPs is to influence industrial and research policy, at EU, national and regional levels, and to 
encourage public and private investments in R&D and innovation in key technological areas. 
The SRAs have provided input which was taken into account when designing FP7 and will 
continue to impact on the annual work programs of the FP7. 
The Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs) have been developed by some ETPs. The concept of 
JTIs was introduced in FP7 as a way of creating public-private partnerships in European R&D. 
In a limited number of cases, JTIs may be set up to implement ETP SRAs (or parts thereof) 
where these have achieved such an ambitious scale and scope that existing instruments are 
not appropriate. To help identify such cases where a JTI could be of particular relevance, 
identification criteria have been developed by the Commission. While ETPs allow public and 
private stakeholders to jointly define research needs, JTIs are a way of implementing large-
scale applied and industrial focused research activities, based in part on the needs identified 
by ETPs. 
The Competitiveness & Innovation Program (CIP) and especially its Intelligent Energy for 
Europe pillar are aiming to complement the FP7 activities by addressing non-technological 
barriers and providing support to accelerate investment and stimulate the market uptake of 
innovative technologies across the Community. This program is run by the Executive Agency 
for Competitiveness and Innovation. The key aim of the CIP is to create an EU-wide network 
of actors capable of participating in European as well as national, regional and local initiatives 
furthering sustainable energy use. This EU-wide infrastructure is expected to allow the 
extensive sharing of experiences through dedicated networks [5]. 
 
 
2.11. External Relations 
 
International energy policy must pursue the common goals of security of supply, 
competitiveness and sustainability. While relations with producing and transit countries are 
important, relations with large energy-consuming nations and particularly emerging and 
developing countries are of growing significance. Cooperation with supplier and transit 
countries takes place within multilateral frameworks such as the World Trade Organization 
and the Energy Charter Treaty, through regional initiatives such as the Energy Community 
Treaty (to which the European Community is a party) and in the bilateral context through 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Free Trade Agreements, which provide legally 
binding rules for the energy sector. 
By the end of 2011 the Commission is about to present concrete proposals to reinforce the 
overall consistency and efficiency of our external energy policy, involving Member States, 
various external policies of the EU and external support programs. Some of the most 
important external relations of the EU are: 
1. EU-Russia Energy Partnership 
Russia and the European Union are natural partners in the energy sector. The energy 
partnership aims to improve the investment opportunities in Russia’s energy sector in order to 
upgrade and expand the energy production and transportation infrastructure, as well as 
improve their environmental impact, to encourage the ongoing opening up of energy markets, 
to facilitate the market penetration of more environmentally friendly technologies and energy 
resources and to promote energy efficiency and energy savings. 
Russia is already the largest single energy partner of the EU and is bound to become even 
more integrated in Europe’s energy equation. Russia has been a most reliable energy 
supplier, always respecting the dates, amounts and prices concluded even during periods of 
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internal political turbulence or dramatic world market developments. In this respect, Russia 
deserves to play a role in the EU internal energy market subject, however, to conditions of 
reciprocity in market principles, mechanisms and opportunities, as well as equivalent 
environmental standards. 
The Energy Dialogue with Russia has rapidly become one of the key issues in bi-lateral EU-
Russia relations and one in which the format of frank, open discussions have already 
permitted substantial progress to be made [51]. 
2. Africa-Europe Energy Partnership (AEEP) 
The AEEP is a long-term framework for structured political dialogue and co-operation between 
Africa and the EU on energy issues of strategic importance, reflecting African and European 
needs. Through the Partnership, Africa and Europe work together to develop a shared vision 
and common policy answers, and to stimulate specific actions that address the energy 
challenges of the 21st century. 
AEEP initiatives contribute to existing national, regional and continental energy objectives and 
strategies in Africa, and take into account the necessary social and environmental standards. 
The overall objective of the AEEP is improved access to reliable, secure, affordable, cost-
effective, climate friendly and sustainable energy services for both continents, with a special 
focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa. In order to achieve its overall 
objective, the AEEP will focus its efforts on concrete, realistic, visible targets to be attained by 
2020, as agreed by the First High Level Meeting of the AEEP held in Vienna on 14–15 
September 2010. Some of these targets are the increase of electricity interconnections both 
within Africa and between Africa and the EU; doubling the use of natural gas use in Africa, 
and exports to the EU; increase the RES installed capacity; improving energy efficiency in 
Africa in all sectors etc [52]. 
3. EU-US Energy Cooperation 
The EU and the US share a long tradition working together to promote strong economic 
growth. This is pursued through multilateral and bilateral mechanisms. Bilaterally, the EU-US 
annual presidential Summits have fostered cooperation. 
Ensuring security of energy supply, developing competitive markets and meeting the 
environmental challenges are at the top of the EU and US political agendas. The EU and the 
US have agreed to develop a strategic cooperation on energy and energy security, presented 
in a joint declaration at the EU-US Vienna Presidential Summit on 21st June 2006. This 
cooperation will contribute to increased regional stability, greater security of supply and finally, 
new business opportunities. The dialogue with the US is part of the EU external policy to 
serve Europe’s energy interests [51]. 
4. The Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation (BASREC) 
In October 1999, the energy ministers of the Baltic Sea region countries and the European 
Commission decided in their conference in Helsinki to set up the Baltic Sea Region Energy 
Cooperation (BASREC). The countries participating in BASREC are Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden. The 
Commission is a full member represented by Directorate-General Energy and Transport. 
The main issues addressed are security of energy supply and the growing dependency from 
Russia, gas transit routes, progress on electricity and gas interconnection, energy efficiency, 
climate change, and renewable energies [51]. 
5. EU-China Energy Cooperation 
Since more than 30 years the European Commission and China enjoy diplomatic relations, 
enshrined in the EU-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement signed in 1985. Over 
the course of the last decades a series of Sectoral Dialogues have been established where 
the EU and China cooperate in specific areas. EC-China relations on energy are one of these 
dialogue series, and in fact constitute one of the most constructive areas of cooperation 
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between the EC and China. Today the relations are marked by a mutual understanding of the 
added value of cooperation in the field of energy. 
Energy cooperation has been in existence since 1994 and is one of the earliest Sectoral 
Dialogues between the European Commission and its Chinese partner in EU-China foreign 
relations. Two main bilateral forums on energy allow for close cooperation. Conferences 
between the Directorate-General for Energy and the Chinese Ministry of Science & 
Technology take place on a bi-annual basis, alternating between China and Brussels since 
1994. Furthermore an annual energy dialogue with the National Energy Administration of 
China is being pursued since 2005. In addition, energy issues are also being discussed 
between Heads of States at the EU-China summits, which take place once a year. The most 
recent one took place in October 2010. 
Six priority areas have been identified for cooperation between the EC and China in the field 
of energy: Renewable energy, smart grids, energy efficiency in the building sector, clean coal, 
nuclear energy and energy law [51]. 
6. European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
The ENP was developed in 2004, with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new 
dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the 
prosperity, stability and security of all. This ENP framework is proposed to the 16 of EU's 
closest neighbours – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. 
Central to the ENP are the bilateral Action Plans between the EU and each ENP partner (12 
of them were agreed). These set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short 
and medium-term priorities of 3 to 5 years. Following the expiration of the first Action Plans 
succession documents are being adopted. The ENP is not yet fully ‘activated’ for Algeria, 
Belarus, Libya and Syria since those have not agreed Action Plans. 
In 2009, the EU and its ENP partners further strengthened energy cooperation and ENP 
partners progressed in their sector reform. Bilateral cooperation with ENP partners generally 
continued under the ENP Action Plans and the Energy Memoranda of Understanding and 
Declarations (Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Ukraine). 
At regional/multilateral level, the EU and the Eastern partners launched cooperation under the 
Eastern Partnership. The six Eastern partners participated in the first meetings (May and 
November 2009) of the Eastern Partnership Platform on Energy Security. The Platform will 
promote the implementation of mutual energy support and security mechanisms by initiating 
work on ‘Security of Supply Statements’. The Platform furthermore covers energy efficiency 
and renewable energy. The EU and the Eastern partners continued implementing the 2006 
energy roadmap agreed by ministers under the ‘Baku initiative’ for EU-Black Sea/Caspian 
energy cooperation. They continued cooperation in the areas of market integration, regulatory 
convergence, networks, energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
The Mediterranean ENP partners and the EU pursued implementation of the priority action 
plan 2008-2013, decided by Euro-Mediterranean energy ministers. They continued work 
towards the longer-term objective of establishing Euro-Mediterranean gas and electricity rings. 
Partners further worked on the Mediterranean Solar Plan. Other areas of cooperation cover 
regulatory convergence, the creation of a Maghreb electricity market and a Euro-Mashraq 
natural gas market, energy efficiency, renewable energy and statistical matters. The EU and 
the Mediterranean partners continued their cooperation through the Cairo-based Regional 
Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency for Middle East and North Africa 
countries, which is supported by the European Commission, Denmark and Germany [51]. 
EU energy policy has an impact beyond EU borders, first because of the size of the population 
and the number of countries it affects, and secondly because of its design, with recent policy 
proposals being explicit about the aspiration of the EU to become a global leader in creating 
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sustainable energy policy. As a consequence of this ambition, and the realisation of the 
responsibilities thrust upon it, the Commission has developed some energy policies that are at 
the cutting edge of global energy policy development. In particular with integrating energy into 
the broader sustainability objectives and approaching policy issues in an integrated way, by 
drawing together energy security, cost, and environmental policies into a comprehensive 
framework. This is highly commendable, and the Commission is encouraged to continue on 
this path. 
Since 2006, helped by political commitments in the European Council and clear indications 
from the EP, the Commission is developing and driving a strong, coherent energy policy at EU 
level, which recognises the increasingly pressing challenges of growing imports of energy, 
while addressing the environmental impact of energy production and use. In response to 
compelling and growing global energy security and climate change challenges, the 
Commission has developed a clear and comprehensive energy policy built upon three 
intrinsically linked elements: 
• Sustainable development and building a low-carbon future. 
• Decisive actions to achieve the long-held European goal of a single energy market. 
• Energy security and external relations. 
These closely interlinked challenges are very difficult to resolve and the Commission is highly 
commended for offering a range of bold and politically demanding proposals that are essential 
to success in overcoming them. The energy security/climate change endeavour is taking place 
at a timely moment for action. The timing also shows the critical risk of failure to deliver the 
internal market. This will add uncertainties that are detrimental for competitiveness and 
security of supply and for meeting the challenging political goals; failure to achieve the 
environmental goals will affect energy security as well. 
The Commission has launched a wide-ranging and ambitious agenda. It is however by no 
means clear that the resources available are allocated in a manner that is commensurate to 
the goals pursued. Policy implementation, execution and monitoring normally require more 
resources and sophisticated organisation than policy planning, and a shortage of resources 
could lead to inadequate compliance, with grave consequences for the achievement of the 
targets [5]. 
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RES Penetration Progress 
 
 
The effort, towards increasing RE penetration, as a Union and not individually, started with the 
White Paper of 1997, "Energy for the Future - Renewable Energy Sources of Energy - White 
Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan". This Community strategy confirms an 
indicative target of a 12% share of renewable energy sources in total final energy 
consumption by 2010. The target was characterized ambitious but realistic and a good policy 
tool, giving a clear political signal and impetus to action. 
At the end of 2001 the Directive on the Promotion of the Electricity Produced from Renewable 
Energy (2001/77/EC) was adopted. In accordance with the White Paper, the overall indicative 
target of this directive was to increase, by 2010, the share of renewable energy in final energy 
consumption to 12% with the total renewable electricity target to 21% (adapted to 2004 EU 
expansion) of overall electricity consumption. 
In 2003 the Directive "on the promotion of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport" 
(2003/30/EC) was adopted. The Directive stipulates that Member States should set national 
indicative targets to raise the share of biofuels in their transport fuel market up to 5,75%, by 
2010, of the share of biofuels in diesel and petrol for transport purposes calculated on the 
basis of energy content. 
Although significant progress has been made, the 2010 targets set out by the Commission in 
the 2001 and 2003 directives regarding renewables in general, renewable electricity and 
renewable transport fuels have not been achieved as was admitted through the MEMO 11/54 
of January 2011. 
Overall it is clear that the first phase (up to 2010) of the effort has come to its end, without the 
desirable results, and the second one, towards the 2020 targets, has started in the mid of a 
financially tough period for EU. 
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3.1. Overall Progress 
 
During the past decade, the EU has emerged as the world’s leading region in developing and 
implementing renewable energy technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Primary energy production in EU. 
Data Source: [10] 
Renewable energy share in primary energy production was 6,2% in 1990 and rose to 9,7% in 
1997. A significant increase can be observed after the implementation of the first RES and 
biofuels directives with 18,3% RES share in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. RES share in primary energy production. 
Data Source: [10] 
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Figure 3.3. RES in primary energy production. 
Data Source: [10] 
RES in primary energy production were increased by 82,3% from 41Mtoe (1990) to 75Mtoe 
(1997). A further 98,6% increase occurred up to 148Mtoe (2009) with an average rate of 9% 
over the last seven years. 
In the next figures the status of renewable energy sources at the member state level is 
presented. In Figure 3.4 the share of RES in total gross final consumption is shown for the 
year 2008 for all EU member states. This figure shows a large variance between countries, 
with Sweden consuming almost half of the total final energy in the form of RES, while Malta 
has a share close to zero. Seven member states have already achieved a share of 20% RES 
in gross final consumption, whereas biomass in the heating sector and hydropower in the 
electricity sector are still the dominant sources (Figure 3.4). In most member states, the total 
RES generation is dominated by renewable heating, followed by RES-E. Biofuels in the 
transport sector show only a minor but quickly growing contribution to RES in total final 
consumption. In absolute figures, almost 50% of the total final energy from RES is contributed 
by the three countries Germany, France and Sweden, as can be seen from Figure 3.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. RES per sector in total gross final consumption in 2008 [22]. 
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Figure 3.5. Final energy from RES in 2008 [22]. 
In spite of this progress the 12% target was missed. According to the MEMO 11/54 issued by 
the Commission on 31 of January 2011, the EU failed to meet the overall 12% from RES in 
final energy consumption with only a few Member Sates having reached their quotas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. RES share in final energy consumption. 
Data Source: [10] 
There are several reasons for this. Even though the cost of most renewable energy sources is 
declining, in some cases quite dramatically, at the current stage of energy market 
development renewable sources will often not be the short term least cost options. In 
particular, the failure to systematically include external costs in market prices gives an 
economically unjustified advantage to fossil fuels compared with renewables. 
Another important reason is the complexity, novelty and decentralised nature of most 
renewable energy applications result in numerous administrative problems. These include 
unclear and discouraging authorisation procedures for planning, building and operating 
systems, differences in standards and certification and incompatible testing regimes for 
renewable energy technologies. 
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The development recorded so far is made up of generally patchy and highly uneven progress 
across the EU, highlighting that national policies have been inadequate for achieving the EU 
target. While ambitious policies creating investor certainty have been adopted in some 
Member States, national policies have proven vulnerable to changing political priorities. The 
absence of legally binding targets for renewable energies at EU level, the relatively weak EU 
regulatory framework for the use of renewables in the transport sector, and the complete 
absence of a legal framework in the heating and cooling sector, means that progress to a 
large extent is the result of the efforts of a few committed Member States. The differences in 
the regimes for electricity, biofuels and heating and cooling established at EU level are 
reflected in the development of the three sectors: clear growth in electricity, the recent start of 
solid growth in biofuels, and slow growth rates for heating and cooling. For all the previously 
mentioned reasons EU decided to implement a more strict policy by adopting the new RES 
Directive (2009/28/EC) in order to strengthen the framework towards the 2020 targets. 
 
 
3.2. Electricity (RES-E) 
 
In Figure 3.7 the historical development of electricity generation from renewable sources 
(RES-E) in the European Union is presented. Data is provided by Eurostat until 2008 as this is 
the most recent year for which data is available from the Eurostat databases (RES include the 
large hydro according to Eurostat). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Electricity final energy consumption. 
Data Source: [10] 
In 1997, when the European Commission initiated discussions on a European renewable 
energy policy, the share of renewable electricity in the European Union was 13,8%. By 2008, 
16,7% of the European Union's final electricity consumption was from renewable energy 
sources: a 21% increase from 1997 levels. In the same period electricity consumption 
increased from 207,7 Mtoe (1997) to 281,4 Mtoe (2008), a 35,5% increase. 
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Figure 3.8. Share of RES in final electricity consumption. 
Data Source: [10] 
Important policies like indicative targets for Member States, support schemes evaluation, 
GOs, efforts to simplify administrative procedures and grid priority access were introduced 
with the Directive 2001/77/EC at the end of 2001. From 2002 up to 2008 the increase in total 
electricity gross final energy consumption was 49% while from 1997 up to 2002 it was 10%. 
So, the first RES directive set strong foundation for the growth of RES-E. However, EU missed 
the 21% target of 2010. According to the MEMO 11/54, the EU as a whole reached just over 
18% with only seven out of twenty seven Member States expected to meet their 2010 share. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. RES-E generation in 2008 per Member State [55]. 
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In Figure 3.9 the renewable electricity profiles of each EU Member State are presented for the 
year 2008. As hydropower is the largest renewable electricity source in Europe, the countries, 
which have significant hydropower assets, dominate the total RES-E production as well. 
Wind power production is most notable in Germany, Spain, and Denmark, while the top 
countries in producing electricity from biomass are Germany, Sweden, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and France. Only Italy has notable power generation from geothermal 
power plants. In Germany and Spain, photovoltaic power generation has increased in the 
recent years and is at present a significant source of electricity. Only Spain has solar thermal 
electricity generation, and the figures are still too low to show in graphics. 
EU has regularly assessed how Member States are progressing towards the 2010 targets. 
The last progress report showed that the EU will not achieve the RES-E target in 2010 (EC 
2011). Only Hungary and Germany had already achieved their targets in 2008 and a few 
Member States (Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal) are still likely to achieve 
their 2010 targets for renewable electricity in electricity generation. Targets for RES-E by 
Member State and the situation in 2008 are presented in Figure 3.10 [55]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Member States’ progress towards their indicative energy targets for electricity in 2008 [55]. 
There are many reasons for different progress rates among Member States [56] [57]. Earlier 
analysis of Member States' different support schemes shows that stability is a critical feature 
of an effective system, in order to facilitate investment. Consequently, "stop-and-go" regimes 
that run out of budget, as well as policy and rule changes hamper the development of 
renewable electricity. Despite some improvements, such as the development of premium feed 
in tariffs and more detailed technology banding, it remains essential to improve support 
schemes, particularly for those Member States with slow rates of progress. 
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Several non-cost related barriers are also significant constraints on the growth of renewable 
electricity. It is for this reason that Directive 2001/77/EC requires actions to be taken to 
improve consumer information (the creation of guarantees of origin), reform administrative 
procedures and ensure better grid access for renewable electricity. 
Examination of the guarantee of origin regime reveals that it has still not been implemented 
fully by all Member States, with problems of reliability, double counting and the risk of 
disclosure of the same energy to two different groups of consumers. This has undermined the 
consumer market for renewable electricity in general; a market which could have been a 
further source of revenues and hence investment. Whilst Directive 2001/77/EC allows Member 
States to agree to transfers of guarantees of origin to count towards another Member State's 
target (enabling a member State to reach its target more cost effectively), no such agreements 
have been established and no such transfers have occurred. 
The administrative procedures associated with planning and developing renewable energy 
capacity have been the subject of careful examination in previous Commission reports. 
However, little progress appears to have been made on any of the Commission's 
recommendations for administrative reforms. Procedures continue to be complicated, with 
multiple authorities requiring consultation when applying for construction, development or 
environmental permits. Surveys suggest that the time lags involved and the uncertainty of the 
process remain major bottlenecks. 
The problems of gaining connection to the electricity grid often result from a lack of adequate 
rules on grid connection and from a failure to dedicate sufficient administrative resources to 
process applications. Technical problems are also disruptive, with limited capacity of the grid 
to incorporate more variable renewable electricity and a general lack of strategy to address 
the problem. There are also financial constraints, with different and often opaque connection 
charging rules and risk of discrimination against smaller distributed power generators 
compared to large incumbent conventional energy producers. 
The issues associated with grid access highlight the role that large power producers play in 
the less than perfectly competitive internal market. The inadequacies of the energy market 
highlighted recently in the Commission's third internal energy market package have also 
contributed to the difficulties for producers of renewable electricity to gain access to the 
market and to compete fairly. This issue has also been addressed by the Commission and the 
timely adoption and implementation of the package will ensure significant steps are taken to 
level the energy market playing field. 
The above reasons for the slow progress in developing renewable electricity are not new. 
Directive 2001/77/EC addresses them explicitly. However, despite the Directive and the 
monitoring and guidance of the European Commission, some Member States have failed to 
take adequate measures. Since 2004, the Commission has been obliged to start 61 legal 
proceedings against Member States for non-compliance with the Directive. Italy has had the 
most cases, with 13, followed by Spain with 6, Austria with 4 and the Czech Republic, France, 
Latvia and Poland with 3 each. Of these 61 cases, 16 have not yet been resolved. The 
European Commission will continue to monitor Member States' compliance with the Directive 
and will open infringement cases wherever necessary. However the poor progress and 
number of infringement proceedings also implies that the legal framework is not sufficiently 
strong. This is one reason for the new Directive on renewable energy. 
A better focus on Administrative barriers and grid access problems will help understand why 
they play a major role in progress of RES-E penetration. Directive 2001/77/EC requires that 
electricity from renewable energy sources has guaranteed access to the grid and requires 
Member States to set rules for sharing and bearing the cost of various grid investments 
necessary to integrate it. Member States are also permitted to give priority access to 
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networks.COM(2006)84810 noted that grid connections and extensions needed to be 
simplified and stated that the Commission would "continue to co-operate closely with grid 
authorities, European electricity regulators and the renewables industry to enable a better 
integration of renewable energy sources into the power grid..." SEC(2008)5711 noted that 
despite the requirements of Directive 2001/77/EC, project developers still faced different grid-
related barriers, which were mainly related to insufficient grid capacity, non-transparent 
procedures for grid connection, high connection costs and long lead times to obtain 
authorisation for grid connection. High priority should be given to remove administrative 
barriers and improve grid connection for renewable energy producers. 
Commission analysis has also been undertaken to examine some of the administrative 
procedures that are considered to be potential barriers to the development of renewable 
electricity. An examination of the permit regimes for building renewable electricity plants 
highlighted a wide variety of practices across Member States. On average, over nine different 
authorities needed to be contacted. This amount varied according to the Member State, the 
technology in question and sometimes the size of the installation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11. Average number of authorities involved in the permission procedure [56]. 
There have been some reforms to the authorisation process in recent years. For example, the 
UK revised its legislation on planning permission for projects of national interest and the Greek 
government has begun to streamline environmental permission procedures by setting up two 
central bodies to coordinate procedures and has limited the time authorities have to grant or 
deny permits to 6 months. 
National practices differ, and whilst most informed, potential renewable electricity producers 
believe that the procedures for licensing are clear; a common complaint is the lack of time 
limits for responses. This problem appears to have been exacerbated by the introduction of 
tiers of regional government working in conjunction with support schemes or authorising 
bodies at a national level. Examining the duration of permit planning also reveals differences 
according to Member States and technologies (Figure 3.12). 
In general, average lead times for grid connection were very high representing a significant 
bottleneck. Exceptionally high authorisation procedure lead times were reported for offshore 
wind developments. 
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Figure 3.12. Average lead time in months for overall procedure and grid connection [56]. 
The uncertainty of the procedure and the time it takes to complete the process compound the 
uncertainty of the overall acceptance or rejection of an application. On this point to there is 
wide variation across Member States but less variation according to technology. The average 
rate of permit rejection is 30% but in some cases (reflecting ad hoc moratoriums on certain 
technologies in certain regions or countries) the rate is much higher. 
In many cases, a lack of grid capacity represents a crucial factor for rejection. This and other 
reasons (such as an excess of applications) suggest that better structured administrative 
procedures, further administrative resources and coordination with grid planning is necessary. 
For instance, in countries with a high rate of successful planning appeals, an increase in 
resources for initial applications could speed up the treatment of applications, increase the 
rate of initial approvals and reduce the administrative costs associated with appeals. 
Analysis of the planning process reveals that problems relating to grid connection and 
capacity are a major obstacle which is more often generated by limits on administrative and 
other resources than technological constraints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13. Share of planned projects for which insufficient grid capacity represents a major problem [56]. 
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3.3. Transport (RES-T) 
 
The Directive 2003 on renewable energy in transport required Member States to set targets 
for the share of renewable energy replacing petrol and diesel in transport in 2005 and 2010, 
taking as their starting point reference values of 2% and 5,75% respectively. It is known as the 
"Biofuels Directive" since in practice, biofuels were expected to be the sole contributor in this 
sector up to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14. Fuels in final energy consumption in transport. 
Data Source: [10] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.15. Share of RES in final consumption in transport. 
Data Source: [10] 
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In 2005, biofuels achieved a share of 0,86% in the EU, with only Germany and Sweden 
reaching the reference targets and the interim target of 2% in 2005 was missed. Biofuels 
production progressed much faster in 2006 and 2007 than in earlier years. In 2007 the use of 
biofuels in road transport was 1,75% (6,7 Mtoe). Biofuels contribution in final energy 
consumption grew by 113% between 2005 and 2007, and by 134% between 2003 and 2005. 
An overall 800% increase occurred after the implementation of the 2003 biofuel directive while 
the increase was 240% between 1997 and 2003. 
In 2008 four countries – Austria, Germany, Slovakia and Sweden – had already met their 
2010 transport targets with France being almost certain to join this group of countries in 2009. 
With the exception of Slovakia, all of these countries, as well as Finland and Portugal state in 
their NREAPs their intention to exceed the 5,75% target for renewable energy use in transport 
in 2010. 
According to MEMO 11/54, nine Member States are about to meet their 2010 targets in 2010 
with EU reaching 5,1% instead of 5,75% RES share in transport sector. 
The more rapid development of biofuels since 2005 reflects the widespread development of 
support systems at Member State level (see Appendix A3). Tax relief and biofuels obligations 
remain the two most common instruments used by Member States to promote biofuels. In 
2005-2006 all Member States, except Finland, used excise tax exemptions as the main 
support measure, while biofuels obligations were only used by 3 countries. Since 2007 more 
than half of Member States have adopted obligations to blend, in most cases combined with 
partial but increasing levels of taxation. Some countries use a quota mechanism and tender. 
This mechanism allows Governments to decide the amount of biofuels that has to be supplied 
each year, thus creating some regulation of the market. 
The good progress resulting from tax exemptions and new measures such as biofuels 
obligations are still in evidence today. The Member States which saw above-average progress 
in biofuels use between 2005 and 2007 (Figure 3.16) reflect this. It can also be seen from the 
figure that nine Member States are making little or no progress towards their national targets, 
raising concern about whether those targets will in fact be achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16. Progress of Member States towards 2010 RES-T Targets in 2008 [58]. 
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Since 2005, the Commission has started 62 legal proceedings against Member States for 
noncompliance with the Directive 2003/30, many of which were for failure to comply with 
reporting obligations or failure to set national objectives incompliance with the references 
values of the Directive. Of these cases Italy, Greece and Finland have had the most with 5 
each, followed by France, Denmark and Ireland with 4 and Hungary, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and the Slovak Republic with 3. These cases have been successfully resolved. The 
EC will continue to monitor Member States' progress towards their targets [58]. 
In the next paragraphs the development of consumption in the EU between 2000 and 2009 is 
presented [17]. Of the 2009 total, an estimated 11 Mt (75% by mass) was biodiesel and 3,5 Mt 
was ethanol. Biodiesel accounted for an estimated 5,4% of the approximately 230 billion litres 
EU road diesel market on a volume basis in 2009. Ethanol accounted for an estimated 3,4% 
of the approximately 130 billion litre gasoline market, again on a volume basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.17. Biofuels consumption in EU [59]. 
Overall, biofuels accounted for 3,3% of energy use in road transport; up from 0,9% in 2005. 
Biodiesel production grew more than six-fold between 2003 and 2009 to 9 Mt (Figure 3.18). Its 
Production capacity started to dramatically outpace actual production from around 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.18. Biodiesel production & installed capacity [59]. 
The relatively low barriers to entry in terms of capital requirements and technology for 
esterification of vegetable oils, combined with a rising oil price and an apparently supportive 
regulatory environment led to a surge in investment in biodiesel production plants in the EU. 
As of July 2009, installed biodiesel production capacity is estimated to have totalled 22 million  
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tonnes per year. With production of only just over 9 million tonnes in 2009, the average 
industry utilisation rate for the region was around 40%. A lot of biodiesel production capacity is 
currently lying idle and many European biodiesel producers are finding themselves in financial 
difficulties, which were exacerbated by the recent credit crunch. Rationalisation of existing 
capacity seems inevitable. 
Figure 3.19 shows the development of fuel ethanol production in the EU between 2004 and 
2009. Production grew more than seven-fold over this period to reach 2,9 Mt. Production is 
estimated to be growing rapidly in 2010 and could reach close to 4 Mt. Installed fuel ethanol 
production capacity in Greater Europe as of mid- 2010 is estimated at 5,7 Mt. A further 1,4 Mt 
of capacity is under construction, potentially raising total capacity to 7,1 Mt over the next 
couple of years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19. Bioethanol production in EU [59]. 
Overall, it is obvious that biofuels started to play their role in the energy mix at the end of 90s 
and both their production and consumption skyrocketed after the Directive 2003/30. The 2010 
target was missed only slightly and considering their rapid growth and the 10% target for 
2020, sustainability criteria were introduced with the RES Directive 2009/28. 
 
 
3.4. Heating & Cooling (RES-H) 
 
Despite the fact that the RES-H is the dominant sector in RES contribution to final energy 
(Figures 3.4 & 3.5), its growth has been the least rapid, compared to the RES-E and RES-T 
sectors. In previous years it had received little political attention and in most EU Member 
States there is not yet a comprehensive approach to support RES-H. The last directive on 
RES (Directive 28/2009) finally closed the legislative gap which existed so far for this sector 
and a more rapid growth is expected in the next years. 
The EU renewables based heating market is dominated by domestic decentralised heating 
appliances using biomass. The use of biomass in centralised heating plants or CHP-plants 
also plays an important role in Nordic countries, Germany and Italy. Solar thermal heating 
technologies account for a low share of the total amount of heat generated from renewable 
energy. Similarly, ground source heat pumps and geothermal heating technologies represent 
a relatively limited share of renewables based heat production but are expected to experience 
some growth in the future [60]. 
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In 2008 the share of renewable heating and cooling was 11,9%, compared to 11,5% in 2007 
and 10,3% in 2006. The direct use of biomass, covering wood and wood waste, renewable 
municipal wastes and biogas, contributed 55,1 Mtoe and liquid biofuels used for heating 
contributed 0,6 Mtoe. Also in 2008, derived heat, produced from heating and CHP plants 
using biomass, contributed 7,8 Mtoe of renewable energy, solar thermal energy contributed 
1,1 Mtoe and low enthalpy geothermal energy 0,7 Mtoe. The direct use of liquid biofuels for 
heat production in industry and households, the services sector and in agriculture increased 
significantly, from 128 ktoe in 2006 to 617 ktoe in 2008 [61]. 
Despite the low contribution of solar thermal in the total share of RES-H sector, it would be 
interesting to focus on the solar thermal markets trends and development. According to 
ESTIF, in 2010, the European solar thermal market totalled 2.586 MWth (3.694.940 m²) of 
newly installed capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.20. Trend of newly installed capacity in EU & Switzerland [62]. 
ESTIF has adopted three categories for the European solar thermal markets. These groups 
are: 50 to 200.000m2, above 200.000 to 500.000m2, and above 500.000m2 of newly installed 
capacity of glazed collectors [62]. 
The only country above 500.000m2 of newly installed capacity is Germany which is the leading 
European market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.21. Trend of newly installed capacity in Germany [62]. 
The solar thermal markets above 200.000 to 500.000m2 consists of the Italian, Spanish, 
Austrian, French and Greek markets which behaved very differently in 2010. While the Italian 
market confirmed its 2009 level (around 500.000m²), the Spanish market continued to decline, 
increasing the gap between the second and third European markets in terms of newly 
installed capacity. In previous years, Austria managed to successfully overcome the market 
downturn but is now following the trend set by its northern neighbour, with a significant 
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decrease of 21%. France also experienced a second year of decline, though more modest 
than in Spain (-3,4%). Finally, the Greek market recovered after a bad performance in 2009, in 
spite of the difficult situation faced by the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Trend of newly installed capacity in Austria, France, Greece, Italy & Spain [62]. 
Overall, markets below 200.000m2 and above 50.000m2 grew by 8,8%. Their combined 
increase of 40.000m2 does not quite compensate for the decrease recorded in larger markets. 
However, it illustrates a different dynamic, triggered by new support schemes in some cases 
or possibly an increased awareness of solar thermal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.23. Trend of newly installed capacity in Denmark, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland, UK & Czech R. [62]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In the third chapter the source of the data is Eurostat. Details about the methodology, for the calculation of 
the RES share for every sector, can be found in the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC, the Energy Statistics 
Regulation 1099/2008 and on DG ENERGY´s transparency platform: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/ 
index_en.htm. For the RES-H sector the proposed methodology couldn’t be followed and that is why there are no 
graphs for its contribution through time. Final percentages calculated differ from the percentages in Commission’s 
progress reports, something that indicates the difficulty to handle and ensure the consistency of the necessary 
data. 
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Projections for RES Share in 2020 
 
 
As mentioned in the third chapter, the second phase –towards 2020 targets– has started in 
the middle of a political and financial tough period not only for the EU, but also for the global 
economic and political environment. It is obvious that following the existing strategy is 
currently unlikely to meet all the 2020 targets and deal with the longer-term challenges, 
provided that none of the 2010 targets were accomplished. Exception consist only few 
Member States that have reached their quotas (e.g. Germany, Sweden)  
In order to deal with this challenge, EU has introduced stricter policies through new and 
updated legislation with unambiguous and mandatory targets for the upcoming decade. 
Energy and climate goals have been incorporated in Europe’s 2020 strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. The formal adoption of this strategy has been ratified by the 
European Council in June 2010. 
In this section we will try to assess if the 2020 target of 20%, for the overall RES share in total 
gross final energy consumption, is about to be accomplished. Our study employs annual time 
series data for the share of RES in total gross final energy consumption for the period 1995 to 
2009. As mentioned in the third chapter, the source of the data is Eurostat and details about 
the methodology can be found in the European legislation (Directive 2009/28/EC, Regulation 
1099/2008). 
Five different regression specifications will be implemented in order to end up to the most 
appropriate which will be used in order to perform a long-run forecast. Starting from the most 
simple up to the most complex, the regression specifications are the following: 
• Autoregressive (AR) specification 
• Polynomial regression specification 
• Gompertz regression specification 
• Multiple regression specification 
• Logistic regression specification 
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4.1. Autoregressive Specification 
 
An autoregressive specification is a very common specification for time series in which past 
values are used as feedback and therefore the system can generate internal dynamics. The 
general specification is provided in equation (1) below: 
     0
1
N
t i t i t
i
y c c y e−
=
= + +∑     (1) 
where, ic  are weights or alternatively autoregression coefficients to be estimated, ty  is the 
share of RES in total gross final energy consumption and N is the lag order (length) which is 
generally for annual observations pretty limited (e.g. 3 to 5 lags). The noise or error term, te  
above, is assumed to be Gaussian white noise (normally distributed with zero mean and 
constant variance). 
The problem in the case of the AR specification is to derive the optimal lag length. The ty  
series is assumed to be stationary. By convention the series ty  is assumed to be zero mean. 
If not, this is simply another term 0c  in front of the summation in the equation (1).  
Running the third order of equation (1), AR(3), we get the output of the Τable 4.1:  
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
0c  -2,009431 0,931391 -2,157451 0,0630 
( 1)y −  1,314914 0,289923 4,535389 0,0019 
( 2)y −  -0,095574 0,497687 -0,192036 0,8525 
( 3)y −  0,285297 0,467470 0,610299 0,5586 
R-squared 0,978028 Mean dependent var 4,582500 
Adjusted R-squared 0,969789 S.D. dependent var 0,678958 
S.E. of regression 0,118012 Akaike info criterion -1,174866 
Sum squared resid 0,111414 Schwarz criterion -1,013230 
Log likelihood 11,04920 F-statistic 118,7024 
Durbin-Watson stat 1,891986 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000001 
Table 4.1. Output of the AR(3) regression. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the only statistically significant variable, at the conventional level of 
0,05, is the ( 1)y − . The approximately 97% fit (Adjusted R-squared) shows that past values 
explain to a great extent the variability of the dependent variable. However, due to the model’s 
simplicity12 it is expected high inaccuracy for future estimation, thus, it is not proper for long 
run forecast. 
                                                
1 By construction the specification may provide diffusion values that lie well above the theoretical maximum. 
2 The y variable is probably not stationary at that stage of diffusion (despite the fact that is a bounded variable). 
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After completing the estimation of our adopted specification, we continue by executing a 
pseudo-forecasting exercise in order to evaluate the model’s forecasting performance. In 
particular, we adjust our sample to a smaller size by removing some of the last observations. 
In our case the time period to forecast extents from 2005 to 2009. Then, by choosing the static 
forecasting method, the forecasted values for the desired period are obtained. Hence, we can 
compare the real values with the forecasted values as it is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Actual and forecasted values based on the AR(3) specification. 
Visual inspection of Figure 4.1 reveals a very good forecasting performance with the 
estimated and actual values to be very close. Both of them are moving within the 95% 
confidence bounds which are formed by the ±2 times the standard error (assumed normally 
distributed) of the forecasted values. 
 
 
4.2. Polynomial Regression Specification 
 
Polynomial regression is a form of linear regression in which the relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable is modeled as a kth order polynomial. The 
general specification is provided by the equation (2): 
         20 1 2 ...
k
t t t k t ty c c y c y c y e= + + + + +     (2) 
Where, ty  is the predicted outcome value for the polynomial specification with regression 
coefficients  1 2, ,..., kc c c  for each degree of ty  and finally 0c  is the intercept. A second order 
(k=2) polynomial forms a quadratic expression (parabolic curve), a third order (k=3) 
polynomial forms a cubic expression and a fourth order (k=4) polynomial forms a quadric 
expression. More complex expressions involving polynomials of more than one predictor can 
be achieved by using the general linear regression function. 
Estimating the second order polynomial regression we get the output of Table 4.2: 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
0c  2,403842 0,033905 70,89977 0,0000 
2
ty  0,101339 0,001597 63,47471 0,0000 
R-squared 0,996784 Mean dependent var 4,461333 
Adjusted R-squared 0,996536 S.D. dependent var 0,654270 
S.E. of regression 0,038505 Akaike info criterion -3,552474 
Sum squared resid 0,019275 Schwarz criterion -3,458067 
Log likelihood 28,64355 F-statistic 4029,038 
Durbin-Watson stat 0,742349 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000000 
 
Table 4.2. Output of the second order polynomial regression. 
As shown from the results, the success of the regression in predicting the values of the 
dependent variable within the sample is excellent since the fit is 99,6%. Both variables 2ty  and 
0c  are statistically significant with 2ty  having a positive coefficient. The statistical noise in the 
estimates is very low as we can se from the standard errors which assumed to be normally 
distributed.  
After completing the estimation of the specification we perform the pseudo-forecasting 
exercise described in the previous section. As we can see the actual and forecasted values 
are very close with the 95% confidence bounds being very narrow since the fit is almost 
perfect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Actual and forecasted values based on the second order polynomial specification. 
However, this specification is not as ideal as it seems at first sight. One reason is that it is 
based on a small number of observations, something that might affect the fit. Another and 
very important reason is that the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic is less than 1. This 
indicates strong positive first-order serial correlation in the residuals which means that the 
estimated specification is not proper for further statistical inference. 
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4.3. Gompertz Regression Model 
 
The Gompertz curve is a sigmoid curve. It is a type of mathematic specification for a time 
series, where growth is slowest at the start and at the end of a time period. The right-hand or 
future value asymptote of the function is approached much more gradually by the curve than 
the left-hand or lower valued asymptote, in contrast to the logistic function in which both 
asymptotes are approached by the curve symmetrically. 
The Gompertz curve is given by the equation: 
       ( )( )( )exp expty a b ct= − −      (3) 
Where ty  is the variable representing the diffusion process of RES share in the total gross 
final energy consumption in time t  (time trend) and ,a b  and c  are positive parameters 
subject to estimation. Then by adding the stochastic term te  and after some algebra in 
equation (3), we get the following specification: 
   ( ) ( )( )ln ln ln expt ty ct b c b eΔ = − + − +     (4) 
In equation (4), only b  and c  out of three initial parameters are subject to estimation. The 
third parameter a  (saturation level or upper bound of the regression) is assumed to be time-
varying. The advantage of time-varying assumption is that it permits the identification of 
possible structural breaks that took place during the diffusion process [63]. The series of a  is 
obtained exogenously through the following expression: 
          ( )( )ˆˆ ˆexp ln expt ta y b ct= + −     (5) 
Running the Gompertz equation as it is shown in equation (4) by means of a non-linear least 
squares, we get the output of the Table 4.3: 
 
Parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
b  -0,406545 0,064832 -6,270746 0,0001 
c  -0,002646 0,001572 -1,682378 0,1234 
R-squared 0,797252 Mean dependent var -4,388793 
Adjusted R-squared 0,776977 S.D. dependent var 1,641659 
S.E. of regression 0,775279 Akaike info criterion 2,479824 
Sum squared resid 6,010571 Schwarz criterion 2,560641 
Log likelihood -12,87894 Durbin-Watson stat 1,061091 
 
Table 4.3. Output of the Gompertz regression. 
Τhe results show that the fit of the estimated curve to the data is quite satisfactory but the 
standard error of the regression is high. From the parameters, only b  is statistically significant 
and both of them have negative signs while they were expected to be positive. The pseudo-
forecasting exercise shows the actual and forecasted values lie within the 95% confidence 
bounds (Figure 4.3.) while the Durbin-Watson statistic shows a strong positive first-order serial 
correlation in the residuals. From all these facts mentioned, our model doesn’t seem reliable 
for long term forecasting. 
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Figure 4.3. Actual and forecasted values based on the Gompertz specification. 
 
 
4.4. Multiple Regression Specification 
 
The multiple linear regression specification and its estimation using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) is doubtless the most widely used tool in econometrics. It allows to assess the relation 
between a dependent variable and a set of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is 
an interval variable, i.e. its values represent a natural order and differences of two values are 
meaningful. The dependent variable can, in principle, take any real value between -∞  and 
+∞ . In practice, this means that the variable needs to be observed with some precision and 
that all the observed values are far from ranges which are theoretically excluded. 
The multiple linear regression specification assumes a linear (in parameters) relationship 
between a dependent variable iy  and a set of explanatory variables ( )' 0 1, ,  ..., i i i iKx x x x= ; iKx  
is also called an independent variable, a covariate or a regressor. The first regressor 0 1ix =  is 
a constant unless otherwise specified. So: 
     0 1 1 ...i i i iK iy u x x uβ β β βΚ= + = + + + + 
'
ix     (6) 
where β  is a ( )1K + -dimensional column vector of parameters, 'ix  is a ( )1K + -dimensional 
row vector and iu  is the error term. 
The OLS approach minimizes the squared distances between the observed and the predicted 
dependent values for the variable y : 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
''
1
min
N
i i
i
S y x y X y X
β
β β β β
=
= − = − − →∑    (7) 
The resulting OLS estimator for β  is: 
( ) 1' 'ˆ X X X yβ −=  
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Given the OLS estimator we can predict the dependent variable by ' ˆˆi iy x β=  and the error 
term by ' ˆˆi i iu y x β= − ; ˆiu  is called the residual. 
Some of the parameters affecting the diffusion of the RES share in total gross final energy 
consumption, as suggested by the relevant literature, are: the energy balance ( 1x ) which is 
the ratio imports/exports, the final energy consumption ( 2x ), the R&D as annual percentage of 
GDP ( 3x ) and the oil prices ( 4x ) which is the dominant fossil fuel. 
Estimating the equation (6) we get the output of the Table 4.4: 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -8,482980 5,012412 -1,662543 0,1274 
1x  3,354270 1,353239 2,478698 0,0326 
2x  -6,33E-06 2,00E-06 -3,170906 0,0100 
3x  5,197726 1,146141 4,534978 0,0011 
4x  0,013051 0,004461 2,925708 0,0152 
R-squared 0,936609 Mean dependent var 4,461333 
Adjusted R-squared 0,911253 S.D. dependent var 0,654270 
S.E. of regression 0,194910 Akaike info criterion -0,171360 
Sum squared resid 0,379898 Schwarz criterion 0,064657 
Log likelihood 6,285196 F-statistic 36,93806 
Durbin-Watson stat 2,150833 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000006 
 
Table 4.4. Output of the Multiple regression. 
In general, the estimated sign for every single parameter is theoretically meaningful. Four out 
of the five parameters appear to be statistically significant at the conventional level of 0,05 and 
finally, the model seems to fit the data very well. 
In more detail and in relation to the expected signs we stress the following: One of the most 
important factors that affect the penetration of RES in the final energy mix is the need for 
security of energy supply. As energy imports and prices are steadily increasing, especially for 
fossil fuels which are lacking in the European Union, the penetration of renewable energy 
seems one of the most important factors to offset the increasing trend of EU’s energy 
dependency. Thus, the signs of the energy balance and oil prices parameters were expected 
to be positive, as they are in our model. The penetration of RES technologies in the market is 
the result of R&D like any other new technology. EU has many programs of R&D (see chapter 
2.10), funded with quite significant amounts (see Appendix A2) and R&D is considered a top 
priority policy sector. So, we would expect the sign of the R&D parameter to be positive, as it 
happens in our case. The disadvantages of renewable energy are that it is a diffuse and not 
constant form of energy. This means that RE technologies don’t assure a constant outcome 
and might not be able to meet the demand needs in case of an excess demand period, 
something that would lead to more conventional fuels consumption. On the other hand when 
there is a shortfall in energy demand, the percentage of RES in the final energy consumption 
would increase since less fossil fuels would be used. Thus the sign of the final energy 
consumption parameter could be negative, as it is in our case, or positive. Overall, the signs of 
the estimated coefficients are theoretically meaningful. This indicates that our model could be 
considered as pretty satisfactory. 
 79 
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
(%)
time
upper 95% confidence bound
lower 95% confidence bound
y real
y forecast
Among the independent variables used, only the constant (C) doesn’t appear to be statistically 
significant at the conventional level of 0,05. The significance for a coefficient can be affirmed 
by the corresponding t-statistic or alternatively by the associated p-value. The t-statistic is 
calculated by the ratio of the estimated coefficient (column two) to the associated standard 
error (column three). If the absolute value of the t-statistic is greater than 2, then we may say 
that the coefficient is significant at the 0,05 significance level (but this is a rule of thumb). More 
accurate information with respect to the significance can be derived from the p-value. Hence, 
if the p-value is lower than the selected level of significance (e.g. 0,01), then the coefficient is 
considered significant at that particular level of significance. 
As it can be inferred by the value of the adjusted R-square (corrected with the degrees of 
freedom), which is 0,911, the included into the model independent variables explain more than 
the 9/10 of the RES penetration in total gross final energy consumption. The fit seems 
excellent as it can be seen by the following Figure 4.4. Both the actual and forecasted values 
are within the 95% confidence bounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Actual and forecasted values based on the Multiple specification. 
Despite the fact that our model seems to be well specified, it wouldn’t be safe to use it for 
future estimations. The multiple regression specification assumes the stationarity of the 
parameters. The parameters we have used are not stationary something that would result to 
misleading inference. 
 
 
4.5. Logistic Regression Specification 
 
The functional form of the Logistic curve is given by the next equation: 
    ( )( ) 11 expty a b ct
−
= + −      (8) 
Where ty  is the variable measuring the diffusion process in period t  (RES share in total gross 
final energy consumption) and ,a b  and c  are positive parameters for estimation. Investigating 
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the meaning of these parameters it turns out that: the parameter a  represents the upper 
limiting value of the output, the parameter b  is the number of times that the initial output 0y  
must grow to reach a  and since the parameter c  is much harder to interpret exactly, we will 
simply mention that if it is positive, the logistic function will always increase, while if it is 
negative, the function will always decrease. 
One way to work with the Logistic equation is to apply the same methodology as applied to 
the Gompertz regression in paragraph 4.3. The other way and the one we use for our model, 
is to replace the independent variable t  in the equation (8) with a set of explanatory variables, 
like the OLS model. So, equation (8) is formed to the next specification: 
      ( )( ) 11 expiy a b β
−
= + − X      (9) 
Where, X  is a ( )N K×  matrix containing the independent variables affecting the diffusion of 
the dependent variable ty  (the energy balance ( 1x ) which is the ratio imports to exports, the 
final energy consumption ( 2x ), the R&D as annual percentage of GDP ( 3x ) and the oil prices 
( 4x ) which is the dominant fossil fuel), while β  is the vector of the parameters. The parameter 
a  represents the upper limit, as mentioned above, and for the estimation of the regression it 
will be equal to its theoretical maximum value which is 1. 
Estimating the Logistic regression (2) we get the output of the Table 4.5: 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -5,859490 1,124450 -5,21100 0,00039 
1x  0,690840 0,298223 2,31650 0,04303 
2x  -1,20E-06 4,40E-07 -2,72820 0,02126 
3x  1,066180 0,252583 4,22110 0,00177 
4x  0,002945 0,000983 2,99590 0,01344 
R-squared 0,934456 Mean dependent var 4,461333 
Adjusted R-squared 0,908243 S.D. dependent var 0,654270 
S.E. of regression 0,042954 Akaike info criterion -47,94288 
Sum squared resid 0,018450 Schwarz criterion -44,40263 
Log likelihood 28,97144 F-statistic 35,64412 
Durbin-Watson stat 2,079205 Prob(F-statistic) 6,86E-06 
 
Table 4.5. Output of the Logistic regression. 
In general, the estimated sign for every single coefficient is theoretically meaningful. All five 
variables appear to be statistically significant at the conventional level of 0,05 and finally, the 
specification seems to fit the data very well. 
In more detail and in relation to the expected signs we stress the following: As mentioned in 
the multiple regression model, penetration of renewable energy seems one of the most 
important factors to offset the increasing trend of EU’s energy dependency. Thus, the signs of 
the energy balance and oil prices coefficients were expected to be positive, as they are in our 
model. R&D is considered a top priority policy sector in the EU with many programs and 
significant amounts invested. This accelerates the penetration of RES technologies, so we 
would expect the sign of the R&D coefficient to be positive, as it happens in our case. RES, 
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due to their nature, might not be able to meet the demand needs in case of an excess 
demand period, something that would lead to the use of more conventional fuels. On the other 
hand when there is a shortfall in energy demand, the percentage of RES in the final energy 
consumption would increase since less fossil fuels would be used. Thus the sign of the final 
energy consumption coefficient could be negative, as it is in our case, or positive. Overall, 
since the signs of the estimated coefficients are theoretically meaningful, we reach the 
conclusion that our model could be considered as pretty satisfactory from this point of view. 
Among the independent variables used, all of them appear to be statistically significant at the 
conventional level of 0,05. As mentioned in section 4.4, the significance for a coefficient can 
be affirmed by the corresponding t-statistic or alternatively by the associated p-value. If the 
absolute value of the t-statistic is greater than 2, then we may say that the coefficient is 
significant at the 0,05 significance level (but this is a rule of thumb). More accurate information 
with respect to the significance can be derived from the p-value. Hence, if the p-value is lower 
than the selected level of significance (e.g. 0,01), then the coefficient is considered significant 
at that particular level of significance. 
As it can be inferred by the value of the adjusted R-square (corrected with the degrees of 
freedom), which is almost 91%, the included into the model independent variables explain 
more than the 9/10 of the RES penetration in total gross final energy consumption. The fit 
seems excellent with pretty low standard error. After the pseudo-forecasting exercise we get 
the next figure which shows both the actual and forecasted values within the 95% confidence 
bounds (standard errors assumed normally distributed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Actual and forecasted values based on the Logistic specification. 
 
 
4.6. Model Comparison 
 
The next table (Table 4.6) presents the in-sample criteria as well as the forecast evaluation 
criteria for each one of the previously estimated specifications. 
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AR(3) Polynomial Gompertz Multiple Logistic 
Equation Estimation      
R-squared 0,978028 0,996784 0,797252 0,936609 0,934456 
Adjusted R-squared 0,969789 0,996536 0,776977 0,911253 0,908243 
S.E. of regression 0,118012 0,038505 0,775279 0,194910 0,042954 
Sum squared resid 0,111414 0,019275 6,010571 0,379898 0,018450 
Log likelihood 11,049200 28,643550 -12,878940 6,285196 28,971440 
Durbin-Watson stat 1,891986 0,742349 1,061091 2,150833 2,079205 
Mean dependent var 4,582500 4,461333 -4,388793 4,461333 4,461333 
S.D. dependent var 0,678958 0,654270 1,641659 0,654270 0,654270 
Akaike info criterion -1,174866 -3,552474 2,479824 -0,171360 -47,942880 
Schwarz criterion -1,013230 -3,458067 2,560641 0,064657 -44,402630 
Forecast Evaluation      
Root Mean Squared Error 0,111361 0,053113 0,136566 0,162090 0,186030 
Mean Absolute Error      0,093767 0,049962 0,119809 0,147543 0,163690 
Mean Absolute % Error 1,828450 0,960221 2,298972 2,763333 0,360530 
Theil Inequality Coefficient 0,010678 0,005081 0,013085 0,015519 0,470580 
     Bias Proportion        0,172350 0,143126 0,098692 0,012419 0,019424 
     Variance Proportion 0,286037 0,553590 0,459690 0,080871 0,002826 
   . Covariance Proportion 0,541613 0,303284 0,441618 0,906710 0,977750 
Table 4.6. Data summarization for all regression specifications. 
The R-squared Statistic measures the success of the regression in predicting the values of the 
dependent variable within the sample. In standard settings, may be interpreted as the fraction 
of the variance of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. The 
Statistic will equal one if the regression fits perfectly, and zero if it fits no better than the simple 
mean of the dependent variable. One problem with using R-squared as a measure of 
goodness of fit is that it will never decrease as you add more regressors. The adjusted R-
squared penalizes the R-squared for the addition of regressors which do not contribute to the 
explanatory power of the model. So, according to adjusted R-squared, the Polynomial 
regression model is ideal with the lowest standard error of regression. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is a test for first-order serial correlation. More formally, the DW 
Statistic assesses the linear association in the residuals. This serial correlation violates the 
standard assumption of regression theory that disturbances are not correlated with their past 
values. The primary problem associated with the serial correlation is: OLS is no longer 
efficient among linear estimators; standard errors computed are not correct and are generally 
understated. If there is no serial correlation, the DW statistic will be around 2. The DW statistic 
will fall below 2 if there is positive serial correlation (in the worst case, it will be near zero). If 
there is negative correlation, the statistic will lie somewhere between 2 and 4. So, according to 
the DW statistic, the Logistic regression specification is the selected one. 
The information criteria, in our case Akaike and Schwarz, are often used as a guide in model 
selection. The notion of an information criterion is to provide a measure of information that 
strikes a balance between this measure of goodness of fit and parsimonious specification of 
the model. The various information criteria differ in how to strike this balance. 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is given by: AIC=-2(l/T)+2(k/T), while the Schwarz 
Criterion (SC) is given by: SC=-2(l/T)+klog(T)/T. Where, l is the value of the log of the 
likelihood function with the k parameters estimated using T observations. The various 
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information criteria are all based on -2 times the average log likelihood function, adjusted by a 
penalty function. The selected model is the one with the smallest value criterion. So, 
according to the AIC and SC the ideal model is the Logistic regression model. 
The first two forecast error statistics (Root Mean Squared Error & Mean Absolute Error) 
depend on the scale of the dependent variable. These should be used as relative measures to 
compare forecasts for the same series across different models; the smaller the error, the 
better the forecasting ability of that model according to that criterion. So, the best model 
seems to be the Polynomial regression model. The remaining two statistics (Mean Absolute 
Percentage Error & Theil Inequality Coefficient) are scale invariant. The Theil inequality 
coefficient always lies between zero and one, where zero indicates a perfect fit. Thus, 
according to the mean absolute percentage error the selected model is the Logistic, while the 
Polynomial is the selected according to Theil inequality coefficient. 
Finally, the bias, variance and covariance proportions add up to one in the Theil inequality 
coefficient. The bias proportion informs us how far the mean of the forecast is from the mean 
of the actual series – In the Multiple regression specification the mean of the forecasts does 
the best job of tracking the mean of the dependent variable. The variance proportion tells us 
how far the variation of the forecast is from the variation of the actual series – In the Logistic 
the variation of the forecast and the actual series is the closest. The covariance proportion 
measures the remaining unsystematic forecasting errors with the least of them being in the 
Polynomial regression specification. 
Overall, from the comparison above and having in mind the drawbacks for each model, 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs of the chapter, we draw the conclusion that the most 
consistent, valid and proper regression model for long term forecasting is the Logistic. 
 
 
4.7. The Overall RES Share in 2020 
 
In the previous paragraph we ended up to the Logistic regression model as the most proper 
model for the long term forecasting (up to 2020). In this theoretical approach, in order to 
perform future projection, a decisive assumption must be made. 
We assume that the independent variables (the energy balance – ratio imports to exports, the 
final energy consumption, the R&D as annual percentage of the GDP and the oil prices) 
affecting the diffusion process of RES share in the total gross final energy consumption (y), 
have a stable growth rate for the years 2010-2020 equal to their average growth rate of the 
last fifteen years (1995-2009). 
At first sight this assumption seems rather simplistic; however, the average growth rate from 
the last fifteen years is a quite accurate and safe approach which leads to rather expected 
results. So, performing the forecast for the years 2010-2020 we receive Figure 4.6. 
As it is shown in Figure 4.6, the share of RES in total gross final energy consumption, grew 
from 6,1% (2009) to 11,51% (2020). It is an 88,7% increase from the current levels, a result 
that can be considered as pretty satisfactory. However, the target share for 2020 is 20%, so, 
there is a lack of 8,5% between the targeted and the forecasted value. 
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Figure 4.6. Actual and forecasted values up to 2020 based on the Logistic specification. 
According to the derived forecast, the 2020 target will not be met. As mentioned before, the 
values of the independent variables (energy balance, final energy consumption, R&D as % of 
GDP and oil prices) were assumed to evolve linearly. This assumption implies that the 
projected values of the parameters, for the period 2010-2020, reflect the past policies’ 
effectiveness (policies implemented in the late 90’s and early 00’s). 
From the mid 00’s European Commission had already realized that the 2010 targets would not 
be met due to the loose framework established from the first RES directives (2001/77/EC and 
2003/30/EC). As a reaction to this prospect many directives and regulations were recasted 
and developed. In 2009 and 2010 updated legislation on RES, energy efficiency, internal 
market reforming and energy & environment protection was ratified (e.g. the RES directive 
28/2009, the EPBD 31/2010, the CCS directive 31/2009). Stricter and more aggressive 
policies were introduced in the last couple of years from which there will be results in the years 
to come. Hopefully, these results are expected to have positive impact on the acceleration of 
RES share increase in final energy mix, increase of energy efficiency and environmental 
protection. This stricter framework is expected to help EU achieve its 2020 targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: all the calculations and estimations of this chapter were made with the software EViews & Gretl 
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Conclusions 
 
 
Increasing dependence on fossil fuels, growing imports and rising energy costs are making 
societies and economies vulnerable. EU and the whole world are called to face these 
challenges and proceed towards a sustainable energy development. 
From a world energy review it is clear that the total energy consumption increases at a rate of 
2,3% annually over the last 25 years. Since 80’s the fossil fuels count for about 80% of the 
worlds final energy mix. Consistent with the surge in energy consumption, CO2 emissions 
have an increasing trend and from 270ppm, before the Industrial Revolution, have reached 
the 393ppm in 2011. So, with certainty it can be said that current energy sources and patterns 
of energy use are unsustainable. They lead to major problems related to climate change, 
environmental pollution, inequity, source depletion, higher energy costs and security of supply. 
A sustainable energy future is possible through much greater energy efficiency and much 
greater reliance on RES compared to current energy patterns and trends. Greater energy 
efficiency would reduce growth in energy consumption, decrease investment requirements 
and improve energy services in poorer households and nations. Shifting from fossil fuels to 
RES in the coming decades would address all the problems associated with a business as 
usual energy future. 
Despite the fact that RES could provide all of the energy consumed in the world, according to 
many studies, a wide range of barriers limit their diffusion in final energy mix. The significance 
of these barriers varies among sectors, institutions and regions. In order to overcome them, 
different types of policies must be implemented. The policy options can be classified into 13 
categories: R&D, financing, financial incentives, pricing, voluntary agreements, regulations, 
information & training, procurement, market reforms, market obligations, capacity building, 
planning techniques and supporting tools. 
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The role of each of the above energy policy options depends on the maturity level of the RE 
technology. For example, R&D is important in the very early stage of the technology. Then 
with financial incentives and information & training policies this technology will increase its 
share in the market. Afterwards, while the technology starts to mature, regulations and codes 
will contribute towards the maximization of its share in the market and the final energy mix. 
EU’s energy policy aims at addressing growing environmental concerns associated with the 
energy sector, such as global climate change, and to transform this growing concern for 
sustainability into opportunities for global economic and technological leadership. This 
overarching goal is supported by activities in three main energy policy areas market 
liberalisation, energy security, and protection of the environment and climate. The EU’s 
energy policies can be classified into 8 broad categories: 
• Renewable Energy 
• Energy Efficiency & Savings 
• Internal Energy Markets 
• Security of Energy Supply 
• Environmental Protection 
• Nuclear Energy 
• R&D 
• External Energy Relations 
EU is recognized as a global leader in creating sustainable energy policy. As a consequence 
of this ambition, and the realisation of the responsibilities thrust upon it, the Commission has 
developed some energy policies that are at the cutting edge of global energy policy 
development. In particular with integrating energy into the broader sustainability objectives 
and approaching policy issues in an integrated way, by drawing together energy security, cost, 
and environmental policies into a comprehensive framework. 
An indicative example of a “cutting-edge” policy is the EU ETS which is the first and biggest 
international scheme for the trading of greenhouse gas emission allowances. Its aim is to 
encourage the emissions reduction and energy efficiency increase by reducing the number of 
emission allowances and making fines heavier year by year. In the short term though, it works 
as a mechanism of statistical transfer between industries. The EU ETS will be a model for 
energy markets around the world. 
Important milestones on RE policy’s evolution are: the White Paper of 1997, which sets an 
indicative target of a 12% share of renewable energy sources in total gross final energy 
consumption by 2010. The biofuels Directive 2003/30/EC, which sets an indicative target of 
5,75% of renewable fuels share in the final energy consumption for transport by 2010. The 
RES Directive 2001/77/EC, which sets an indicative target of 21% RES share, in the gross 
final energy consumption of electricity, by 2010. Finally, the last RES Directive 28/2009/EC 
which sets stricter policies on RE penetration like the binding target of 20% RES share in total 
gross final energy consumption by 2020. 
Although significant progress has been made towards increasing the RE penetration in the 
final energy mix, the targets of 2010 were not met. That is mainly due to the loose framework 
established by the policies ratified in late 90’s – early 00’s. For example the policy of setting 
targets for RE share in the final energy mix was disruptive in early 00’s, however, these 
targets were indicative. However, the overall progress can be considered as pretty satisfactory 
since: the RE share in primary energy production increases with an average rate of 9% over 
the last 7 years; The RE share in electricity sector increased by 21% from 1997 levels and in 
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transport sector by 240% in the period 1997-2003 and by 800% in the period 2003-2009 (in 
final energy consumption). 
From the mid 00’s European Commission had already realized that the 2010 targets would not 
be met. As a reaction to this prospect many directives and regulations were recasted and 
developed. In 2009 and 2010 updated legislation on RES, energy efficiency, internal market 
reforming and energy & environment protection was ratified (e.g. the RES directive 28/2009, 
the EPBD 31/2010, the CCS directive 31/2009). Stricter and more aggressive policies were 
introduced in the last couple of years from which there will be results in the years to come. 
Examples of latest and stricter policies in RE are the binding RES share targets for 2020, 
cooperation mechanisms like statistical transfers and joint projects between Member States 
and Member States with Third countries, NREAPs and indicative intermediate targets for 
better monitoring of the progress towards 2020, the close of the legislative gap for heating and 
cooling sector etc. 
In an attempt to forecast the RES share in the total gross final energy consumption, in 2020, 
five different regression specifications were implemented and compared in order to end up to 
the most appropriate for long-run forecast. The parameters involved (energy balance, final 
energy consumption, R&D as % of GDP and oil prices) in the selected specification (Logistic 
regression specification) were assumed to evolve linearly up to 2020. A simplistic approach 
but quite accurate and safe for the elementary level of this attempt. 
The forecasted value for 2020 is 11,51% which is much lower than the targeted value of 20%. 
However, the previous assumption implies that the projected values (up to 2020) of the 
involved parameters reflect the past policies’ effectiveness. 
Finally, it must be made clear that RE penetration progress isn’t affected only by the four 
parameters mentioned above. The phase towards 2020 targets has started in the middle of a 
political and financial tough period not only for the EU, but also for the global economic and 
political environment. Economic recession affects every aspect of our lives and none knows 
for sure its impacts on the EU’s effort towards the sustainable energy development. For 
example someone could say that since economic recession will lead to energy consumption 
decrease this would also lead to fossil fuels consumption decrease, thus increase the RES 
share in final energy consumption. On the other hand, economic recession could lead to a 
significant drop of amounts for RE investments and cause major delay in the RES penetration 
progress. 
EU always set the bar high and hopefully through the extensive reporting from the Member 
States and monitoring from the European Commission it will manage to accelerate the 
increase of RE use and energy efficiency and achieve the 2020 targets. 
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A1. RE Sources & Technologies Overview 
 
Renewable energy is any form of energy from solar, geophysical or biological sources that is 
replenished by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. RE is 
obtained from the continuing or repetitive flows of energy occurring in the natural environment 
and includes resources such as: 
• Biomass 
• Solar energy 
• Geothermal heat 
• Hydropower 
• Tide/waves/ocean energy and 
• Wind energy 
However, it is possible to utilize biomass at a greater rate than it can grow, or to draw heat 
from a geothermal field at a faster rate than heat flows can replenish it. On the other hand, the 
rate of utilization of direct solar energy has no bearing on the rate at which it reaches the 
Earth. Fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) do not fall under this definition, as they are not 
replenished within a time frame that is short relative to their rate of utilization. 
There is a multi-step process whereby primary energy is converted into an energy carrier 
(heat, electricity or mechanical work), and then into an energy service. RE technologies are 
diverse and can serve the full range of energy service needs. Various types of RE can supply 
electricity, thermal energy and mechanical energy, as well as produce fuels that are able to 
satisfy multiple energy service needs. 
Since it is energy services and not energy that people need, the goal is to meet those needs 
in an efficient manner that requires less primary energy consumption with low-carbon 
technologies that minimize CO2 emissions. 
Thermal conversion processes to produce electricity (including from biomass and geothermal) 
suffer losses of approximately 40 to 90%, and losses of around 80% occur when supplying the 
mechanical energy needed for transport based on internal combustion engines. These 
conversion losses raise the share of primary energy from fossil fuels, and the primary energy 
required from fossil fuels to produce electricity and mechanical energy from heat. 
Direct energy conversions from solar PV, hydro, ocean, and wind energy to electricity do not 
suffer thermodynamic power cycle (heat to work) losses although they do experience other 
conversion inefficiencies in extracting energy from natural energy flows that may also be 
relatively large and irreducible. 
Some RE technologies can be deployed at the point of use (decentralized) in rural and urban 
environments, whereas others are primarily employed within large (centralized) energy 
networks. Though many RE technologies are technically mature and are being deployed at 
significant scale, others are in an earlier phase of technical maturity and commercial 
deployment. 
The overview of RE technologies and applications in the next tables provides an abbreviated 
list of the major renewable primary energy sources and technologies, the status of their 
development and the typical or primary distribution method (centralized network/grid required 
or decentralized, local standalone supply) [2]. 
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RES RES Technology Primary Energy Sector 
Bioenergy 
Traditional Use of Fuelwood/Charcoal Thermal 
Cook stoves (Primitive and Advanced) Thermal 
Domestic Heating Systems (pellet based) Thermal 
Small- and Large-Scale Boilers Thermal 
Anaerobic Digestion for Biogas Production Electricity/Thermal/Transport 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Electricity/Thermal 
Co-firing in Fossil Fuel Power Plant Electricity 
Combustion-based Power Plant Electricity 
Gasification-based Power Plant Electricity 
Sugar & Starch-Based Crop Ethanol Transport 
Plant & Seed Oil-Based Biodiesel Transport 
Lignocellulose Sugar-Based Biofuels Transport 
Lignocellulose Syngas-Based Biofuels Transport 
Pyrolysis-Based Biofuels Transport 
Aquatic Plant-Derived Fuels Transport 
Gaseous Biofuels Thermal 
Solar 
Photovoltaic (PV) Electricity 
Concentrating PV (CPV) Electricity 
Concentrating Solar Thermal Power (CSP) Electricity 
Low Temperature Solar Thermal Thermal 
Solar Cooling Thermal 
Passive Solar Architecture Thermal 
Solar Cooking Thermal 
Solar Fuels Transport 
Geothermal 
Hydrothermal, Condensing Flash Electricity 
Hydrothermal, Binary Cycle Electricity 
Engineered Geothermal Systems (EGS) Electricity 
Submarine Geothermal Electricity 
Direct Use Applications Thermal 
Geothermal Heat Pumps (GHP) Thermal 
Hydropower 
Run-of-River Electricity/Mechanical 
Reservoirs Electricity 
Pumped Storage Electricity 
Hydrokinetic Turbines Electricity/Mechanical 
Ocean 
Wave Electricity 
Tidal Range Electricity 
Tidal Currents Electricity 
Ocean Currents Electricity 
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Electricity/Thermal 
Salinity Gradients Electricity 
Wind 
Onshore, Large Turbines Electricity 
Offshore, Large Turbines Electricity 
Distributed, Small Turbines Electricity 
Turbines for Water Pumping / Other Mechanical Mechanical 
Wind Kites Transport 
Higher-Altitude Wind Generators Electricity 
Table A1: RE Technologies overview (part 1) [2]. 
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RES RES Technology 
Technology Maturity Distribution Method 
R&D Demo/ Pilot 
Early 
Stage 
Later 
Stage 
Centr
alized 
Decent
ralized 
Bioenergy 
Traditional Use of Fuelwood/Charcoal       X   X 
Cook stoves (Primitive and Advanced)       X   X 
Domestic Heating Systems (pellet based)       X   X 
Small & Large-Scale Boilers       X X X 
Anaerobic Digestion for Biogas Production       X X X 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP)       X X X 
Co-firing in Fossil Fuel Power Plant       X X   
Combustion-based Power Plant       X X X 
Gasification-based Power Plant     X   X X 
Sugar & Starch-Based Crop Ethanol       X X   
Plant & Seed Oil-Based Biodiesel       X X   
Lignocellulose Sugar-Based Biofuels   X     X   
Lignocellulose Syngas-Based Biofuels     X   X   
Pyrolysis-Based Biofuels   X     X   
Aquatic Plant-Derived Fuels X       X   
Gaseous Biofuels       X X   
Solar 
Photovoltaic (PV)       X X X 
Concentrating PV (CPV)     X   X X 
Concentrating Solar Thermal Power (CSP)     X   X X 
Low Temperature Solar Thermal       X   X 
Solar Cooling   X       X 
Passive Solar Architecture       X   X 
Solar Cooking     X     X 
Solar Fuels X       X   
Geothermal 
Hydrothermal, Condensing Flash       X X   
Hydrothermal, Binary Cycle       X X   
Engineered Geothermal Systems (EGS)   X     X   
Submarine Geothermal X       X   
Direct Use Applications       X X X 
Geothermal Heat Pumps (GHP)       X   X 
Hydropower 
Run-of-River       X X X 
Reservoirs       X X X 
Pumped Storage       X X   
Hydrokinetic Turbines   X     X X 
Ocean 
Wave   X     X   
Tidal Range       X X   
Tidal Currents   X     X   
Ocean Currents X       X   
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion   X     X   
Salinity Gradients   X     X   
Wind 
Onshore, Large Turbines       X X   
Offshore, Large Turbines     X   X   
Distributed, Small Turbines       X   X 
Turbines for Water Pumping       X   X 
Wind Kites   X       X 
Higher-Altitude Wind Generators X       X   
Table A2: RE Technologies overview (part 2) [2]. 
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The economic performance of a specific energy source determines its future market 
penetration. Economic conditions of the various RES technologies are based on both 
economic and technical specifications, varying across the EU countries. We can have an 
overview for each technology through the next tables: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Economic & technical specifications for new RES-E plants [12]. 
Generally speaking, the cost of RE technologies drops as they gain more and more share in 
the market. For example, in 2009 typical PV system costs were in the range 2950 €/kWe to 
4750 €/kWe. These cost levels were reached after strong cost declines in the years 2008 and 
2009. This reduction in investment cost marks an important departure from the trend of the 
years 2005 to 2007, during which costs remained flat, as rapidly expanding global PV markets 
and a shortage of silicon feedstock put upward pressure on both module prices and non-
module costs. Before this period of stagnation PV systems had experienced a continuous 
decline in cost since the start of commercial manufacture in the mid 1970’s following a typical 
learning curve. The new dynamic began to shift in 2008, as expansions on the supply-side 
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coupled with the financial crisis led to a relaxation of the PV markets and the cost reductions 
achieved on the learning curve in the meantime factored in again. Furthermore, the cost 
decrease has been stimulated by the increasing globalization of the PV market, especially the 
stronger market appearance of Asian manufacturers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Economic & technical specifications for new RES-H plants [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Economic & technical specifications for new biofuel refineries [12]. 
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A2. Funding RES & Current Investment Dynamics 
 
The following paragraphs present an overview on the different European bodies involved in 
financing RES employment and list specific funding programmes, pointing out the type of 
financial support, financial volumes, as well as eligible beneficiaries [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Organization of the financing of RE in EU [12]. 
Figure A1 depicts the organisation of the RES financing programmes within the EU. As will be 
seen in the following paragraphs, the main portion of the available funding is dedicated to 
large scale investments through the European Funds funds (particularly ERDF and CF) of the 
EC and the European banks: IEB and EBRD. 
1. FP7 
The Seventh Framework Programme bundles all research-related EU initiatives together 
under a common programme. The FP7 is playing a critical role in reaching the goals of 
growth, competitiveness and employment. It is one of the tools to reach the European Union’s 
Lisbon objective to become the “most dynamic competitive knowledge-based economy in the 
world". The programme will last for seven years from 2007 until 2013 and has a total budget of 
over € 50 billion. It is divided in 4 main specific programmes: 
• The Cooperation Programmes: € 32.413 million; 
• The Ideas Programmes: € 7.513 million; 
• The People Programmes: € 4.750 million; 
• The Capacity Programmes: € 4.097 million. 
The Cooperation programmes will be devoted to supporting cooperation between universities, 
industry, research centres and public authorities throughout the EU and beyond. The 
Cooperation programme is sub-divided into ten distinct themes, one of them is Energy (2.300 
million €). The Energy theme covers: hydrogen and fuel cells, renewable electricity 
generation, renewable fuel production, renewables for heating and cooling, CO2 capture and 
storage technologies for zero emission power generation, clean coal technologies, smart 
energy networks, energy efficiency and savings, knowledge for energy policy making. 
It is expected that renewable energies will cover 45% of the energy sector total budget: 
around € 1.035 million between 2007 and 2013 (€ 150 million per year on average) and 11% 
of the total funding Energy Efficiency projects. At the end of 2009, second generation fuel from 
biomass and photovoltaics were the most subsidized technologies. 
There is a huge financing need during the early-stage of RE technology development that EC 
only partially covers. Indeed, the demand for grant under the FP7 Energy Theme of the 
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renewable energy activities is between six and eight times higher than the EC contribution 
according to the statistical overview of the implementation of the FP7 Energy Theme. 
2. CIP 
With small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as its main target, the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Programme supports innovation activities (including eco-innovation), provides 
better access to finance and delivers business support services in the regions. Among others 
it promotes the increased use of renewable energies and energy efficiency and it runs from 
2007 to 2013 with an overall budget of € 3621 million. 
The Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP) is one part of the CIP. Two financial 
instruments have been developed by the EIP:  
• High Growth and Innovative SME Facility (GIF 1&2) and  
• SME Guarantee Facility (SMEG).  
GIF 1 and 2 are capital risk instruments, while SMEG is a guarantee instrument. The budget 
for 2007-2013 of the former is €550 million, and €506 millions for the latter. Those CIP 
financial instruments are not directly available to SMEs but implemented by the European 
Investment Fund (EIF) and selected financial institutions. For GIF, EIF invests in funds 
focused on early and expansion stage of specialized sectors, particularly eco-innovation. In 
this “eco-innovation” group, some companies are likely to be in one of the renewable energy 
technologies. The total amount dedicated to renewable energies can not be estimated; 
however it should not be very significant. Concerning the SMEG scheme, around 5% of the 
total budget would be allocated to “eco-innovation” (including some renewable energy 
companies). Similarly to GIF, the total amount dedicated to renewable energies can not be 
estimated, but it should not be very significant. 
The Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE) Programme is the other part of the CIP. It aims at being a 
catalyst for innovation and new market opportunities. It is therefore aiming at market 
development and capacity building and not hardware investment or R&D. IEE Programme 
raises awareness on new market transformations. The 2009 funding areas of IEE are the 
following: 
• Energy Efficiency; 
• RE sources (“ALTENER” priority); 
• Mobility; 
• Local Leadership; 
• Special initiatives. 
The IEE Program is implemented largely by means of two main instruments: 
• Grants : Grant agreements / Direct Grant; 
• Procurement. 
The IEE Programme finances different initiatives: usual projects, and specific initiatives such 
as “Covenant of Mayors”, ELENA and Mangenergy. 
Usual projects aim at raising awareness in European territories (e.g. developing a target-
group-specific financial scheme with experts overcoming financial barriers in geothermal 
projects; enhancing proactive land valorisation policies within a strategic eco-sustainable 
approach to local developments, promotion of Renewable Energy for Water production 
through Desalination …). The average size of a usual project is €1 million. Financed projects 
have to involve a minimum of 3 different countries per project and the average number of 
countries involved in one project is around 7 or 8. 
3. Regional Policy 
The European cohesion policy supports the regions through the financial instruments called 
the European Funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion 
Fund (CF). The European Funds are often simply called the Structural Funds. 
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The regulation on the ERDF defines its role and fields of interventions as the promotion of 
public and private investments to help reduce regional disparities across the Union. The 
detailed management of programmes which receive support from the Structural Funds is the 
Member States’ responsibility. For every programme, they designate a managing authority (at 
national, regional or other levels) which will inform potential beneficiaries, select the projects 
and generally monitor implementation. The expenditure planned by ERDF and CF on RE for 
the 2007-2013 period amounts 4.760 million €. This represents a total of 680 million €/year. 
The European Parliament passed the €5 billion European Union (EU) Economic Recovery 
Plan on 6 May 2009, which will see investment in energy projects, broadband internet 
infrastructure and rural development. In the energy sector three activities are concerned: 
• Gas and electricity infrastructure (€2,365bn); 
• Offshore wind energy (€565 million); 
• Carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects (€1,05bn). 
The budget was allocated in 2009 and 2010 for the selected projects. For the Offshore wind 
energy, 9 projects representing €565 million have been selected. These projects will be 
implemented in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, Denmark, United Kingdom 
and Belgium. 
4. EIB 
Since 2006, EIB spending on RE has strongly increased (from € 0,5 billion to 2,8 billion in 
2009). Renewables represent about a third of EIB’s total energy spending (11 billion within 
Europe in 2009). The rest is conventional energy capacities, transmission, etc. 
Key words of EIB’s intervention in the sector are “clean, secure, competitive”. Their goal also 
includes setting the trend to decrease the cost curves of emerging technologies. The EIB has 
also provided credit lines to banks and financial institutions to help them provide finance to 
small and medium-sized enterprises or public institutions active on various RE projects, 
including wind, solar PV and biomass. 
Other minor investment sectors are EIB carbon fund of 50 million € (purchase of carbon 
credits) and a 185 million € loan attributed to Acciona’s Research, Development and 
Innovation programme. 
90% of spending of EIB on RE is done within EU. The main beneficiaries were Spain, UK, 
Belgium, Italy and Ireland benefiting from almost three quarters of EIB expenditures in 2009. 
The EIB normally finances projects up to 50% of investment costs; however, exceptionally the 
EIB is willing to provide a larger percentage for renewable energy projects and projects 
making a significant contribution to energy efficiency. Financing may be combined with EU 
grants depending on the scope and definition of the individual project. Debt tenors are usually 
12-15 years. Other financing instruments include infrastructure investment funds through 
which the EIB indirectly participates in companies and projects promoting EU priority 
objectives in energy and renewable energy projects. 
EIB’s Corporate Operational Plan for the years 2010-2012 highlights two key objectives: 
• 25% of total lending should be related to Climate Change (RE, EE, Transport, etc.); 
• 20% of all energy financing should be dedicated to renewables (already achieved). 
Currently the EIB plays a strong role on the market as the credit market is holding back RE 
projects, but the EIB is not inexhaustible. State-owned banks should also do the effort to get 
more involved in RE financing. The EIB on its side could also contribute to catalyzing private 
equity. The EIB encourages the Commission to support the risk-sharing facility. It can be a 
very good multiplier of money invested in this facility. 
5. EBRD 
The EBRD supports Renewable Energy projects from Central Europe to Central Asia mostly 
through the Sustainable Energy Initiative (SEI). The SEI, launched in 2006, responds to 
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specific needs of the energy transition in the EBRD countries of operation: regulatory 
frameworks not in place in many countries, preferential tariffs not always adequate, 
problematic grid access, technical and financial skills gaps. 
The first phase of SEI ended up in 2008 with an amount of investments of € 2,7 billion (above 
its original targets) in the following categories: 
• SEI 1 : Industrial energy efficiency; 
• SEI 2 : Sustainable Energy credit lines; 
• SEI 3 : Cleaner energy production; 
• SEI 4 : Renewable energy; 
• SEI 5 : Μunicipal infrastructure energy efficiency. 
SEI 2 and SEI 4 fall under the scope of renewable energy financing. During the first period of 
SEI implementation (2006-2008), 10% of investments were signed in the Renewable Energy 
sector that is to say €277 million over 3 years. 
Building on this first experience, SEI phase two objectives for the period 2009-11 include: 
• EBRD SEI financing target range of €3 to 5 billion for total project value of €9 to 15 
billion: the same rate of investments in the RE sector as during the first period can be 
expected, that is to say €500 million over the 3 years; 
• Technical assistance grant funding of €100 million and investment grant funding target of 
€250 million for EE and RE projects. 
After having a picture of the funding structure for RES, the next paragraphs will show an 
estimation of investments in RES projects in the EU according to the RE-Shaping D8 report 
(January 2011) [22]. 
Investments in RE projects represent investments in tangible fixed assets and are financed by 
equity, debts and in some cases by grants. These three capital types differ with respect to 
their source and subordination. In general, subordinated capital shows a higher exposure to 
risks and hence requires a higher risk premium. To analyze the current RES investment 
situation, the investments in RES projects are estimated via two approaches: 
• RES investments are based on the number and volume of transactions in the 
corresponding year (Database of BNEF 2010). 
• RES investments rely on the estimation of the monetary value of the installed RES 
capacities in the EU, based upon average capital costs per capacity (Held 2010) and 
capacities installed (EUROSTAT 2010). These investments reflect the capacities of the 
installations completed in the corresponding year. 
1. Investments in RES based on financial transactions 
The database of BNEF (Bloomberg New Energy Finance) applied in the first approach reflects 
asset financing related to the generation of electricity, heat or fuel from RES. The estimation 
includes RES investments within the EU, differentiated into RES sectors and types of 
transactions, such as acquisitions, refinancing or financing of RES projects by debts and 
equity. The financial transactions are marked with the status “announced” or “completed”. This 
status refers to the transaction status and not to the project development status. A completed 
or announced financing could coincide with different project development phases, e.g. project 
planning or construction, while refinancing or acquisitions can also take place during the 
operation phase. 
The analysis of the data refers to the number of transactions and the transaction volume. The 
transaction volume – if disclosed - either comprises total capital (equity and debt) invested, 
debt or equity only. Not disclosed values on transaction volumes have been supplemented. 
Since the transaction volume only reflects partial investments – in several cases just equity or 
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debt – total investments in RES tend to be underestimated. Furthermore, small individual 
investments, grants or investment subsidies provided by states, governmental organizations 
or NGOs are not listed in the dataset. However, this approach reveals current investment 
trends and activities, and allows a differentiation of investments with respect to financing 
instruments. 
The results of the first approach show that asset financing of RES projects in the EU has 
significantly increased in number and transaction volume during the last decade. The number 
of planned, announced or completed transactions in RES projects encompassing biomass, 
solar energy, wind power, small hydropower, tidal power and geothermal plants reached the 
zenith with around 750 activities in 2008 and decreased slightly in 2009. Data on activities in 
2010 are still incomplete and hence not fully usable. However, first publications of BNEF 
(2011) reveal even a further increase in RES investments in 2010. Regarding the type of 
transaction, financing of new RES installations dominates by number and volume and strongly 
determines the growth in RES financing activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Number of transactions in the EU in 2000-2010 [22]. 
For further analysis, the completed transactions - and not announced or planned transactions 
- are of interest. The development pattern of completed transactions is similar to the pattern of 
total RES asset financing. In numbers and financed volume, investments peak in 2008 and 
2009, respectively. The total volume of investments in RES projects in 2009 is estimated 
between € 20 and 53 billion. 
The range of uncertainty in the estimation based on the existing data is indicated in Figure A3. 
The large uncertainty is due to the fact that the total transaction volume is not disclosed for 
many projects in the database. The upper range refers to the assumption that the average 
transaction volume of all disclosed transactions is used for the non-disclosed ones. The lower 
range reflects the transaction volume if non-disclosed transactions are set to zero.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Estimated volume of transactions in million € [22]. 
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In the last years, the investment in RES has been dominated by wind and solar power. Most 
of the transactions take place in Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy (2008 
and 2009), where mainly PV and wind power projects are developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Share of financed new RES projects in the EU from 2000 – 2010 by sector [22]. 
Regarding the type of finance, balance sheet financing is still dominating the financial 
activities, but with decreasing importance. In turn, loans – construction loans, syndicated bank 
loans – gain in importance. 
The growth of loans and public capital in RES financing signals an increasingly maturing 
market and decreasing risks, both also probably influenced by the increasing use of RES 
policy support mechanisms with guaranteed off-take prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5: Shares of financing instruments based on number of transactions, EU 2000 – 2010 [22]. 
2. Investments based on RES installations 
A second approach, based on installations in RES power generation plants, was pursued. The 
investments are estimated based on the growth of installed RES generation capacities 
weighted with the average investment per capacity. 
The data on capacity installations relies on statistical data from EUROSTAT, where current 
data for 2010 or 2009 is not available yet. Therefore, the values for 2009 are projected and 
not based on statistics about actual installations, as in the preceding years. The data for the 
average capital costs per installed capacity is applied as gathered in Held (2010). The 
investments enter the statistical database in the year the generation plant starts operation. 
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The results depicted in Figure A6 show a steadily increasing investment in RES projects 
reaching around € 40 billion in 2009. Regarding RES installations with respect to RES 
technology and country, PV and wind power have dominated the RES projects in recent 
years, and Spain, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France are also the leading 
countries in RES investments. 
Compared to the first approach, this method reveals an investment volume that is significantly 
lower than the estimated investment volume based on financial transactions. Furthermore, it 
allows no conclusions on the financial instruments used to finance RES investments to be 
drawn, but it shows the capital funds needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A6: Investments of new RES projects in the EU from 2001 – 2009 in million € [22]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7: RES investments 2001 – 2009 in the EU by technology [22]. 
The estimated investments based on financial transactions show a similar level to those 
based on capacity of around € 40 billion in 2009, whereas the estimate based on completed 
transactions is subject to substantial uncertainty. 
In both approaches, most investments were carried out in wind power and PV and take 
predominant place in the same five countries, but with a slightly different order. One of the 
main reasons for the differences in investment volume is likely to be the time gap between 
financial transactions and installed capacity. The first takes place during planning, 
development and construction of the generation plant, while the latter occurs with the 
completed installation or operation of the plant. Further, financial transactions include all RES 
projects (power and fuel, possibly heat) while installed capacities include only plants for 
electric power generation, but no fuel refineries. Additionally, data on financial transactions are 
most likely rather incomplete for the earlier years of the last decade. Finally, in 2000, markets 
for RES investments were less mature than in 2010, therefore probably less financing deals 
were concluded in the market. 
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The decreasing equity share in RES investments (Figure A8) shows changes in financing 
patterns that could be explained by technology and market development, resulting in a 
reduction of risks. Furthermore, from the viewpoint of investors and lenders, the strong 
political commitment for RES might also contribute to a reduction and/or shift of risks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: Average equity-debt ratio of RES investments in the EU from 2001 – 2010 
 Transactions with 100% share of equity or debt are ignored [22]. 
Overall, in the EU, financial transactions – and hence investments - in RES projects have 
strongly increased over the last years and range between € 55 and 62 billion (US$ 60 and 70 
billion in 2008 and 2009, respectively). 
The estimated investments exceed those indicated by REN21 for Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa (US$ 42 billion in 2009). Capital expenditures needed to achieve the EU deployment 
objectives are estimated at € 70 billion per year, which is still quite above the current actual 
investments; but they tend to get closer. 
Furthermore, capacity-based installation was relatively high at the beginning of the decade, 
but grew at a slower pace than financial transactions. The dominance of capacity-based 
investment in 2000-2006 can be explained by rather immature markets for RES investments, 
in line with a strong political commitment. 
While at the beginning of the decade balance sheet financing (with equity) strongly dominated 
the financial instruments, in recent years debts or loans are growing in number, revealing an 
increasing confidence of lenders and other investors in the RES business/market. 
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A3. Evaluation of Support Schemes in Key RES Technologies 
 
Evaluating the experiences made with policies for the support of renewable energy 
technologies (RET) in practice is crucial to continuously improve the design of renewable 
policies. To do so, reliable evaluation criteria covering various aspects of renewable support 
policies have to be defined. These aspects include the effectiveness of the policies used to 
measure the degree of target achievement and the costs for society resulting from the support 
of renewable energies, expressed by the static efficiency. In addition, a comparison of the 
economic incentives provided for a certain RET and the average generation costs, helps to 
monitor whether financial support levels are well suited to the actual support requirements of a 
technology. 
To asses the described issues, this analysis [22] relies on the policy performance indicators 
that have already been developed in the context of the EIE-funded research project OPTRES 
and applied for EC's monitoring process of renewable support schemes as well as for an 
analysis of the International energy agency. 
The Policy Effectiveness Indicator, has formerly be used to evaluate RET exclusively in the 
electricity sector, to monitor the effectiveness of support policies in the heating and cooling 
sector as well as in the transport sector. In principle the effectiveness of a policy instrument 
serves as a measurement for the degree to which a predefined goal could be achieved. 
Nevertheless, this definition of the effectiveness complicates a cross-country comparison of 
the effectiveness, as the setting of objectives and their ambition level might vary significantly 
among countries. A less ambitious objective is easier to attain than a more ambitious one. In 
this case, the degree of achievement does not serve as an appropriate indication for the 
quality of a support scheme. Consequently, the effectiveness of a policy scheme for the 
promotion of renewable electricity is understood as the increase in the supply of renewable 
final energy due to this policy compared to a suitable reference quantity. Such a reference 
quantity could be the additional available renewable electricity generation potential or the 
gross electricity consumption.  
The renewable final energy provided may show some volatility from year to year which cannot 
be attributed to changes in policy support, but rather to weather-related factors. This means, 
that hydro or wind power electricity generation may vary from year to year as a result of 
changing precipitation or wind speed conditions. In case of renewables-based heating system, 
it shall be considered that the space heating demand may also vary according to the average 
temperatures. To exclude the influence of changes in the supply of renewable final energy 
due to weather conditions and other external and un-predictable circumstances, the energy 
provided shall be corrected by these factors. Using real generation figures would lead to a 
biased picture of policy effectiveness, as for instance a successful policy in the wind sector 
would be underestimated, if the wind conditions were especially bad in the observed time 
frame.  
In order to take into account additional factors that may influence the attractiveness of RET 
investments information about the deployment status of a certain RET will be provided in 
terms of the Deployment Status Indicator. The RET (Renewable Energy Technology) 
Deployment Status Indicator aims to quantify how advanced the market for a specific RET is 
in a specific Member State: the higher the value, the higher the maturity of that specific 
technology market in that country. The indicator shall be applicable to the key RE 
Technologies in 27 EU Member States based on existing statistical data. 
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Based on earlier RET market surveys, we differentiate three types of deployment status, well 
aware that these categorization is somewhat rough and generalizing.  
Immature RET markets are characterized by small market sizes, few market players and low 
growth rates. Local, regional and national administrations have little experience with the use 
and the promotion of that RET. Also local banks needed for financing, energy companies and 
local project developers have little experience with that RET. This goes along with the typical 
market entry barriers for the RET, e.g. long and in transparent permitting procedures, grid 
access barriers, low or unreliable financial support etc.  
Intermediate RET markets are characterized by increased market sizes, typically ac-
companied by strong market growth and the interest of many market players. The increased 
market size reflects that the energy sector, the administration and parties involved in financing 
have gained growing experience with the RET. In case of fast market growth, growth related 
market barriers may occur, e.g. infrastructural (rather local) and supply chain bottlenecks (both 
local and global). Not all intermediate markets show fast market growth, however; in some 
countries this status reflects that the market has stopped growing at intermediate level, e.g. 
due to a stopped support policy; in other countries the potential for a specific RET is so limited 
that the market cannot reach advanced deployment status.  
Advanced RET markets are characterized by established market players and fully mature 
technology. Market growth may start to slow down at this advanced stage. Market players 
may encounter typical high-end barriers: competition for scarce sites and resources as the 
most cost effective RES potential is increasingly exploited, power system limitations like 
curtailment, etc. 
In addition to the effectiveness of policy support the level of financial support paid to the 
supplier of renewable final energy is another core characteristic of a support policy. Besides 
its direct influences on the policy cost, it influences also the policy effectiveness. In general, 
one can expect that a high support level induces more capacity growth than a lower support 
level, provided that the remaining framework conditions are equal. Evidently, a higher support 
level does not necessarily lead to an accelerated market development of RET, if e.g. the 
framework conditions for permitting procedures are not favourable or if risk considerations are 
taken into account. Nevertheless, a high support level involves higher policy costs to be borne 
by the society. Hence, the support level should be sufficient to stimulate capacity growth of 
RES by offering a certain profitability level to potential investors but should also avoid windfall 
profits caused by high support levels exceeding the requirements of the RES technology. 
Comparing the support level available for the different technologies in each MS contributes to 
the identification of best policy practices that have been the most successful in encouraging 
market growth at preferably low costs. However, the actual support levels are not comparable, 
since significant criteria including in particular the duration of support payments are not 
considered. For this reason the available remuneration level during the whole lifetime of a 
RET plant has to be taken into account. The remuneration level contains the final energy price 
if the support payments expire after a certain time horizon, but the RET plant continues in 
operation. To make the remuneration level comparable, time series of the expected support 
payments or final energy prices respectively are created and the net present value is 
calculated. The remuneration level under each instrument was normalised to a common 
duration of 15 years based on the assumption of discount rate of 6.5 %. The discount rate is 
assumed to reflect weighted average costs of capital (WACC) consisting of costs for equity 
and debt. Support payments with a duration of 20 years lead to a higher annualised 
remuneration level than the same payments available only for 15 years. In case of a certificate 
scheme, it was assumed that remuneration level is composed of the conventional electricity 
price and the average value of the tradable green certificate. It is supposed that the elements 
of the time series remain constant during the time certificate trading is allowed. 
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1. Wind Onshore (RES-E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A9: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2003-2009 [21]. 
Figure A9 displays the Policy Effectiveness Indicator for wind onshore power plants. The 
columns depict the average indicator of the observation period 2003 to 2009. To get an idea 
of the current trends of the policy effectiveness, the effectiveness indicator is also shown for 
2009, the last year where statistical data is available. The colour of the columns indicates the 
policy instrument prevailingly applied in the respective country to support wind onshore power 
plants.  
Observing Figure A9, it becomes evident that the countries with the highest average 
effectiveness during the last seven years (Germany, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) apply feed-
in tariffs to promote electricity produced by wind power plants (onshore). Whilst Germany and 
Spain already supported effectively wind onshore electricity before 2003, the wind onshore 
development in Ireland and Portugal caught up after 2004. Regarding Ireland the change from 
the tendering system to a feed-in tariff, which took place in 2006, helped to speed-up the 
development of wind onshore energy.  
The trend of the policy effectiveness in 2009 observed in a group of countries with a 
reasonable average policy effectiveness including Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Sweden 
and UK is clearly upward. Despite existing grid-capacity problems in Estonia, wind onshore 
capacity increased from 77 MW to 150 MW in 2009. The accelerated growth in 2009 appears 
to be a result of the government's decision to increase the cap for electricity from wind power 
plants that receives the feed-in tariff support from 400 GWh to 500 GWh. Although the grid 
capacity still appears to be a limiting factor in Italy wind power plants experienced strong 
growth in Italy during the last five years, achieving a total of almost 4,8 GW of wind power 
plants at the end of 2009. To tackle the grid-integration problems obliged curtailment of wind 
power production was already required and realised in Italy. After comparatively moderate 
capacity development of wind onshore energy in Sweden until 2008, Sweden shows a strong 
policy performance in 2009, corresponding to a doubling of the installed capacity to a total 
installed capacity of 1.4 GW. The example of Hungary – that showed the third-highest policy 
effectiveness in 2009 while it has the 15th rank in deployment status - shows that strong 
growth can be achieved also in Member States starting from a low deployment level.  
Looking at the situation in France, the effectiveness of policy support has been improving in 
recent years. However, given the vast wind energy potential, more growth than the 
additionally installed 1 GW of wind turbines in 2009 could be expected. Despite a favourable 
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feed-in tariff system, problems with permission procedures and an active anti-wind lobby are 
still obstacles to higher growth rates. 
Policy effectiveness in the Netherlands appears to be on a reasonable level on average. The 
capacity growth achieved in 2009 is mainly due to the repowering of old turbines. In the Czech 
Republic a reasonable capacity growth of wind onshore power plants is hampered by a very 
strong growth of solar PV power plants. The extraordinary growth of Solar PV in the Czech 
Republic may have involved some difficulties for wind projects to get permissions for 
connecting to the electricity grid which again may have hampered stronger growth of wind 
energy.  
In general, the progress in the support of wind onshore energy is low in Finland, Latvia, 
Romania and Slovakia. Hardly any capacity growth has been observed in Cyprus, Malta and 
Slovenia.  
Comparing the policy effectiveness of wind onshore electricity with previous analysis 
(European Commission 2005; European Commission 2008), it becomes clear, that countries 
using quota obligations such as Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom have caught up in 
terms of policy effectiveness in particular in 2009. However, their performance still lags behind 
policy effectiveness in the group of effective feed-in tariff countries Spain, Germany, Portugal 
and Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A10: Deployment status indicator for 2009 [21]. 
Wind onshore is one of the more advanced technologies (Figure A10). The majority of MS 
meets (or exceeds) the 100 MW installation threshold. 15 MS reach the deployment status 
intermediate or higher. The results for the five advanced countries illustrate how the sub-
indicators balance each other: The absolute market size and the share of exploited potential is 
in the medium range for Portugal, Denmark and Ireland (all < 4 GW installed capacity, 25-32% 
exploited potential), but wind energy already plays an advanced role in their electricity sector 
(10 or more percent of sector consumption). Germany has developed the largest wind 
onshore market and exploited 57% of its on-shore potential, but the contribution to the 
electricity sector is with 6% not as high as in the other frontrunner countries. Spain is the only 
country that scores high on all sub-indicators. 
Figure A11 shows the range for the support level paid for electricity generated by onshore 
power plants and compares it with the minimum to average electricity generation costs. 
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Figure A11: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average tariffs are indicative) compared 
to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
Electricity generation costs of wind onshore power plants have increased during the last few 
years as a result of increasing steel prices and a strong demand for wind turbines. In general, 
almost all EU Member States appear to provide a sufficiently high support level for wind 
onshore electricity. Only in Austria and Luxemburg, the support level is just high enough to 
cover the lower limit of electricity generation costs. In contrast, countries applying a quota 
obligation with tradable green certificates such as Belgium, Italy, Poland, Romania and the UK 
provide a support level which clearly exceeds the average level of generation costs. Likewise, 
the feed-in tariff in Cyprus leads to a rather high support level of roughly 166 €/MWh at the 
maximum. In the figure, the system services costs are displayed. They notably contribute to 
the generation costs in Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands. 
 
2. Wind Offshore (RES-E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A12: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2003-2009 [21]. 
Due to the fact that the development of wind offshore is still in its initial phase, the Policy 
Effectiveness Indicator is still on a considerably lower level than in case of wind onshore. 
Comparing the policy effectiveness in the EU Member States reveals that Denmark is the 
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most successful country in supporting the market diffusion of wind off-shore technologies so 
far. Both, the average effectiveness as well as the trend in 2009 shows higher values than in 
other European countries. Finland, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
begin to achieve capacity growth of wind offshore power plants. Due to differences in the 
overall wind offshore potential, the effectiveness in Finland, where one offshore wind park 
(Kemi Ajos I & II) of 24 MW was installed between 2007 and 2008, was higher than in the 
United Kingdom, where a total of 688 MW have been installed until 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A13: Deployment status indicator for 2009 [21]. 
Only eight MS deploy wind offshore so far (Figure A13). The deployment status is still 
immature in all countries except Denmark, where wind offshore contributes with 5,3% to 
electricity consumption. Besides Denmark, also the UK exceeds the 0,5 GW threshold. The 
UK is currently clearly the most dynamic market in terms of projects under development, but 
as explained earlier this indicator does by purpose not include dynamic elements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A14: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average tariffs are indicative) compared 
to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
Figure A14 indicates cost ranges for electricity production in wind offshore power plants and 
the available support level. Electricity generation costs of wind offshore power plants are 
mainly characterised by the water depth, the distance to coast and finally by the local wind 
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conditions. Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom apparently provide a support level 
above average electricity generation costs. Given the fact that less experience with 
commercial wind offshore installations is available than in case of wind onshore, offshore 
electricity generation costs are characterised by higher uncertainties. In countries such as 
Denmark, Spain, France and the Netherlands the support granted for wind offshore appears 
to be sufficient for the lower cost potentials. In contrast, the support level available for wind 
offshore in Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden is 
clearly beyond the economic requirements in the respective countries. 
 
3. Solar Photovoltaics (RES-E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A15: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2003-2009 [21]. 
Similar to the case of wind onshore, statistical data for solar PV required to calculate the 
effectiveness indicator as shown in Figure A15 is available until 2009. However, it was 
necessary to estimate electricity generation in the year 2009, as only capacity data is 
available. Therefore, 2009 capacity data is multiplied with the ratio of electricity generation 
and capacity data in 2008.  
In general the Policy Effectiveness Indicator for PV is on a lower level than in case of wind 
onshore energy and the same goes for the Deployment Status (Figure A16). This is partly due 
to still comparatively high electricity generation costs and many markets still being in their 
infancy. In addition this fact can be explained by the large PV potentials available in most 
Member States, which means that only smaller shares of the potential can be realised in a 
year compared to technologies with a limited total potential. However, the deployment of solar 
PV in the EU has increased impressively during the last decade, increasing from merely 180 
MW in 2000 to 15,7 GW in 2009.  
Looking at the development in the individual MS, it becomes evident that Germany clearly 
dominates the PV deployment in recent years. With roughly 9,8 GW of totally installed PV 
capacity by the end of 2009, more than 60% of PV capacity installed in Europe is located in 
Germany. But other countries such as Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy also show a 
considerable market development of PV. Whilst in Spain PV capacity nearly stagnated in 2009 
as a result of cuts in feed-in tariffs and the limitation to support only 500 MW of additional PV 
capacity, Belgium and Italy show considerable average policy effectiveness due to an 
outstanding development in 2008 and 2009. 
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According to the effectiveness indicator in 2009 further growing PV markets are the Czech 
Republic and Portugal. In particular the Czech Republic experienced an exceptional boom of 
solar PV development in 2009 with an additionally installed capacity of more than 400 MW. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A16: Deployment status indicator for 2009 [21]. 
The deployment status of photovoltaics is still immature in all MS except for Germany. Seven 
further countries pass the 50 MW threshold (Spain, Belgium, Italy, Czech Republic, Portugal, 
the Netherlands and France). Compared to other RET, the untapped PV potential is huge. 
Only three countries exploit more than 5% of their mid-term PV potential: Germany (16%), 
Spain and Luxemburg (both 7%). 
The German PV market is currently by far the most important one in terms of installed 
capacity and market dynamics. This is not fully reflected by the indicator, because the 
indicator does reflect absolute market size only to a limited extent in order to be able to 
compare larger and smaller Member States. The indicator gives strong weight to production 
as share of consumption and potential, and in that respect even the German market is still 
rather small with 1,3% contribution to electricity consumption and 16% of the mid-term 
potential being exploited. 
In contrast to the case of wind onshore electricity, Figure A16 shows that the support level 
paid for electricity from Solar PV power plants is far below electricity generation costs in some 
countries. These countries include some Northern European countries with less favourable 
solar conditions such as Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Po-land, Sweden and the UK. 
However, also Southern European countries including Hungary, Malta and Romania provide a 
support level significantly below the range of electricity generation costs. Belgium and Italy, 
both countries using a quota obligation as their dominant support scheme offer special feed-in 
tariffs for Solar PV electricity. In the United Kingdom, the technology-banding option, which 
provides two certificates for one MWh of Solar PV electricity, implies a support level which is 
still far below generation costs.  
In Bulgaria, Cyprus and Czech Republic tariffs clearly exceed the level of average generation 
costs, whilst France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain support photovoltaic electricity with 
stable and technology-specific feed-in tariffs. According to Figure A17 Germany, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia apparently provide a sufficient support 
level for the lower-cost potentials of solar PV electricity. 
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Figure A17: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average tariffs are indicative) compared 
to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
 
4. Solid & Liquid Biomass (RES-E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A18: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
To calculate the effectiveness indicator for electricity generation based on solid and liquid 
biomass illustrated in Figure A18, we could resort to statistical data available until the year 
2008. The effectiveness indicator for biomass-based electricity generation comprises biomass 
incineration in pure electricity generation plants and in cogeneration plants. In addition, some 
countries such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Hungary and Sweden, also support 
co-firing of biomass in coal-fired power plants. It should be noted, that biomass-derived 
electricity generation comprises domestically available as well as imported biomass 
resources. Since the realisable potential covers exclusively the domestic biomass potential 
the effectiveness indicator may be rather high, as it is the case in Belgium.  
According to the indicator the country found to be the most effective in supporting electricity 
from solid and liquid biomass is Belgium, followed by Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Austria, Hungary, Germany and the Czech Republic. It is striking that in case of biomass 
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electricity the application of different support mechanisms appear to be effective. These 
include quota obligations in Belgium and Sweden as well as feed-in tariffs or premiums in 
Germany, Denmark, Hungary and the Netherlands. Due to the comparatively low electricity 
generation costs in particular in the Scandinavian countries, biomass-derived electricity 
benefits from technology-uniform renewables support. Given the abundant resource potential 
and crucial role of the pulp and paper industry, Scandinavian countries (Finland and Sweden) 
are traditionally characterised by a well-established market of biomass conversion 
technologies (Figure A19). Looking at the most recent development of policy effectiveness, 
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands indicate a positive trend in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A19: Deployment status indicator for solid biomass in 2008 [21]. 
Figure A19 shows the deployment status of the solid biomass technology mix. As explained 
above, solid biomass is a very heterogeneous category as it comprises different technologies 
(pure biomass plants and co-firing) and both domestic and imported biomass. This limits 
comparability between countries: co-firing in existing fossil fuel plants is by definition a more 
advanced market than the use of pure biomass power plants; the exploitation of domestic 
biomass resources is not as meaningful as for other RES, as it does not reflect biomass 
imports and exports. 
Despite these limitations, the frontrunners that reach advanced deployment status are 
obvious: Finland, Sweden and Austria. Also Belgium reaches advanced deployment status 
due to its high share of exploited potential. Further nine countries reach intermediate 
Deployment Status, which makes solid biomass the most advanced technology category 
besides large hydro. 
Figure A20 illustrates the current support level and the generation costs of biomass electricity 
generation. Since both costs and the support level may vary strongly for the many different 
types of biomass resources, price ranges are shown for electricity production from forestry 
residues. However, there are considerable differences in generation costs even within this 
option. This is partly due to the fact that the support systems of countries with comparatively 
low minimum generation costs allow the application of cost-efficient co-firing. Moreover, it 
should be added that the generation costs in bio-mass sectors are also heavily dependent on 
plant size.  
The general support situation for biomass-based electricity generation in the EU appears to be 
rather favourable. Again, the support level in some countries is considerably above generation 
costs. These countries apply both feed-in tariffs, such as the Czech Republic, Germany, 
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Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal and quota obligations such as Belgium, Italy, Poland and 
the United Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A20: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2008 (average tariffs are indicative) compared 
to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
 
5. Small-Scale Hydro (RES-E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A21: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
In most European countries the additional potential for the exploitation of hydropower is small. 
Greece shows the highest average effectiveness due to several new hydropower installations 
between 2003 and 2008 and very limited additional exploitation potential. Some Eastern 
European countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic have promoted small-scale hydropower effectively. The market development in 
these countries is still feasible since there is still some unexploited potential available. 
The Deployment Status of small hydro is intermediate for most countries that have 
hydropower potential. Austria, Slovenia, Italy and Sweden are the only countries that reach 
advanced Deployment Status. The available potential for small hydro is very limited. 10 
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countries have very low potential, i.e. lower than 1% of the electricity consumption, and are 
therefore not shown in the chart. With the exception of Slovakia and Latvia, all other countries 
already exploit more than 25% of their potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A22: Deployment status indicator in 2009 [21]. 
In case of small-scale hydropower or hydropower plants with a capacity below 10 MW the 
country-specific costs show very large differences. It can be seen that the existing feed-in 
tariffs are quite well adjusted to generation costs. Similar to the case of wind onshore, the 
support level resulting from the application of a quota obligation appears to exceed clearly 
electricity generation costs of small-scale hydropower plants in Belgium, Italy, Romania and 
the United Kingdom. This can be explained by the fact that electricity generation costs of 
small-scale hydropower are at the lower end of the cost range of renewable electricity. 
Likewise, the support level resulting from feed-in tariffs are considerably above generation 
costs in Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia 
and Slovakia. Due to the fact that there is still some unexploited potential available this 
technology is especially relevant for these new Member States. In contrast, the available 
potential for the use of small-scale hydropower is already exploited to a large extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A23: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) for hydro<10 MW in 2008 (average tariffs are 
indicative) compared to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
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6. Biomass Centralized Heating Plants (RES-H) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A24: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
According to the indicator depicted in Figure A24, in particular Scandinavian (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden) and Baltic countries (Estonia and Lithuania) as well as Austria have 
supported centralised biomass heating plants effectively between 2002 and 2008. 
Additionally, the ascending trend of the indicator in 2007/2008 points to a continuation of the 
effective policy support in most of these countries. 
Several factors, such as the tradition of Northern European countries to use grid-connected 
heating systems with an existing infrastructure of district-heating networks, the biomass 
availability and the sufficiently available heat demand certainly have an effect on the 
successful support of biomass-derived district heating and CHP-plants. Policy effectiveness in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland and Slovakia appears to be on the upgrade. 
Given the low heat demand in Southern European countries, only little effort is made to 
support heating technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A25: Deployment status indicator in 2008 [21]. 
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Figure A25 shows the deployment status of grid connected biomass heat in the EU-27, which 
varies considerably. The market is very advanced in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, 
Denmark, and Finland) with contributions to heat consumption between 9 and 20% and a 
potential exploitation between 57 and 72%. They are followed by Lithuania and Austria that 
also reach advanced deployment status. Latvia and Estonia reach intermediate deployment 
status. All other countries score immature, even though five of them reach the 500 MW 
threshold. 
Figure A26 shows the range of the remuneration level for heat generated by RES district 
heating plants and compares it with the minimum to average heat generation costs. District 
heating by RES in this section typically refers to large biomass plants, which produce 
centralised heat for a heating grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A26: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average remuneration levels are 
indicative) compared to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
Sweden has the highest level of remuneration. It is comprised of the conventional reference 
price for grid connected heat and the level of remuneration of RES district heating. The main 
support instruments applied in Sweden are direct subsidies and exemption from energy, CO2, 
sulphur and the NOx taxes. France is ranked second with a maximum remuneration level of 54 
€/MWh. Investors in RES-H grid in France benefit from a regional feed-in premium for large-
scale installations or from a zero-interest loan for small-scale district heating. Italy and 
Portugal also have above-average levels of remuneration in the range of 50 €/MWh. In the 
EU-12 Member States relevant support of district heat is provided in the Czech Republic, in 
Latvia and Slovenia. 
 
7. Biomass Decentralized Heating Plants (RES-H) 
When looking at the effectiveness of support for small decentralised biomass heating plants 
(boilers and stoves) in Figure A27 a different picture emerges. In general, the policy 
effectiveness on EU-level for small-scale biomass heating plants is higher than for large 
centralised systems. It is no longer Northern European (except Denmark) countries which are 
the most effective, as is the case with centralised heating plants, but the Czech Republic 
Hungary, Belgium, Germany and Romania. 
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Figure A27: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A28: Deployment status indicator in 2008 [21]. 
Figure A28 shows the Deployment Status of biomass heat installations that are not connected 
to any heating network, i.e. mainly traditional and modern wood combustion technologies. The 
Deployment Status is generally mature. 13 countries have reached fully advanced 
Deployment Status, i.e. they exploit more than 60% of their potential and non-grid biomass 
covers at least 10% of their heat consumption. The leading countries are the Scandinavian 
countries, the Baltic States and Austria. Further seven countries score advanced, with high 
shares in exploited potential, but lower contributions to their heat consumption. The only 
countries that exploit less than 60% of their solid biomass potential are Ireland and 
Luxemburg. Malta and the UK are not shown as their potential is assumed to be below 1% of 
heat consumption.  
The high scores for exploited biomass potential can be explained by the fact that Europe has 
only limited additional potential that can be harvested in a sustainable way. In that sense, 
biomass technologies have a structural advantage when the Deployment Status is calculated 
compared to RET with vast potential like solar energy. 
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Figure A29: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average remuneration levels are 
indicative) compared to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
Cyprus shows the highest remuneration level among all Member States. This is due to a 
relatively high reference price for heat non-grid and investment subsidies that amount to 55% 
in Cyprus. In terms of the average remuneration level, Sweden ranks first. Here, biomass heat 
non-grid is promoted by investment incentives and tax exemption. Furthermore, Greece, 
Portugal, Italy and Belgium have high remuneration levels. There is no promotion of biomass 
heat non-grid via investment grants, tax exemption or fiscal incentives for Estonia, Spain, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Romania. 
 
8. Solar Thermal Heat (RES-H) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A30: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
Figure A30 illustrates the effectiveness indicator for solar thermal heating appliances, 
including glazed and unglazed solar collectors covering the time horizon from 2002 to 2008. 
Glazed collectors may be further differentiated in flat plate and vacuum collectors. The market 
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development of solar thermal heating appliances in the EU was rather moderate until 2005, 
but started to accelerate in 2006. Given the vast available potential for solar thermal heating 
the effectiveness indicator in the EU is still on a comparatively low level. But in particular the 
2007/2008 trend reflects two years of impressive growth corresponding to an additionally 
installed capacity of 3,2 GWth. Most of the growth in this year took place in Germany with an 
annual in-stalled capacity of 1,3 GWth in 2008. However, market development of this sector is 
expected to contract as a result of budget constraints for the investment incentives provided 
by the "Marktanreizprogramm" (MAP) as of 2010. 
Countries showing a high effectiveness are Austria, Cyprus and Greece, followed by 
Germany, Spain, Portugal and the Czech Republic. Austria offers stable support conditions for 
solar thermal heat by providing investment incentives on state level. In addition, Austria is very 
active in the field of communication campaigns, encouraging therewith the population to invest 
in solar thermal heating applications. The effective support of solar-based domestic hot water 
heating systems in Spain stimulated by obligations established in building codes (CTE – 
Código Técnico de la Edificación) is expected to slow down for the future due to the housing 
crisis.  
Although France and Italy rank among the top five countries in terms of total capacity installed 
the effectiveness appears to be moderate due to a vast available solar thermal heating 
potential. The French incentive system for solar thermal heating systems providing a 50% tax 
credit on equipment costs and additional support from local authorities appears to be one of 
the most attractive in Europe. Similarly, Italy attained a considerable growth of solar thermal 
heating between 2006 and 2008 by means of a tax reduction scheme. For the future some of 
the Italian regions and municipalities are planning the introduction of obligations for newly 
constructed buildings. 
Figure A31 shows the Deployment Status of solar thermal. Only three countries score 
intermediate: Cyprus, Greece and Austria. Malta is one of the smallest markets in absolute 
size, but one of the largest markets in relative terms. Germany is by far the largest solar 
thermal market, but this hardly shows due to the rather low share in potential and 
consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A31: Deployment status indicator in 2009 [21]. 
Figure A32 shows the range for the remuneration level for solar thermal heat and compares it 
with the minimum to average heat generation costs. 
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Figure A32: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average remuneration levels are 
indicative) compared to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
France, Portugal and Austria have the highest maximum remuneration for solar thermal heat 
with levels of 215 €/MWh, 188 €/MWh and 184 €/MWh respectively. In France, there is a 
regional feed-in premium in place for large-scale installations and an income tax and VAT 
reduction and a zero-interest loan for small-scale installations. Besides investment incentives, 
the promotion consists of a tax credit and a VAT decrease in Portugal. In Austria, solar 
thermal heat is promoted by a direct investment incentive and an income tax reduction. There 
is a building obligation for solar thermal heating in Spain that is not accounted for in the 
efficiency indicator. 
There is no support in Denmark, Spain4, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. This leaves those 
countries at the price level of heat non-grid which is in the range of 64 €/MWh to 82 €/MWh. 
 
9. Ground-source Heat Pumps (RES-H) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A33: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
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Figure A33 outlines the effectiveness indicator for ground-source heat pumps covering the 
time horizon between 2002 and 2008. Given the still immature markets (Figure A34) the 
average effectiveness is mainly on a level below 5 % with the exception of Sweden. Besides 
Sweden, countries showing a comparatively high performance are Hungary, Finland and 
Bulgaria. In general Eastern European countries appear to be quite effective in supporting 
ground-source heat pumps. To achieve the effective policy support, investment grants and 
fiscal incentives are predominantly applied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A34: Deployment status indicator in 2008 [21]. 
The markets for ground source heat pumps are still immature in the vast majority of Member 
States. The most advanced market is Sweden with 47% of the potential being exploited and 
3,3% contribution to heat consumption, which results in intermediate (almost advanced) 
Deployment Status. Finland follows in some distance. Still, 13 countries meet the 50 MW 
threshold. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A35: Support level ranges (average to maximum support) in 2009 (average remuneration levels are 
indicative) compared to the long term marginal generation costs (minimum to average costs) [21]. 
From the above figure it becomes evident that France has the highest remuneration level in 
terms of the maximum and the average. Heat pumps are promoted by either a combination of 
an income tax, a VAT reduction and a zero-interest loan or by a regional feed-premium. The 
remuneration level in Cyprus, Greece and Portugal is in the same range as France.  
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No support schemes are in place in Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia. This leaves those countries at the price level of heat non-grid which is 
in the range of 64 €/MWh to 86 €/MWh. 
 
10. Geothermal Heat (RES-H) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A36: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
Geothermal heat shows even a lower effectiveness level than ground-source heat pumps. 
Hungary and Portugal perform strongest in supporting geo-thermal heat, followed by Greece, 
Austria, the United Kingdom and Italy, which have achieved at least a positive average 
effectiveness between 2002 and 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A37: Deployment status indicator in 2008 [21]. 
The Deployment Status of geothermal heat shows that this RET is still immature in almost all 
Member States. The most advanced market is Hungary with 2% contribution to heat 
contribution and a potential exploitation of 30%, followed by Romania. 
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11. Biofuels for Transport (RES-T) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A38: Policy effectiveness indicator in the period 2002-2008 [21]. 
The policy effectiveness for biofuel consumption appears to be on comparatively high level. 
According to the effectiveness indicator shown in Figure A38, in particular Germany, Austria 
and Luxembourg have effectively increased biofuel consumption in their countries. Germany 
showed a high effectiveness until 2008 but German biofuel consumption started to decrease 
from 2008 onwards. This effect cannot be observed in Figure A38, since the calculation of 
moving averages smoothes this effect in 2008. This fact can be explained by the total phase-
out of the tax exemption for biofuel blends starting in 2007 and the low quota for biodiesel, 
which was over-achieved already before 2007. Furthermore the tax reductions for pure 
biofuels are gradually reduced until 2012. The phase-out of the tax exemption had a stronger 
impact on the German biodiesel market than on the bioethanol market, due to the different 
quotas for biodiesel and bioethanol. As depicted in Figure A39, the predominant part of the 
bio-fuel consumed in the EU is biodiesel, but the share of ethanol and other biofuels shows a 
slightly increasing trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A39: Composition of biofuel consumption 2005-2008 [21]. 
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Since biofuels are assumed to be an internationally traded commodity in this case not the cost 
levels between Member States are compared with the remuneration / support levels, but only 
the support levels have been assessed. The support for biofuel consumption in EU Member 
States is often a combination of an obligation and tax reductions or only one of these two 
instruments is applied. 
In case of biofuel obligations the level of support is very difficult to assess since the prices 
implied by these obligations are typically not public (different to the case of quota systems in 
the electricity sector where TGC prices are generally transparent). Therefore we show the 
level of tax reductions for biofuels in each Member State. This is shown in Figure A40 for the 
case of biodiesel. For some countries like Bulgaria, Finland and the Netherlands only a quota 
obligation is applied. Other countries such as Germany apply a mixed support based on quota 
obligations and tax reductions, whereas tax reductions are subsequently phased out. The 
overall picture shows a rather homogenous level of support in terms of tax reduction among 
EU Member States. Figure A41 shows the level of tax reductions for the case of bioethanol.  
In addition, any kind of double-support should be avoided, as it happened with bio-diesel 
imports from the US, benefitting therewith from US as well as from European support 
schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A40: Level of tax reductions for biodiesel in 2009 [21]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A41: Level of tax reductions for bioethanol in 2009 [21]. 
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Overall Support Schemes Policy 
In general, the support policy performance is rather heterogeneous depending on the final 
energy sector, the renewable energy technology (RET) and the individual Member State. The 
main messages from the analysis of the policy performance achieved in all EU Member States 
in recent years are the following:  
Relationship between support level and generation costs  
If support levels are below generation costs, little or no capacity growth can be observed. 
There can be exceptions when investments are motivated by other than economic reasons 
(e.g. ecologic benefits). High support levels compared to generation costs do not in all cases 
lead to substantial capacity growth. Usually this is due to flaws in the support instrument or 
non-economic barriers in other parts of the regulatory framework (permitting, grid connection, 
electricity market structure, etc.). Too high support levels can also lead to unnecessarily high 
sup-port costs.  
Relationship between market deployment status and policy effectiveness  
Often a correlation between deployment status and policy effectiveness can be observed: 
Markets with a higher deployment status tend to grow faster. However, some examples can 
be found where markets with a low deployment status also grow very quickly as e.g. observed 
for wind onshore development in Hungary. If adequate policies are applied and non-economic 
barriers are removed, markets can grow quickly without having an extremely long track-record 
in the past, partially by using spill-over effects from other markets. If the market development 
has already achieved a very advanced stage, the effectiveness may decrease due to 
saturation effects or reduced policy efforts (see e.g. wind onshore in Denmark).  
Comparison of support in the electricity and heat sector  
Support levels for renewable heat generally appear to provide less profit than the ones 
provided in the electricity sector, despite the low generation costs of many RES-H 
technologies. On average, policy effectiveness in the heat sector is also lower than in the 
electricity sector.  
Policy effectiveness of promotion schemes in the electricity sector is comparatively high in 
several countries, in particular with regard to mature, but still evolving technologies such as 
wind onshore and biomass conversion. Owing to the existence of a legal framework and 
sectoral (indicative) targets since 2001 some RES-E technologies including wind onshore 
have experienced considerable growth in several countries. Therefore, more experience is 
available for RES-support in the electricity sector than in the heat sector. 
RES-E Support Schemes Policy 
Comparison of support scheme performance  
Compared to previous analyses the policy effectiveness in quota-using countries in the last 
two years shows improving values for low-cost technologies (wind on-shore and biomass), but 
in general feed-in systems still appear to be more effective than quota obligations. It should be 
noted that in the same period e.g. in the UK quota system risk for investors has been reduced 
substantially – from an investment risk perspective the system evolved in the direction of a 
less risky feed-in premium system. 
Relationship between market deployment status and support scheme  
Depending on the deployment status and the maturity of a technology, different support 
instruments may be more or less suited. For example, technology-uniform quota obligations 
appear to be more effective in stimulating more mature technologies such as wind onshore or 
biomass-based renewable power plants than in promoting less mature technologies such as 
wind offshore or solar PV. Many Member States act accordingly and apply different support 
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instruments for different technologies. For example very often a feed-in premium or a quota 
obligation for large-scale and/or mature technologies is combined with a feed-in tariff for small-
scale and/or less mature technologies.  
Support level comparison  
The analysis of the economic characteristics of RES-E support and electricity generation costs 
reveals that the remuneration granted under a FIT-system tends to be lower for lower-cost 
technologies than under a quota obligation scheme. In contrast, the remuneration level based 
on electricity price and TGC-price in case of technology-uniform quota obligation schemes is 
generally lower than under technology-specific support. In most cases this support level is 
insufficient to incentivise investment for more cost-intensive technologies such as solar PV.  
To trigger additional growth of cost-intensive technologies which do not receive sufficient 
support from technology-uniform quota obligations, some countries offer additional incentives 
such as technology-specific minimum prices or feed-in tariffs. For example, Belgium offers 
minimum prices for solar PV electricity, Italy uses an additional feed-in premium for Solar PV 
and the United Kingdom has introduced feed-in tariffs for small-scale applications with a 
capacity below 5 MW. Technology-banding within the quota, which is applied in the United 
Kingdom, can help to support cost-intensive technologies like wind offshore, but is less 
suitable for small-scale projects than feed-in tariffs.  
Relationship between potential profit and policy effectiveness  
The results have shown that high potential profit opportunities do not necessarily lead to high 
policy effectiveness. In particular in case of less mature technologies such as wind offshore, 
an economically attractive profit level – calculated with uniform risk premiums – appears to be 
insufficient to stimulate capacity growth. Uncertainties related to technological, financial and 
administrative factors still appear to hamper a faster growth of these technologies. Also 
political uncertainties about the future development of the support scheme (e.g. price 
development of TGC-prices) may involve higher risk premium requirements or reduced policy 
effectiveness.  
Policy costs  
When evaluating policy effectiveness of a support scheme, stimulated capacity growth also 
may develop faster than envisaged and therewith cause high policy costs. This appears to be 
a risk of technology-specific support. Thus, the application of feed-in systems carries the risk 
of involving considerable policy costs for consumers if the market for a cost-intensive 
technology is booming unexpectedly, as happened with the development of solar PV power 
plants in Spain, the Czech Republic in 2008/2009 or currently in Germany. This risk exists to a 
lesser extent also in quota systems with technology-specific banding or minimum prices.  
Identification of best practice countries  
The leading countries in terms of effectively supporting wind onshore energy are Germany, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland. At the same time all these countries show an advanced market 
deployment status. Looking at the effectiveness of policy support for wind offshore, it becomes 
clear that market development is just starting in a few countries (United Kingdom, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Denmark). Examples for an effective promotion of solar PV are Germany, the 
Czech Republic and Italy. In terms of supporting biomass-based electricity some Member 
States already have a very advanced deployment status. Of the others, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have achieved the most effective policy support in 2008. In case of biogas power 
plants, Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom still apply very effective support schemes.  
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RES-H Support Schemes Policy 
Policy effectiveness and infrastructure  
The existence of district heating grids is crucial for the realisation of renewable-based 
centralised heating systems. This means that depending on the situation of the gas and 
district heat grid no short-term structural changes are feasible. Similarly, the competition 
between gas and district heating grids may have an impact on the effectiveness of policy 
support for centralised biomass heating applications. For example, the expansion of the gas 
network in Greece in recent years appears to hamper a stronger development of district 
heating grids.  
Technology-specific observations  
Long reinvestment cycles limit the diffusion rate for the integration of renewable heating 
systems that are integrated in buildings.  
Burden sharing  
The dependence of financial incentives – predominantly in terms of investment grants – on the 
public budget and a potential stop- and go policy creates stronger uncertainty for investors in 
the heat sector than common in the electricity sector, since RES-E support is mainly based on 
long-term commitments. For example the German "Marktanreizprogramm" (MAP) has been 
suspended due to budgetary reasons and re-launched recently in summer 2010.  
Identification of best practice countries  
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania and Sweden have effectively promoted bio-mass-based 
centralised heating plants in recent years with an ascending trend in 2008. Several factors, 
such as the existing infrastructure of district heating net-works in Northern European 
countries, the biomass availability and the sufficiently available heat demand certainly have an 
effect on the successful support of bio-mass-derived district heating and large-scale CHP-
plants. 
In general, the support for decentralised biomass heating plants is on a higher level than that 
of centralised plants. According to our analysis Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany and 
Romania have shown the most effective support policies for decentralised biomass heating in 
terms of the policy effectiveness indicator. 
Owing to a high remaining resource potential the policy effectiveness for the sup-port of solar 
thermal heating is on rather moderate level. Austria, Greece and Cyprus rank among the 
group of leading countries in terms of effective support policy. In Austria, communication 
campaigns and investment incentives have primarily contributed to this positive market 
development. 
Ground-source heat pumps have been effectively promoted by using obligations in Sweden 
and investment grants and fiscal incentives Hungary and Finland. The transition to the use of 
heat pumps in Sweden was favoured by a previously high share of electric heating.  
RES-T Support Schemes Policy 
Despite the uniform European biofuel target, deployment varies significantly across Member 
States. 
The support of biofuels in recent year is characterised by a comparatively high effectiveness. 
However, the development in one of the leading countries Germany started to decrease from 
2008 onwards due to the phase-out of the tax exemption and the low biodiesel quota. 
In general a rather homogenous level of support in terms of tax reduction among EU Member 
States could be observed. 
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